While Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister Javad Zarif set the tone, they do not enjoy the final say in Iran’s policy towards Yemen.
Instead, the major decision makers are Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the senior cadre of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Although there exist religious affinities between Iran and the Houthis, the convergence of a number of strategic interests is the main driving force behind Tehran-Houthi commonalities.
Mr Khamenei and the IRGC are utilising several means when it comes to Yemen’s war.
Iran’s supreme leader is heavily reliant on rhetoric and social media to spread his message on Yemen.
Currently, Iran’s message is that the war in Yemen is the struggle of “the oppressed” against the oppressors.
In addition, one of the core revolutionary slogans of the Islamic republic is that Iran views itself as the saviour of “the oppressed”.
As a result, Iran’s narrative towards the conflict in Yemen is placed within Tehran’s broader ideological principles.
The Supreme Leader has used his recent speeches to emphasise this principle.
Iran projects its role in Yemen as limited to humanitarian assistance in order to help the “oppressed”.
Iranian leaders have continually denied giving any military and weapons assistance to the Houthis, but why does it issue such denials?
An Iranian diplomat once told me it is not in its interests to advertise the deployment of hard power against the will of the majority.
Another layer of complexity is that the Iranian government views the war in Yemen through the terms of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia.
From the perspective of the Iranian leadership, the tension is deep-rooted: it is sectarian, ethnic, ideological, geopolitical and strategic.
Economically and financially speaking, for Iran, its role in Yemen is not especially costly.
Iran does not spend billions of dollars in Yemen as it does in Syria to maintain the bankrupt power of Bashar Al Assad.
In addition, Yemen does not pose a national security threat to Iran as it does to Saudi Arabia.
Although Iran’s role in Yemen is partially sectarian, it is mainly ideological, as Iranian leaders attempt to tip the regional balance of power and unsettle the regional order.
However, geopolitically and strategically speaking, Iran also uses Yemen to advance its revolutionary ideology.
Iran can also exploit its ties with the Houthis as an additional leverage against Saudi Arabia and its allies.
This leverage can be used by Iran as a strategic bargaining chip in future negotiations or to pressure Riyadh to change direction.
Although Iran pursues a sectarian and ideological agenda in Yemen, Iranian leaders skilfully attempt to avoid using sectarian language within this narrative. This is due to one of Tehran’s key revolutionary principles, which projects the supreme leader as the supposed leader of the Islamic world.
Mr Khamenei’s official website refers to him as the supreme leader of Muslims. Mr Khamenei has accused the West and its allies in the region of using sectarian language to divide and rule.
Iran’s goal in Yemen is anchored in creating a political reality out of the Houthis, as it did with Hizbollah in Lebanon.
This is to ensure Tehran’s influence in a country which borders its regional competitor.
Based on Mr Khamenei’s rhetoric and IRGC actions, the likelihood of Iran compromising in Yemen is very remote.
As a result, direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, with the mediating presence of the UN, would be a practical approach.
Dr Majid Rafizadeh is an Iranian-American Havard scholar and president of the International American Council on the Middle East
On Twitter: @dr_rafizadeh
Company profile
Date started: 2015
Founder: John Tsioris and Ioanna Angelidaki
Based: Dubai
Sector: Online grocery delivery
Staff: 200
Funding: Undisclosed, but investors include the Jabbar Internet Group and Venture Friends
Mercer, the investment consulting arm of US services company Marsh & McLennan, expects its wealth division to at least double its assets under management (AUM) in the Middle East as wealth in the region continues to grow despite economic headwinds, a company official said.
Mercer Wealth, which globally has $160 billion in AUM, plans to boost its AUM in the region to $2-$3bn in the next 2-3 years from the present $1bn, said Yasir AbuShaban, a Dubai-based principal with Mercer Wealth.
“Within the next two to three years, we are looking at reaching $2 to $3 billion as a conservative estimate and we do see an opportunity to do so,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Mercer does not directly make investments, but allocates clients’ money they have discretion to, to professional asset managers. They also provide advice to clients.
“We have buying power. We can negotiate on their (client’s) behalf with asset managers to provide them lower fees than they otherwise would have to get on their own,” he added.
Mercer Wealth’s clients include sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and insurance companies among others.
From its office in Dubai, Mercer also looks after Africa, India and Turkey, where they also see opportunity for growth.
Wealth creation in Middle East and Africa (MEA) grew 8.5 per cent to $8.1 trillion last year from $7.5tn in 2015, higher than last year’s global average of 6 per cent and the second-highest growth in a region after Asia-Pacific which grew 9.9 per cent, according to consultancy Boston Consulting Group (BCG). In the region, where wealth grew just 1.9 per cent in 2015 compared with 2014, a pickup in oil prices has helped in wealth generation.
BCG is forecasting MEA wealth will rise to $12tn by 2021, growing at an annual average of 8 per cent.
Drivers of wealth generation in the region will be split evenly between new wealth creation and growth of performance of existing assets, according to BCG.
Another general trend in the region is clients’ looking for a comprehensive approach to investing, according to Mr AbuShaban.
“Institutional investors or some of the families are seeing a slowdown in the available capital they have to invest and in that sense they are looking at optimizing the way they manage their portfolios and making sure they are not investing haphazardly and different parts of their investment are working together,” said Mr AbuShaban.
Some clients also have a higher appetite for risk, given the low interest-rate environment that does not provide enough yield for some institutional investors. These clients are keen to invest in illiquid assets, such as private equity and infrastructure.
“What we have seen is a desire for higher returns in what has been a low-return environment specifically in various fixed income or bonds,” he said.
“In this environment, we have seen a de facto increase in the risk that clients are taking in things like illiquid investments, private equity investments, infrastructure and private debt, those kind of investments were higher illiquidity results in incrementally higher returns.”
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, one of the largest sovereign wealth funds, said in its 2016 report that has gradually increased its exposure in direct private equity and private credit transactions, mainly in Asian markets and especially in China and India. The authority’s private equity department focused on structured equities owing to “their defensive characteristics.”
ENGLAND SQUAD
Team: 15 Mike Brown, 14 Anthony Watson, 13 Ben Te'o, 12 Owen Farrell, 11 Jonny May, 10 George Ford, 9 Ben Youngs, 1 Mako Vunipola, 2 Dylan Hartley, 3 Dan Cole, 4 Joe Launchbury, 5 Maro Itoje, 6 Courtney Lawes, 7 Chris Robshaw, 8 Sam Simmonds
Replacements 16 Jamie George, 17 Alec Hepburn, 18 Harry Williams, 19 George Kruis, 20 Sam Underhill, 21 Danny Care, 22 Jonathan Joseph, 23 Jack Nowell
