Last week, Afghanistan’s new president, Ashraf Ghani, reached out to China through a four-day visit. There was high-flying rhetoric as Mr Ghani said his country viewed China “as a strategic partner, in the short term, medium term, long term and very long term”. President Xi Jinping reciprocated by hailing Mr Ghani as an old friend of the Chinese people with whom China was prepared to work towards “a new era of cooperation”.
Afghanistan and China signed agreements on trade and commerce, economic ties, humanitarian aid and travel permits for public servants. Despite China’s concerns that a deteriorating security situation could threaten greater investment, it agreed to give Afghanistan $327 million (Dh1.2bn) in aid – $81.8 million this year and the remainder between 2015 and 2017. More significantly, China also agreed to act as a mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In turn, Mr Ghani pledged to help China fight its own Islamist militants.
With the impending departure from Afghanistan of most US troops, and with Taliban gains threatening to stoke militancy in China’s western Xinjiang region and cut off mineral resources valued as high as $3 trillion, there are new pressures on China’s Afghanistan policy.
Both Beijing and Kabul recognise each other’s importance. Afghanistan has requested assistance from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in its fight against the Taliban. Providing this assistance may form a part of Mr Xi’s wider plan to establish a 6,437-kilometre “Silk Road” economic belt connecting China with Europe via Central Asia.
Security concerns have prevented important Chinese investments in Afghanistan from getting off the ground. The state-owned China Metallurgical Group spent $3 billion to mine copper at Mes Aynak, about 50 kilometres south of Kabul, only to see the project stalled because of insurgents and the discovery of Buddhist artefacts at the site. China National Petroleum Corp, the nation’s largest oil company, agreed in 2011 to develop Afghanistan’s Amu Darya basin, a project the government estimates will yield about $7 billion in profits.
In September 2012, China’s then security chief, Zhou Yongkang, became the first senior Chinese leader to visit Afghanistan in almost five decades. With this visit, Beijing signalled an end to its policy of “masterful inactivity” vis-à-vis Kabul. During Mr Zhou’s visit, Beijing announced a pact to train, fund and equip Afghan police, underscoring China’s growing interest in Afghanistan’s internal security. China has also started holding trilateral consultations with Pakistan and Afghanistan on regional security.
Much like the rest of the region, China is worried about the withdrawal of western forces from Afghanistan as it fears a broader destabilisation of the region. The growing problems in Pakistan have also alerted China to the reality that its leverage over that country may not be enough in managing regional turmoil.
As tensions have risen in Xinjiang, the perceived Pakistan link to Uighur militancy has led to a reassessment of China’s approach towards Afghanistan, especially as concerns are rising in Beijing that Islamabad has not been very effective in controlling the training of Uighur militants in Pakistan.
From the 2001 US invasion until quite recently, China has adopted a hands-off policy towards Afghanistan. It did not want a serious involvement but it also did not want a victory for the extremists, given the potential for negative impact on China’s problems with Uighur separatists in Xinjiang. Apart from the Mes Aynak copper project, China did not make a significant attempt to project its economic power.
But as the substantial departure of western forces from Afghanistan has come nearer, China has been more active. The China National Petroleum Corporation has helped set up Afghanistan’s first commercial oil production site, with an estimated annual capacity of 1.5 million barrels.
China’s humongous appetite for resources will make sure that Afghanistan, with over $1 trillion in potential mineral wealth, gets adequate attention from Beijing.
With China’s backing, Afghanistan became an SCO observer, and China signed a strategic partnership agreement with Kabul in 2012. Viewing a political settlement in Afghanistan as increasingly important for protecting its economic and security interests in the region, Beijing has also been quietly expanding its links with the Taliban and seeking assurances that its interests would be secure if they were to return to power.
Interestingly, China has not embedded its Afghan policy in the larger regional context. It refuses to discuss Pakistan with India ensuring that its privileged relationship with Islamabad remains intact. But this will make it difficult for China to act an independent mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Whatever happens, China is upping its game in Afghanistan and the rest of world should take notice.
Harsh V Pant is a professor of international relations at King’s College London
