As global media speculate on potential outcomes and the probable fate of US-Iran negotiations, we in the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf states, remain deeply concerned about Iran’s next move in the region.
Two prominent questions arise: will the US and Iran reach a genuine settlement, or is a return to war the more probable outcome? And regardless, if a version of Iran persists, crippled, angry and able to dictate the fate of global energy supplies, even as it rebuilds its proxies and missile programmes, where will this ultimately lead – and how?
The reality is that many Arab observers and political commentators remain pessimistic regarding the behaviour and intentions of the current Iranian regime. Even if the US and Iran eventually reach an agreement, Tehran is likely to view it as a temporary arrangement. For Iran, the issue is not the absence of legal terms or guarantees, but the gap between the outward language of politics and the ideology behind it.
The core objectives of the 1979 revolution are embedded in a rigid ideological structure. From this perspective, the failure of current or future negotiation rounds appears inevitable, reflecting a crucial difference in how each side defines a “solution”.
Washington tends to view diplomacy as a pathway to a definitive resolution – one that neutralises threats, particularly regarding Iran’s nuclear programme and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran, by contrast, approaches negotiations as part of a longer game using diplomatic engagement to buy time and ease pressure, without altering its core strategy.
In the Iranian political mindset, however, negotiation is not necessarily a means to resolution but a way to manage confrontation. Flexibility in this context becomes a powerful tactical instrument.
This approach cannot be separated from the intellectual foundations of the Iranian revolutionary system. Even leaders with advanced academic credentials view the state as a vehicle for a project extending beyond its borders.
Within this context, some strands of Islamist political thought have drawn on historical interpretations of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah in 628 CE as an example of a tactical truce under conditions of weakness. Intended to last 10 years and prevent hostilities, the accord was broken within two years and led to the mobilisation of a 10,000-strong Muslim force and the eventual conquest of Makkah.
Such interpretations often conveniently overlook the specific historical circumstances that led to the breakdown of the agreement, including violations by allied tribes, and instead present it as a precedent for tactical flexibility followed by strategic reversal when conditions permit. Nevertheless, they are used to justify the concept of any agreement being considered a temporary convenience.
That precedent is often presented as tactical flexibility, followed by strategic reversal, when conditions permit.
The threat posed by the current Iranian system is not limited to enriched uranium or ambitions to acquire a nuclear weapon; it is inherent in the very Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which implicitly enables the export of revolutionary ideology and action.
The founding leader of the system, Ruhollah Khomeini, and his successor, Ali Khamenei, have both openly discussed Iran’s objective of extending the revolution beyond its borders. Iranian state media has also previously highlighted Tehran’s influence in several Arab capitals, including Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa.
These provisions outline a political framework that extends beyond the nation-state and provide ideological justification for influence outside Iran’s borders. In this sense, “exporting the revolution” is a natural outcome of Iran’s constitutional and ideological system.
Against this backdrop, the potential for meaningful reform from within appears limited. Genuine reform would require revisiting the foundational principles upon which the system rests – principles that, in a theocracy, are ideological before they are political.
Iran’s behaviour in recent decades reinforces this conclusion. The system has demonstrated a consistent ability to absorb pressure, adjust to sanctions and recalibrate its political and military tools. Moreover, Iran’s pursuit of influence through its proxies has been relentless.
Yet this internal tension, despite its significance, has not produced structural change. The security establishment, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, continues to dominate the levers of power and steer the system in ways that preserve its foundational project.
For this reason, reliance on agreements alone appears insufficient. The issue is not confined to the text of any deal, but to Iran’s interpretation of the framework that shapes implementation. Any arrangement that fails to account for this reality risks being reinterpreted, or bypassed altogether, as conditions evolve.
Ultimately, the Iranian experience suggests that when politics is grounded in a closed ideological system, it develops a dual language: of negotiation on the surface, and of a continued commitment to subversion and the pursuit of ideology beneath. It is within this space – between what is said and intended – that the smallest details gain the greatest significance.
And it is in these details, when we consider the long-term outcome of any potential deal reached with Iran, that the devil lies.
