The ability to separate deterrence and control from unintended slippage towards wide confrontation is receding, not only in the Middle East but globally. Conflict arenas increasingly overlap, and pressure tools accumulate and interact. The danger lies not only in the outbreak of deliberate wars or those triggered pre-emptively, but in managing proximity to war.
Europe experiences this transformation with suppressed anxiety. The war in Ukraine has become a full test of the fragility of the European system in confronting a weakened Russia, which insists on redrawing the rules of engagement with the West, betting on erosion in European political will and American hesitation driven by internal calculations.
The US manages an interconnected web of crises – Ukraine, the Middle East, the South China Sea, Venezuela, tariff wars and the global economy – in a way that preserves room to manoeuvre while carrying the seeds of strategic exhaustion should it be forced to move from risk management to direct confrontation. In the Middle East, the world watches the limits of Iranian deterrence, the ceiling of American support for Israel and the ability of regional powers to adapt. Where the region is heading, and how major powers intersect with regional actors, has become a comprehensive test of balances.
At the international level, the US seeks to maintain its hegemony through military, political, economic and diplomatic tools, carefully monitoring the movements of other powers. China and Russia are reordering their priorities, exploiting any American retreat from traditional or emerging spheres of influence, while the EU struggles to safeguard its interests amid rapid international transformation.
Conventional wars are no longer the sole means of influence or deterrence. Pressure tools now include economic interventions, cyber operations, political campaigns and smart alliances. The effects of every strategic decision in Washington, Moscow, Beijing or Brussels extends to conflict zones, including in the Middle East, which has become a global laboratory for power balances.
Within this framework, no Iranian, Israeli, Turkish or Arab move can be understood in isolation. Each actor’s success depends on its ability to balance force, pressure and internal and external interests.
The US does not seek to control the Middle East from a local perspective; its priorities lie elsewhere. It aims to establish the foundations of influence while avoiding direct crisis management. The US administration prefers to avoid escalation on regional fronts and does not want a test of its ability to manage alliances and preserve the global balance of power. The core challenge lies in the complex interaction between Iranian and Israeli doctrines.
Iran seeks to preserve influence through a network of proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, benefiting from political and economic vacuums while remaining limited in its capacity for direct action. Its doctrine – based on raising ceilings, bargaining, and exploiting vacuums – allows Tehran to retain phased political influence without sliding into a full-scale confrontation that could threaten its internal stability.
Israel, by contrast, pursues a strategy aimed at controlling any accumulation of threats near its borders. The Israeli government encourages settlement expansion in the West Bank, manoeuvring around US President Donald Trump’s opposition to annexation, while Gaza is managed through mechanisms designed to prevent security vacuums. Lebanon remains a theatre for testing deterrence with Hezbollah, a key actor constrained in direct impact but capable of exerting pressure according to Iranian calculations. Israel’s doctrine assumes any confrontation will be short but inherently high-risk.
A notable development is Israel’s effort to establish security belts and buffer zones with Lebanon and Syria under American and international guarantees. Washington views Israel as a pivotal strategic ally, and any threat to it is interpreted as a test of American deterrence. The Trump administration seeks to apply precise pressure to restrain Israel while containing Iranian influence and monitoring regional dynamics without slipping into direct confrontation.
In Syria, following the decline of direct Iranian influence, the government faces renewed challenges: the re-emergence of ISIS, management of Kurdish and minority issues and Turkish pressure in the north. Israel bets on buffer zones to secure its borders, while the US commits to a stability framework that serves Israeli security, monitors Turkish movements and manages extremist threats.
Turkey emerges as a variable factor in northern Syria and strategic influence zones, reshaping regional balances and rendering Syrian or Israeli moves vulnerable to indirect intersections between powers. This influence extends to controlling strategic areas, affecting minorities and creating pressure corridors leveraged in managing field dynamics.
Palestine remains a sensitive point. The West Bank is under strict control, Gaza is managed to prevent security vacuums and Egypt and Qatar play pivotal mediating roles to balance international pressure and Israeli security.
Internal challenges in both Iran and Israel are directly tied to external confrontations. In Iran, risks of internal implosion could produce chaos spilling beyond its borders, shaping the calculations of neighbouring states and the US. Saudi Arabia, aware of this danger, seeks calm with Tehran and prefers diplomacy over confrontation. Internal stability is a strategic necessity, not a luxury.
It is hoped Iranian leaders recognise there is no alternative but to adjust the system’s doctrine – nuclear, missile and proxy-based expansion. Failure would place Iran at the centre of a storm.
Israel also faces risks if it continues settlement policies and rejects a two-state solution. Today it relies on unwavering American support, viewing itself – as Senator Lindsey Graham put it – as a “strategic value” to the US. Yet failure to advance Mr Trump’s plan for Gaza and the region will carry costs.
Maintaining strategic stability requires Israel to abandon a siege mentality. Strategic rigidity may become a trap that weakens security and limits long-term stability. We face a critical year testing Iranian and Israeli doctrines. The most dangerous element is persistent confrontation through proxy wars, particularly in Lebanon – where containment alone may no longer suffice.
