* This transcript has been edited
During my visit to Iran I met with some officials as well as different research centres that are affiliated with different power centres in the Iranian leadership. And all of them expressed that in the first 48 hours the Iranian leadership was surprised by the speed, efficiency, and level of organisation that was shown by the groups carrying out the attack on Mosul.
Will Iran accept another Shiite leader other than the current prime minister Nouri Al Maliki?
They will keep on supporting the Iraqi leadership including Mr Maliki. But if the Iraqi parliament decides to go for somebody else, to choose another prime minister, they would also support that prime minister...The Iranians are not wedded to Mr Maliki, they are much more comfortable, they have much more strategic depth inside the Iraqi leadership.
In Syria they feel that without Assad the regime will implode. They are seeing more and more that Assad is the key to keeping that regime in power and keeping the Syrian regime in power is a core Iranian interest.
How strong are Iran’s ties to other Shiite leaders in Iraq, such as Muqdata Al Sadr? Are they as strong as Iran’s ties to Mr Al Maliki?
The relationship between the Iranians and Sadr has always been an interesting one. It is a nuanced one. And I think there is definitely a strong relationship, but Sadr has always tried to keep a certain distance. Sadr also plays an important role for the Iranian leadership by keeping his relationship open with various Sunni components. Iran is interested in having an inclusive political process in Iraq. Until now they thought Maliki could provide that. I think they are increasingly coming to see that Maliki is the single most important obstacle to having an inclusive political process in Iraq. And in that respect the Iranians and the Americans share interest in seeing that inclusive political process launched.
It appears that Iran has maintained a fairly sectarian policy in the Middle East. Was there any recognition in Tehran that this policy might have been a mistake?
Not at all. In fact, this is a theocratic regime. This is a theocratic leadership. And despite the differences among different groups within that leadership they all are united around the common interest of preserving the regime. This regime by its nature is sectarian. Although the Iranian leadership tries to look at itself as and portray itself as an Islamist revolution and not as a Shiite revolution, for practical purposes it has projected itself as protector of the Shiites in the region, in the Middle East, and around the world. And so it is a choice that the Iranian leadership is facing going forward. If it is interested in playing a constructive role in the region: does it it wants to be a regional power or does it want to be a Shiite power. Up till now it has behaved as a Shiite power and not as a regional power. We will see, whether post a possible nuclear deal, between Iran and the P5+1 whether Iran will have more resources or more time to devote to regional policy. And if so what choice will it make? Will it continue to be a Shiite power or will it start looking for a new modus vivendi with the other big power in the region, the Saudis and other members of the Gulf to carve a regional policy that is accommodating of all regional player’s interests.
There’s been some recent signs of rapprochement between Iran and some of the Arab Gulf states. Do you think some of this rapprochement might bear fruit? Might they unite against the Islamic State?
I sensed a sincere desire, at least among the people I met with, for having a new relationship with the neighbours. Right now, the time and the efforts and the political capital that the leadership has is being spent on this deal with the P5+1 on the nuclear deal. It was clear to me that this was priority number one for the Iranian leadership and different power centres in Iran. I think if that deal is reached, then there is a possibility for the Iranian leadership to have the manuvering room to start opening up to exploring new avenues for redrawing a regional policy.
Do you see Iran’s support for Bashar Al Assad in Syria shifting?
Whether with time they are going to start cultivating different perspectives about whether the regime can survive with or without Assad, we will see.
For now, this is prevailing view in Tehran: Without Assad there is no regime.
foreign.desk@thenational.ae