Two years ago, we argued that the international community was overlooking one of the only workable options for Gaza’s post-war governance: a UN-led transitional administration. Today, that idea is essentially the US’s proposal before the UN Security Council.
The draft resolution, now circulating in New York, calls for a two-year International Stabilisation Force under UN mandate to administer and stabilise the security environment in Gaza while reinforcing the fragile ceasefire. It envisions co-operation with regional states, demilitarisation of non-state armed groups and an interim governance structure – a so-called “Board of Peace” – supported by the UN.
Our earlier warnings about the risks of such a proposal are even more acute given the recent reports that the US proposal would also see a division of Gaza into two zones, one of which would retain Israeli forces on the ground. Any international presence in Gaza must be legitimate in the eyes of Gazans, providing meaningful Palestinian participation in governance from the outset. It should have a clearly defined role for regional actors, giving them a stake in the successful transformation of Gaza from an occupied warzone to a self-administered territory. And the Security Council mandate should be unambiguously temporary, with a viable pathway for exit and phased transition to full Palestinian rule.
The US plan proposes a new interim governing body for Gaza rather than a return to direct Palestinian rule. This rightly acknowledges that Gazans would reject any imposition of the Palestinian Authority in an interim administration, and that Israel rejects any role for Hamas in the future of Gaza. But legitimacy cannot be outsourced. Any transitional administration must include Palestinians’ participation from the start, not merely as advisers but as decision-makers in reconstruction, policing and justice.
Gazans will not accept an international presence that feels imposed from the outside, even less so if it appears to sideline Palestinian political voices. The mission must be built on consultation and inclusion, drawing on Gaza’s civil society, local technocrats and professional networks that long kept the enclave functioning under siege. These are the people who can be the bridges between international structures and local realities.
Here, history offers important lessons. After the US invasion of Iraq, the de-Baathification process dismantled the state’s administrative core, leaving long-term risks (for example, ISIS) in its wake. Gaza cannot afford a similar purge, which would risk paralysing reconstruction efforts. There are many ways an internationally administered mission could build on the UN’s experience in vetting to retain a core group of Palestinian technocrats who can keep Gaza’s ministries running.
Similarly, the mission’s mandate should recognise that disarming everyone in Gaza overnight is impossible. A phased demilitarisation plan should prioritise protecting civilians and enabling humanitarian aid delivery, not conducting an open-ended counter-insurgency.
The proposal before the Security Council rightly seeks co-operation from Egypt, Jordan and possibly Gulf states. Regional involvement can lend credibility and investment, especially if Arab forces are part of the international stabilisation force. And regional partners will remain essential to the long-term credibility and implementation of any proposal. But this should not become a regional occupation under US or UN sponsorship. The UN should remain the visible face of the mission, with regional partners operating under its mandate and oversight.
A UN leadership role is especially important given the strongly different positions across regional actors. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are setting strict conditions for any engagement in an international mission in Gaza, whereas Qatar, Turkey and others appear more willing to support it without as many conditions. The UN is far from universally accepted by Israel, Palestine or even regional leaders, but it is the best source of impartiality for the long, heavily contested process that lies ahead.
The draft resolution also calls on the World Bank and other financial institutions to establish a dedicated trust fund to support Gaza’s redevelopment. Frontloading this fund with a serious sum of money is probably a condition to any successful interim mission in Gaza.
The US proposal’s two-year timeframe until the end of 2027 acknowledges the need for a time-bound international presence in Gaza. This is the right idea: any transitional mission must aim to restore Palestinian self-governance within a clear horizon. The international community cannot indefinitely govern 2.3 million people without their consent.
But the danger of mission creep is real. The draft resolution suggests that an expiry date could be extended, subject to Security Council approval. Rebuilding a devastated territory, disarming armed groups, training police, restoring governance, and preparing and holding elections will take far longer than two years. Without a clearly defined exit strategy, a transitional mission could easily become an open-ended protectorate we cautioned against.
To avoid this, the Security Council should define measurable milestones for the phased withdrawal of international actors and incremental increases in Palestinian ownership of the process. The end state should be Palestinian rule within a framework of Gazans’ dignity and Israel’s security, but many steps will be required along the way.
Two years ago, we called a UN-led transitional mission “the best hope we have”. At the time, it was hypothetical. Now a version of this idea is a formal proposal from Washington, debated at the UN Security Council. This shift reflects a growing realisation that neither total war nor wishful diplomacy will produce a stable Gaza, nor begin to address the scale of destruction Gaza has experienced.
Whether this mission becomes a genuine bridge to peace or just another failed experiment will depend on whether the UN and its partners treat Gazans as partners, not wards, and whether the mission can oversee an incremental increase in Palestinian governance over Gaza.
Dr Adam Day is head of the Geneva Office of UN University Centre for Policy Research
Emma Bapt is a research collaborator based in Geneva supporting human rights and conflict prevention work
