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Israel is reportedly preparing for a major ground invasion of Lebanon, with plans to seize the entire area south of the Litani River and dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. Israeli and American officials have signalled that such an operation is no longer hypothetical. If it happens, Lebanon will face destruction and displacement not seen in decades. For a country already battered by war and economic collapse, the stakes could hardly be higher.
Lebanon did not have to arrive at this point. The regional war exposed how profoundly its leadership misunderstood the strategic equation. The Middle East is undergoing a structural realignment in which ambiguities about state sovereignty and militias are no longer tolerated. Israel’s plans were never secret: dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and remove the threat along its northern border. Yet Lebanon’s leadership behaved as though time was on its side.
For over a year after the ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024, and the election of President Joseph Aoun and the formation of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s cabinet, the international community waited for Lebanon to take decisive steps to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese presidency instead insisted on “calm dialogue” and resisted a clear timetable for disarmament, hoping to avoid civil unrest or even civil war. This argument was always misguided. Hezbollah had no intention of complying or relinquishing its weapons voluntarily. Delaying decisions in the name of stability ensured the opposite outcome.
The result is the worst-case scenario. Lebanon now faces the prospect of a large-scale Israeli military campaign, occupation of territory, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and further devastation of an already shattered economy. The country has also lost most of its diplomatic leverage, and international engagement has been minimal apart from France’s President Emmanuel Macron.
The core problem is structural. A state that does not hold the monopoly over the use of force cannot negotiate credibly. Hezbollah’s military autonomy has systematically undermined Lebanon’s bargaining power. It has also tied the country’s fate to regional dynamics over which Lebanese institutions have little control.
At this stage, only one external actor can impose a diplomatic settlement: the US. Here Lebanon’s leadership already squandered what may have been the country’s golden opportunity.
Say what one likes about US President Donald Trump and his policies. Many have, including this author. Yet Mr Trump would have offered Lebanon a rare opening. His diplomacy is unconventional but also pragmatic. Moreover, Lebanon has an unusual degree of proximity to his administration. Figures such as Tom Barrack, Massad Boulos and other Lebanese-American voices within the broader policy network have influence in Washington.
Even more striking is the appointment of Michel Issa as the ambassador to Beirut, a close friend of Mr Trump and not a career diplomat. It is rare for the US to send a political confidant rather than a professional envoy to a country as sensitive as Lebanon. The decision alone signals a degree of personal engagement Beirut has not seen in decades. The US still sees common values with Lebanon: democracy, economic openness and religious pluralism. Even Senator Lindsey Graham raised the prospect of a US-Lebanon defence agreement.
Lebanon’s leadership should have recognised the strategic significance of this moment. Instead, it drifted.
The consequence is that what might have been a golden opportunity to reposition the country diplomatically has now become Lebanon’s last realistic chance to preserve its territorial integrity. If Israel proceeds with its planned offensive, the window for a favourable negotiated agreement will narrow dramatically, leaving Lebanon to negotiate from a far weaker position.
The only viable strategy now is radical clarity. Lebanon must immediately declare, in explicit terms, that the Lebanese state stands outside the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel. The government should sever ties with Iran and formally outlaw Hezbollah under Lebanese law. If it cannot seize the group’s weapons immediately, it should at the very least take control of its headquarters, financial network and institutional infrastructure. Such steps would signal to Lebanon’s partners that the state is reclaiming its sovereignty.
None of these measures will be easy. They will provoke internal tensions and political backlash. Yet, the alternative is worse: the slow disintegration of society and the loss of territory.
This is an existential moment. It requires decisive leadership.
Mr Aoun holds the responsibility for Lebanon’s security and defence policy. He should act accordingly. The most immediate step would be surprisingly simple: pick up the phone and call Mr Trump. Ask him to broker a trilateral conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Lebanese presidency. Trump thrives on high-stakes negotiation. If there is any path to halting escalation and saving what is left of the country, it likely runs through Washington.
Lebanon’s tragedy has often been the absence of strategy. This time, the margin for error has disappeared. The choice now is stark. Either the state reasserts its authority and seeks a negotiated settlement with the support of the US, or events will impose a far harsher outcome.
History rarely offers second chances. For Lebanon and its president, this may be the last one.
