The so-called Change bloc in Lebanon’s parliament is threatened with collapse. Until last week, the bloc was made up of 13 parliamentarians who won seats in the elections of May. They portrayed themselves as opponents of the political elite who reflected the reformist aspirations of those rising up against the Lebanese system in October 2019.
Two developments underlined how the bloc was facing major challenges. In elections to parliamentary committees, Ibrahim Mneimneh, a Change MP, failed to be re-elected to the key finance and budget committee. Speaker Nabih Berri had wanted to implement prior understandings in which all major blocs would have representatives appointed to committees. The Change bloc argued this would only give them one member in each committee, so they refused, demanding that elections be held instead. Marc Daou presented his candidacy to the committee, hoping he would win a seat alongside Mr Mneimneh, but in the end both men lost to a third candidate.
Soon thereafter, a Change MP unhappy with this situation, Michel Douaihy, announced he was withdrawing from the bloc in its current form, striking a severe blow. While Mr Douaihy’s resentment was understandable, it would have made more sense to manage the situation from inside the bloc, rather than taking a step that threatened its very existence.
From the outset the Change bloc faced a major challenge, which it has not resolved. It had to act as a cohesive unit, while also adapting to the fact that it is not a political party and that its members were elected from separate lists. On top of this, each of its members has ambitions of his or her own, meaning they are often more likely to adopt positions clashing with those of their colleagues.
At the same time, while the bloc has made clear what its general preferences are, and has sought to distance itself from the practices of the traditional political elite, it has not really adopted a practical strategy that sets out achievable, realistic priorities. When he announced his withdrawal from the bloc, Mr Douaihy expressed his hope that it would become a consultative gathering. But in the absence of internal rules and specific policy objectives, that is more or less what the Change bloc had already become.
Nor is this a minor matter. The Change bloc reflects the aspirations of tens of thousands of voters who hoped that by electing a new kind of parliamentarian, they would help to achieve some of the goals of the uprising of 2019. Yet by putting on a display of disarray, the Change bloc is effectively betraying the faith that these voters had placed in them.
Is there a way out of this situation? The simple truth is that divided, the members of the Change bloc will fall, which means that unity remains their only path to political relevance. It’s difficult to see, for example, what Mr Douaihy’s added value will be now that he is on his own, in a parliament in which large blocs dominate. At best, he will be someone whose presence will be felt on political talk shows, but little more than that.
Yet the Change bloc remains one of the larger parliamentary blocs, and can play a major role if it picks its battles intelligently. But at present it is marginalised in the election of a new president, the major matter at hand for Lebanon. In all the parliamentary sessions to vote in a president, bloc members have not named a candidate. While they support several respectable political figures, at least two have asked the bloc not to vote for them, fearing this would make them less likely to emerge as compromise candidates.
This has placed the Change bloc in the midst of a maelstrom. The candidate of the so-called sovereigntist parties in parliament, which tend to oppose Hezbollah, is Michel Mouawad. However, the Change bloc has refused to vote for him, seeing him as a representative of the old political class. This has angered the sovereigntists, while those close to Hezbollah are delighted that no consensus is building around a candidate whom they oppose.
Had the Change bloc voted for Mr Mouawad last week, this would have given him around 55 votes, nine shy of the 64 needed to be elected in a second round for a president. At the least, such a tally would have allowed Mr Mouawad’s supporters to strengthen their hand in negotiations with Hezbollah over a consensus candidate, reinforcing the parliamentary majority, including the Change bloc, that is uneasy with the party’s sway. By refusing to think tactically, the Change bloc has simply become isolated.
Not naming a candidate of its own while also failing to support Mr Mouawad is a recipe for irrelevance. It makes no sense to win an election to parliament, and then refuse to play politics. Politics is about bargaining and horse-trading, and unless the Change bloc secures its priority objectives by giving other political actors or blocs what they want elsewhere, it will achieve little. The election of a new president is a good place to start.
For now, however, the Change bloc must engage in self-criticism and alter its approach. If it continues making the same mistakes, the bloc will guarantee its inconsequence. Its fortunes certainly show how difficult it is to change political life in Lebanon, but this need not be exacerbated by the fact that the agents of such change are failing to agree to a sensible plan of action.
