Has the concept of Arab national security come to an end? Perhaps that is no longer the right question. It assumes that what once existed still holds relevance in the same form.
The more pressing question today is this: do we still need that concept as it was framed in the literature of the last century? The answer leans towards no. And it is not because the idea of shared security has lost its importance, but because its tools, boundaries and premises have fundamentally changed.
The world is no longer what it used to be. Geography alone no longer determines alliances, and Arab nationalism or identity is no longer a sufficient reason or framework for building effective security systems. What we are witnessing is a comprehensive redefinition of security itself. It is no longer confined to protecting borders; it now encompasses energy security, supply chains, cyber security, technological superiority and even the capacity to manage complex emerging global scale crises – from pandemics to conflicts.
In this context, linguistic, cultural or historical affinity is no longer the primary determinant. What matters instead is the ability to contribute to a flexible, adaptive and credible system of security – where security is framed as more than defence, but of guaranteeing the safety and security of communities against blended threats of almost overwhelming proportions.
The recent experience in the Gulf, particularly in the face of Iranian aggression, has laid bare the limits of the traditional model. The Arab world did not move as a unified bloc, nor did the cohesion long assumed in Arab national and regional security doctrine materialise.
What did act decisively were states with strong institutions and clear strategic vision, using alliances as leverage built on practical foundations rather than rhetorical ones. The response was not collectively Arab; it emerged from networks of real partnerships in which interests converged and capabilities were readily available.
The countries that moved swiftly to support the UAE were not Arab states. France, the UK, Greece, Ukraine and South Korea engaged in direct and rapid military and political co-operation. Politically, countries such as Ethiopia, Serbia, India, Italy and Albania also aligned in support. This is a model of emerging security and political alliances rooted in shared interests rather than shared geography or identity.
By contrast, major Arab states hesitated at first even to issue clear political statements condemning the Iranian missile and drone attacks, let alone offer material support.
This transformation does not signify the failure of the old idea so much as its transcendence. Arab national security emerged in a different historical context, when threats were understood primarily through the lens of conventional military conflict and when the region’s post-colonial nation-states were still taking shape.
Today, the states that have succeeded are those that have redefined security from within: building diversified economies, forging pragmatic international partnerships, developing advanced defence capabilities, investing in technology and strengthening social cohesion. Overall, it is a model where shared economic interests take prime position in foreign policy (a key stated principle for the Emirates). These are the foundations of real power, not mere affiliation with a broad geographic or cultural framework.
The realistic alternative today is not to revive an outdated concept but to transition towards a more flexible and pragmatic model.
Alliances are increasingly formed around specific priorities: protecting maritime routes, stabilising energy markets, advancing air defence systems, countering cyber threats and collaborating in artificial intelligence and advanced technologies. These alliances are not measured by cultural similarity but by the extent to which interests align and co-operation proves effective. They may include countries beyond the Arab world, yet they are often more capable of action and impact than traditional frameworks based around a shared notion of identity or proximity.
At the heart of this transformation stands the nation-state. It is the state that decides, builds and selects its alliances based on precise calculations rather than emotional considerations. A strong modern state is one that can manage its balances, cultivate multidirectional partnerships and invest in its own capabilities before seeking external guarantees. It is no longer possible to rely on abstract concepts without possessing real tools.
Security today is a complex system of intersecting interests. It is built in ports as much as in laboratories, in data centres as much as in defence installations. It is economic as much as it is military, cognitive as much as it is geographic. Those who fail to grasp this shift will remain trapped in a cognitive state that can neither explain reality nor shape it.
We are not, then, witnessing the end of security, but the end of its old definition. Security is no longer articulated in the language of grand slogans, of nationalist or regionalist identities but in the language of capability and achievement.
It is built where interests converge, not where sectarian or racial identities protect against “the other”. Those who understand this equation will secure their place in a world being reshaped – one that waits for no one and recognises only those who possess the tools of both hard and soft power but also of economic influence.
The Arab world, in practical terms, is entering a new political era in which the winners will be defined by alliances of forward-looking shared interests, not the empty slogans of the past.
