If the first Gulf War was a success, it certainly doesn’t seem so today

Alasdair Soussi looks at the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait 25 years ago.

A group of Kuwaitis greet a convoy of Egyptians armored vehicles moving along a highway near Kuwait City in February 1991 as Kuwait is liberated. .(Sadayuki Mikamd / AP)

It all seems so long ago now that, with the Middle East’s current travails, few should pay it any real heed.

But the end of the first Gulf War – 25 years ago yesterday, when America’s then-president, George HW Bush, triumphantly declared a permanent ceasefire after Iraq relinquished control of Kuwait – proved to be a critical chapter in the region’s history and remains crucial to any understanding of the Arab world.

Back in 1991, it had all seemed so clean – as clean as any war can be. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990, and refused to comply with a United Nations ultimatum demanding he withdraw. Operation Desert Storm began the following January. A devastating US-led aerial campaign, involving Britain and Saudi Arabia, was followed by a land assault in February, which caused the Iraqi army to retreat and assured victory for the allies.

On the face of things, the liberation of Kuwait appeared to usher in a new – and more targeted – kind of warfare. It was a television extravaganza, a conflict that wowed the American public with its pioneering use of the cruise missile and its charismatic general, “Stormin’” Norman Schwarzkopf. It was built upon adept diplomacy and legitimised by an explicit UN resolution – both of which were severely lacking in the second Gulf War 12 years later.

From a US perspective, Operation Desert Storm was widely hailed because it seemed to consign the country’s disastrous military campaign in Vietnam to history.

So far so good – if only the legacy of the first Gulf War wasn’t seen through the prism of the region’s turbulent aftermath. The events of September 11, 2001 came just 10 years after Mr Bush’s victory in the Gulf and during the presidency of his son, George W Bush, who launched a second Gulf War in 2003. Unlike Mr Bush, who stopped short of advancing on Baghdad, Mr Bush Jr went all the way – only to fall foul of sketchy post-war planning that, despite Saddam Hussein’s removal, capture and eventual execution, has haunted Iraq and the whole region ever since.

The Arab Spring promised much, but delivered little. Syria’s civil war has reached tragic proportions. And the rise of extremism, encapsulated by the actions of ISIL, has terrorised and shocked a region – and inspired atrocities across the world.

It could be argued that because the US-led coalition routed the Iraqi state so comprehensively in 1991, this handed the initiative to regional aggressors operating on the fringes of political conventionality – non-state militants.

In the first Gulf War, the US-led allies, including the UAE, defeated a plucky Iraqi army in a conventional kind of conflict – between land armies – that from our very modern perspective seems utterly last century.

Right now, the US, Britain and others are not trying to purge another state’s army from Syria and Iraq, but a terror group that is proving a tough and mercurial adversary. Indeed, as remarkable and penetrating as western military technology is nowadays, ISIL and its ilk have adapted and found ways to combat air strikes from American and European aircraft. The timescale for ISIL’s military defeat, therefore, remains a great regional unknown.

Despite its resounding victory on the field in the first Gulf War, the American-led coalition was far less prepared to grasp the all-important political resolution. Mr Bush Sr didn’t exceed his remit and march on Baghdad – but the hope never materialised that a battered and bruised Saddam, whose military machine was given a pounding, would fall. As such, Iraq developed into a long-term crisis issue for the West that, from year to year, and despite subjecting the country to brutal sanctions and no-fly zones, was debated to a state of political irrationality.

This resulted in the 2003 invasion led by a very determined Mr Bush Jr who resolved to remedy the situation. Here, as before, the military battle was won, but the post-conflict planning was an unmitigated disaster.

The removal of Saddam – a tyrant who subjected his own people to decades of cruel rule – was hardly met by an outpouring of global grief. Yet, the manner in which Mr Bush Jr and then-UK prime minister Tony Blair handled the entire campaign – the lack of a UN resolution authorising military action and dubious intelligence – is remembered 13 years on.

The US-led military victory of 1991 gave rise to a sense of western military might that, in retrospect, made the 2003 version a foregone conclusion. Today, few are anticipating another Gulf War-style military campaign from the West, which has opted for a more arms-length approach to fighting its current enemies.

Yet, 25 years on from the hubris of success, the US and its allies have found themselves bogged down in a region that is more volatile than ever.

Alasdair Soussi is a freelance journalist who has worked across Africa, Europe and the Middle East

On Twitter: @AlasdairSoussi