Abu Dhabi // Gulf countries, like nervous US allies across the globe, are grappling with what a Donald Trump presidency will mean for their crucial bilateral relations and the increasingly chaotic region – but one area of cautious optimism is the next administration’s potential stance on Iran.
During the election campaign Mr Trump repeatedly contradicted himself on foreign affairs and there was a lack of clarity around both the specifics and larger strategic framework that would guide the reality television star and businessman’s foreign policy once in office.
His appointments and potential nominations for key cabinet positions since his election may offer some insight, but are similarly confusing – many of the personalities mentioned so far hold opposite views to each other and to what Mr Trump has said.
“With Trump, we have no idea what to expect,” one senior Gulf official said before the election. Anwar Gargash, minister of state for foreign affairs, said just after the election that it had “heightened uncertainty regarding the future direction of global politics – there are certainly more exclamation marks than answers.”
And while leaders and officials in GCC countries are still watching and thinking about how to approach the new administration, there is a sense that there are a number of areas where perceived interests could be furthered more than during Barack Obama’s tenure, especially if there is a return in Washington to a containment approach to Iran. This is despite the fact that another thread of Mr Trump’s foreign policy thinking is a limiting of US commitments abroad and even working more closely with a central adversary and Iranian ally, Russia.
Mr Trump said during the campaign that “dismantling” the Iran nuclear deal would be his number one priority in office, but since his election he and a foreign policy adviser, Walid Phares, have signalled that the president-elect plans to at most try to renegotiate aspects of the multilateral accord to give the US more leverage.
In the Gulf, there is consensus that ripping up the deal – which has successfully, if for a limited time frame, taken Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb off the table – would be a mistake.
“To scrap that willy-nilly, as it were, will have ramifications, and I don’t know if something else can be put in its place to guarantee that Iran will not go that route if the agreement is scrapped,” said Prince Turki Al Faisal, the former Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to the US, at a recent event in Washington.
The question is now becoming how exactly will the new White House and its Republican-dominated Congress apply pressure on Iran, to either set the stage for renegotiating the deal or pushing back on Tehran’s regional policies.
Mr Obama largely subordinated his broader objectives in the Middle East to maintain the nuclear deal. His administration has not looked to punish Tehran for two temporary violations of heavy water limits under the deal, and has encouraged European and other investors that it is safe to do business with Iran – both positions that a Trump administration is unlikely to take.
“One of the challenges of the post-deal environment is that no matter what ended up happening you always weighed taking actions against Iranian policies against the risk to the deal,” said a former Obama administration official. “In that instance, the deal always won out.”
The deal was, by Mr Obama’s calculations, most vulnerable during its first year and his desire to maintain it clouded – in the minds of many in the region – his efforts to show that Iran was still viewed as an enemy and that he was committed to enhancing Gulf countries’ security capabilities.
“The next administration won’t be burdened by that and may be more willing to test the proposition that the Iranians will walk away,” the former US official said.
If the Trump administration were to attempt to ramp up pressure on Iran to renegotiate aspects of the deal, they, more likely than not, will fail, according to many observers. As a multilateral accord signed by major world powers and ratified by a United Nations security council resolution, renegotiating even parts of the deal would be extremely difficult.
“That’s a dashed expectation,” said Andrew Parasiliti, director of the Center for Global Risk and Security at the Rand Corporation in Washington. “There is no sign in Russia, China, the EU or anywhere else – [other than] in the absence of a breach in the deal by Iran – [that] that’s going to go forward.”
Even if the US wanted to more vigorously enforce the deal and take smaller violations to the security council, to get Russia and China on-board would require making compromises with them on other issues.
Most Gulf countries view Iran’s push for more power in the region as their primary security concern. When it comes to regional US policies a Trump administration may be more proactive in trying to contain Iran than his predecessor, which the Gulf would embrace enthusiastically.
Mr Trump’s nominations may give some road map for the kinds of policies that can be expected. The front-runner to be the next defence secretary, retired marine corps general James Mattis, gave a speech in Washington in April that gave a broad view into his thinking on Iran. Gen Mattis, who has good personal relationships with many Gulf officials, maintained that closer cooperation with regional allies is key, and he also supported keeping the Iran deal.
“It remains the single-most belligerent actor in the Middle East, and as the commander of Centcom …. every morning I woke up and the first three questions I had, had to do with Iran and Iran and Iran,” he said.
But the same speech also showed that Gen Mattis has deep disagreements with key Trump positions and raises questions about just how much input even senior foreign policy and security officials will have in forming policy.
Mr Trump’s promise to scale back Washington’s traditional role as guarantor of the post-Second World War global order and make relations with allies more transactional, has caused deep concern for many in the Gulf – not least with regard to Iran – but there are also potential interests that could be served.
“Whether he agrees or disagrees with us, this is a different issue, but at least you have a clear vision, you know how to manoeuvre yourself,” said Mustafa Alani, a security expert at the Gulf Research Center who is close to the Saudi interior ministry. “With Obama we were basically lost.”
The next administration’s potentially more real politik approach that emphasises counter-terrorism and deal making, and eschews Washington’s traditional relative balancing of interests with values such as democratic reform and human rights, is also seen by some as a positive development.
“If his intention is to fight terrorism he will need us; if he is going to contain Russia in the Middle East he needs us; if he is going to contain Iran he needs us,” Mr Alani said. “We have a value, and he’s a businessman, he understands when people have a value.”
There is some hope that if he does ask partners in the Gulf to do more against terrorist groups and Iran, this could complement their own desire to enhance their military capabilities and ability to project power in the region and beyond.
But there are too many unknowns to be certain. “You have to go back to what the new administration considers the guiding principles of American foreign policy – what limits American involvement? What limits risk exposure? Does indefinite support for regional wars [such as Yemen] do that? Those are the kinds of questions leaders here are going to have to ask themselves,” the former Obama administration official said. “I don’t think they get the blank check of support just because the US doesn’t have to” involve itself in the region.
Inevitably, any scaling back of the US footprint in the Gulf and an isolationist Trump White House will entail hedging by Washington’s regional partners, and engagement with other regional and world powers aimed at reducing their dependence on the US.
“In today’s world, the stability of the region cannot rest on American engagement alone,” Dr Gargash said. “Other actors, including Russia, China, India and the EU also have an important role to play, which is why our foreign policy seeks to consolidate relations with these actors.”
tkhan@thenational.ae
