On March 2, Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel – though the decision for it to do so was almost certainly made by Iran – carrying Lebanon into a new war with Israeli forces. On the same day, Lebanon's government declared Hezbollah's military and security activities illegal. Shortly thereafter, army commander General Rodolphe Haykal made it clear to Prime Minister Nawaf Salam that the military did not have the means to implement the government's decision. Now, the Lebanese army finds itself in an uncomfortable position.
The reportedly tense exchange led many people to criticise the commander, arguing that he was not showing enough aggression with regard to Hezbollah, with some even demanding his resignation. According to sources familiar with Mr Haykal, he is indeed risk-averse. However, the question of disarming Hezbollah, which has tens of thousands of armed combatants and is backed by an entire community, has little to do with attitude or audacity, and portraying it as such is dangerous.
The army commander’s reluctance is understandable. He knows his institution and its vulnerabilities. He probably also has a good sense of the army’s past record against sectarian militias. In 1984, the military besieged Beirut’s southern suburbs and the Amal militia there, but the effort soon bogged down as the army bombarded civilian quarters. Within weeks, the militias had expelled the army from western Beirut.
In 1990, Christian units of the army entered a devastating confrontation with the Christian Lebanese Forces militia, which also quickly became a grinding stalemate that killed many civilians. Whenever the multi-sectarian national army, whose main role is to defend against foreign attacks on Lebanon, involves itself in domestic battles against members of its own society, the consequences are likely to be ruinous.
Moreover, if the army were to try to forcibly disarm Hezbollah, it would raise two other major problems. First, unless it is certain of prevailing – and today it most certainly is not – the outcome could be far worse than doing nothing. If it were compelled to backtrack, this would further undermine the state’s credibility in a fundamental way, and show that Hezbollah can impose its will on the rest of Lebanese society.
Second, an attack against Hezbollah at a time when the Shiite community is traumatised, dispersed and disoriented because of Israeli bombings and evacuation orders from much of the south and Beirut’s southern suburbs could be perceived as a stab in the back by the community. This would very likely rally many Shiites to Hezbollah’s side, placing the military in an impossible situation.
Militarily, the army does have very well-trained units, including special forces that are thought to have between 7,000 and 8,000 men. Even if one adds other fairly well-trained intervention units, the force probably does not have the numbers to decisively roll up a motivated Hezbollah dispersed mainly among southern Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley, sustained by an apprehensive community that feels under threat.
Furthermore, Hezbollah has shown much more military vigour in fighting Israel than expected. A recent Reuters report noted that since the ceasefire with Israel in November 2024, Iran had provided Hezbollah with weapons and $50 million monthly for combatants’ salaries. Those advocating for the army to disarm Hezbollah never seem to ponder how difficult this would be when the underpaid armed forces are still suffering from the economic collapse of 2019–2020.
For all that, can the army afford to do nothing? At a time when Israel is preparing to occupy land along the Lebanese-Israeli border, and probably hold on to it until Hezbollah is disarmed, is remaining idle an option? The short answer is no, but in that case, what can Gen Haykal do?
One thing the army can try doing is plan its actions according to the direction of the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah. This need not imply clashing with the party, but exploiting opportunities created by the situation on the ground. This can involve deploying in areas of the south vacated by Hezbollah, perhaps co-ordinated by a third party such as the UN force in Lebanon, and preventing the return of party members.
Despite criticism of the army’s removal of Hezbollah’s weapons south of the Litani River, the reality, which Israel recognises, is that most of the party’s rocket attacks against Israel have come from north of the Litani. In other words, the army’s efforts were relatively effective.
The army can also deploy along main supply lines between the Bekaa Valley and the south to interdict Hezbollah’s weapons supplies to combatants in the south. This is certainly becoming increasingly difficult as the conflict in Lebanon escalates, and may lead to accusations that the army is helping Israel. But the army’s primary duty is to the Lebanese state, which has formally declared Hezbollah’s military operations illegal.
A key role here will be played by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri. As the most senior Shiite figure in Lebanon, Mr Berri must realise that the war with Israel, and the occupation and destruction it has wrought, has existential implications for his community. If he wants to end this, he could play an important role in building a consensus around the army, even if he may hesitate to cross Hezbollah’s red lines.
None of these proposals is a silver bullet. However, putting more pressure on the army on the assumption this will precipitate a conflict between it and Hezbollah – a conflict in which it will probably not be victorious – is foolish in the extreme. If the army cracks, so too will the Lebanese state, which would only benefit Hezbollah and Iran.
