When it will happen, no one is quite sure. But in the near future, Egyptians will elect a new People's Assembly.
Islamists won last winter's elections, but now non-Islamists are talking about coalitions and alliances, and looking for a formula to break the Islamist dominance.
A good political system provides checks and balances. With Mohammed Morsi in the presidency, the parliament needs a strong, constructive force from the opposition to call the administration to account.
However, few people anywhere get into political life to provide checks and balances. They jump in to support their beliefs - the worldview that shapes their opinion on how things should be organised - and to support clear-cut policies designed to put that worldview into effect.
However, that is not particularly clear among the non-Islamist groupings in Egypt.
Many call these groupings "secular" or "liberal", but those terms are not very useful in the Egyptian context. Those who label themselves that way run the risk of being ostracised and slandered, by radical religious forces, as "haters of religion".
Most political activists who call themselves liberal or secular do not appear to have a well-thought-out political ideology. True, they are reacting to what they perceive to be injustices in society and government. But on the level of ideas, they have not moved past reacting. Nor have they provided well-thought-out policies within a cohesive political framework.
In fact, some have often taken quite illiberal positions. Many of them, for example, supported the unsuccessful presidential campaign of Ahmed Shafiq - a man described by human rights activist Manal El Tibi, in her resignation letter from the Islamist-dominated Constitutional Assembly, as "president for an authoritarian, corrupt state for the military and the intelligence apparatus".
Others say they advocate secularism and yet are quite keen for the state to be involved in religious affairs, fearful of what Salafi movements and the Muslim Brotherhood might do in this field if given a free hand. Is this genuine secularism based on values, or simply a reaction?
To be sure, some are genuinely liberal or secular, having studied and imbibed such notions - but they are few. In Egypt, "liberal" and "secular" usually refer to identities based on personal attitudes and individual lifestyles, rather than signalling intellectual or political positions based on concepts and theories.
And yet, many commentators (in the West and elsewhere) prefer to use those terms, because they make the situation more familiar and easier to understand.
Ultimately this only increases confusion, and does not improve analysis. Talking about liberalism and secularism without connecting these ideas to the actual experiences and history of Egypt will only leave these political forces open to being dismissed as bad copies of the West.
The irony is that something similar could be said about Egyptian Islamism: many of its adherents are essentially "identity" Islamists. There are Salafi political parties, but they are based on identity rather than a "pure" ideology.
Indeed, Al Dawla Al Islamiyyah, the "Islamic State" notion supported by many Islamists, is based on the nation-state concept derived from the Treaty of Westphalia in 17th century Europe.
In fact, much of contemporary Islamist political discourse appears to be based (knowingly or not) on European political thought, adorned with Islamic vocabulary. This is more identity than politics: or, to put it another way, more identity politics.
What all these groupings have in common is that they are absent from the field of real politics; they do not proclaim comprehensive policy platforms based on the real issues facing Egyptians. Education, health service, job creation, taxation, social benefits: all these matters, and others, seems to have been swept under the rug, leaving only the polarising issues of identity as the battleground in the struggle for power.
There is another option. When citizens in next-door Libya finally had free elections, it wasn't the Islamists who won. Those who did win were not liberal, not secularist, not Islamists. Their model may be particular to Libya, but one aspect of it can be seen as universal: the idea of coming up with something new.
There is an opportunity in this region to begin new political narratives, ones that go beyond identity labels bereft of depth, and that are rooted in the heritage of these lands. That version of politics can give rise to indigenous political theories that address the aims and desires of the peoples of this region.
That kind of narrative has a chance to lead to parties that offer actual policies to address the real problems of the peoples of this region, instead of just relying on identity politics.
Meaningful political life is a right for the Arab peoples, and it is the duty for their leaders. It would truly be revolutionary - and isn't this an age of revolution?
Dr HA Hellyer is a non-resident fellow of the Brookings Institution based in Cairo
On Twitter: @hahellyer
