Iraq’s elections come at a crucial moment for the region – and not for the first time

Iraqis are set to go to the polls for parliamentary elections on November 11. Nick Donaldson/ AFP

Iraq’s elections on November 11 will test whether the country’s most stable period in recent memory can withstand the turbulence of electoral politics and protracted government formation, and remain insulated from the wider wars consuming a region in profound and perilous transformation.

Iraqi elections are rarely contests over competing policy visions or debates, domestic or foreign. Instead, they revolve around the mechanics of patronage and proximity to power: thousands of candidates vying for seats in the 329-member Council of Representatives by offering material and economic incentives to mobilise their social bases. With voter turnout consistently low, these bases – or those who still vote – become all the more decisive.

Yet behind the familiar retail politics that define elections lies an elite conversation about how to sustain Iraq’s recent stability, which has partly facilitated a period of prosperity. Across Iraq’s political spectrum – even among factions aligned with Tehran and hostile to Washington – there is broad agreement that such stability depends on maintaining the current policy of regional engagement with all neighbours and continued, if cautious, co-operation with the US.

Iraq remains the only country connected to Iran and the so-called “axis of resistance” that has not descended into significant violence. Its insulation has rested on the ruling Shiite Co-ordination Framework’s (SCF) consolidation of power and its choice to trade ideological confrontation (vis-a-vis the axis) for economic rewards through the Iraqi state.

Any ideological conflict has been bad for business. The question now is whether this election, and the fraught, often violent process of government formation that follows, will fracture that consensus, unravel Iraq’s fragile calm and draw the country once more into regional conflict.

In the past, elections have often marked periods of instability that have come at a geopolitical cost. Before the 2021 vote, Baghdad had been making significant strides in positioning itself as a regional bridge, hosting dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran, advancing the Baghdad Conference that brought together leaders from across the Gulf, Iran and beyond, and beginning to carve out a potential role as a regional convener.

Workers prepare voting materials for Iraq's upcoming elections at a polling station in Baghdad. AP Photo

But the elections upended that momentum. The subsequent government-formation process descended into chaos: rival factions stormed the Green Zone, drone attacks targeted the homes of Prime Minister Mustafa Al Kadhimi and other leaders, as well as several areas in Erbil, while tit-for-tat assassinations across southern Iraq and a Sadrist invasion of the Green Zone in August 2022 resulted in 30 deaths.

It took over a year to form a government, and in that time, amid the violence and paralysis, Iraq’s diplomatic momentum evaporated. The next regional forum convened not in Baghdad but in Amman, and it was China, not Iraq, that eventually brokered the formal Saudi-Iran detente.

Once again, Iraq’s elections arrive at a pivotal regional moment. Iraqi elites are acutely aware that the confrontation between Israel and Iran is far from over, and the prospect of a less predictable Trump administration in the White House has only heightened their anxiety.

People walk past campaign posters in Baghdad ahead of Iraq's parliamentary elections. AFP

Even among figures from the SCF traditionally aligned with the “resistance” camp, there has been a shift in tone. For many of them, watching violence sweep through their neighbourhood, stability and their own survival have come to matter more than resistance. This is why the June war was seen in Baghdad as a success: the leadership managed to keep the Iraqi resistance factions quiet – and out of the war.

This recalibration stems from a sober recognition that Iraq’s stability, and the brief economic respite it has enjoyed, remain fragile. In conversations with senior politicians and advisers, one hears a consistent refrain: Iraq can no longer afford to be pulled into regional confrontation, most likely triggered by Israel or the US.

The question is whether Iraq’s current policy of multi-alignment can survive the coming election

Many fear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who pointedly referenced Iraq in his recent UN General Assembly address, has not taken his gaze off Baghdad. Quietly, some acknowledge that Iraq’s relationship with Washington, particularly in security co-operation and counterterrorism, has functioned as an informal deterrent against Israeli provocation. Yet beneath this pragmatism lies deep anxiety: that the delicate equilibrium Iraq has maintained between the US and Iran is precarious, and that the coming months may test whether Baghdad’s pursuit of stability can survive the region’s conflicts.

To counter these mounting threats, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani’s government has made a concerted effort to draw US oil companies back to Iraq after years of absence.

A poster of Iraq's Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani in Najaf. AFP

Baghdad recently signed an agreement in principle with Chevron for the Nassiriya project, encompassing four exploration blocks and the development of several producing oil fields with vast untapped potential. ExxonMobil has also agreed to assist in expanding production at the giant Majnoon field, a symbolic return for one of America’s energy giants.

Smaller firms have followed suit. From Baghdad’s perspective, these deals are not merely commercial; they are strategic. By restoring US corporate investment in Iraq’s energy sector, the government hopes to anchor American interests more firmly in the country’s stability, and, in doing so, ensure that Iraq remains outside the line of fire in an increasingly volatile region.

The real question, then, is whether Iraq’s current policy of multi-alignment, and its improved relations with the Gulf, Turkey and the US can survive the coming election and the formation of a new government.

Mr Al Sudani remains the frontrunner in the vote, yet few expect him to secure a second term. The system, by elite design, prevents any premier from becoming too powerful; it demands a perpetual compromise.

Still, even within the SCF, including factions historically aligned with Iran, there is recognition of what Mr Al Sudani’s tenure has delivered: stability through hedging, engagement over resistance, and profit through stability. His successor may change faces, but Iraq’s power brokers have felt the benefits of restraint. The test ahead is whether they choose to preserve this fragile equilibrium or allow the country to be swept once again into the region’s conflicts.