The future of Kurds in Syria hangs in the balance after dramatic shifts in control over the past week, marking a major turning point for the Kurdish issue across the region.
Over the past decade, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have controlled the most resource-rich parts of Syria, which are being dismantled with the acquiescence of the US, the same power that helped create the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region in the north of neighbouring Iraq.
The Syrian government’s takeover of SDF areas marks the end of a unique experiment in the history of the Kurds, a transnational minority left out of deals between the great powers that shaped the Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century.
From Syria to Iraq to other areas of the region, Kurdish political projects have long rested on fragile understandings with stronger states and the shifting calculations of international backers. The erosion of SDF control, therefore, indicates a wider retreat of Kurdish autonomy.
The contrast with Iraq is telling. The Kurdistan region remains the most institutionalised Kurdish entity in the Middle East, yet its room for political and economic manoeuvre has steadily declined under pressure from Baghdad and neighbouring states. Syria’s Kurds had hoped their experiment in self-rule might follow a similar path, evolving from wartime autonomy into a recognised and durable political structure. Instead, the dismantling of SDF control suggests the opposite direction is in store.
On the ground, across what remains of Kurdish-led territory, fear and anxiety now dominate as the SDF faces the stark choice between confrontation or integration into state security forces.
“We’re trying to collect and buy as much as possible, just in case things get worse, in case we end up under a full siege, like,” one resident from Qamishli told The National over the phone. "The situation is very dire." The man asked to remain anonymous out of fear of reprisals.
“We don’t want any more war. People want a ceasefire. Morale is very low but when negotiations restart, people start to feel hopeful again."
Autonomous experiment
Unlike the Kurdish quests for self-determination in other areas, the SDF was in control of a large region inhabited mostly by Arabs.
Kurdish SDF commanders, many of whom were members or surrogates of the Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and the European Union, had the ultimate say over a mostly Arab population. This is in contrast to northern Iraq, which is majority Kurdish and has held regular elections, although two parties, each led by different families, remain the dominant political players.
The SDF ran the east and benefited from oil revenues, with US support, but without awarding real decision-making to Arab tribes who were also part of the group and participated in its civil structures. Many of these tribes turned against the SDF as soon as it became clear last week that US support would end.
A Syrian Arab official in the force said SDF commanders had been “better” than the former Assad regime in that “one could talk to them and they would make an effort to listen”. Ultimately, however, the SDF “didn’t know how to manage” its holdings.
“They were not interested in creating equal citizenship,” the official said. “The Americans told them repeatedly that they were failing in governing.”
He said the new government in Damascus has also failed so far in creating a unified Syrian identity. “The underlying theme is that it is OK to target Kurds because they are Kurds.”
A spree of killings targeting Alawite and Druze minorities had already deepened Kurdish fears about the intentions of government forces, particularly after evidence emerged that some troops had taken part in those massacres and were not prosecuted.
Another disadvantage was the violent roots of the group, set up in 2015 by the US, drawing commanders linked to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK’s Syrian affiliate. The PYD allied with the former regime, shortly after the revolt against the president at the time, Bashar Al Assad, in March 2011. PYD and PKK operatives crushed pro-democracy protests in the majority Kurdish areas in north-eastern Syria, as well as in the northern countryside of Aleppo, particularly in Kobani.
One of those operatives in Kobani was SDF leader Mazloum Abdi, who joined the PKK in the 1990s after studying engineering in Aleppo. “He was not known to be one of those PKK thugs. But after March 2011, he underwent a violent transformation and led the crackdown in Kobani,” said one of Mr Abdi’s relatives, who is now an official in the post-Assad central government.
But to some, regardless of the SDF's origins and the nature of their rule, the current situation is the result of American betrayal.
The end of the relations was cemented by a tweet by US envoy Tom Barrack, who wrote that the mandate of the SDF as the main anti-ISIS partner had “expired”, essentially stating the group had become obsolete and was no longer needed despite the losses incurred in the fight against the extremist group.
On Sunday, Mr Abdi had accepted a ceasefire agreement declared and signed on television by Syrian President Ahmad Al Shara. The SDF leader then travelled to Damascus but reportedly found a different agreement on the table, according to Syrian researcher Zozan Alloush. “He discovered he had been betrayed ... Barrack had been lying,” so Mr Abdi decided to return to fighting.
Sources previously told The National that the US ended its support of the Kurds in exchange for Turkey, one of the main backers of Mr Al Shara, to pave the way for talks between Syria and Israel, which have taken place in Paris and resulted in an agreement to de-escalate and share intelligence.
"We feel abandoned by the US and the international powers involved in the Syrian conflict," said the Qamishli resident.
Loss of control
The SDF has agreed in principle to a plan under which its military and civilian structures would be gradually absorbed into state institutions. Under the terms of the ceasefire, Damascus will assume full control of most territories, with Kurdish forces expected to integrate individually into the army rather than as a single unit that would maintain independent command.
For many Syrian Kurds, the integration process could present both a challenge and an opportunity. Kurdish political leaders have long advocated a federal or decentralised government within a unified Syrian state, pushing for the constitutional protection and autonomy that would safeguard the Kurdish language and culture.
Before the offensive, Mr Al Shara issued a decree recognising Kurdish rights, citizenship and language. However, many have pushed back, given the context of conflict in which the decree was issued and have called for constitutional rights instead.
“The best and most realistic approach to a political settlement between Damascus and the Kurds is recognising local autonomy for areas currently under SDF control,” Kamaran Palani, principal investigator of PeaceRep Iraq, LSE Middle East Centre, told The National.
“If this is not guaranteed, Syrian Kurds face two equally destabilising outcomes: either the forced suppression of Kurdish political life, or the continued reproduction of the Kurdish issue through securitisation, instability and conflict,” he added.
In Iraqi Kurdistan, where ruling parties had usually steered away from supporting the SDF largely due to incompatible political ideologies, support has been vocal, from the streets to TV channels to official statements.
Unlike in Iraqi Kurdistan, the SDF did not push for an independent state but instead sought autonomy within a Syrian state.
“What they were looking for is a region within Syria where they could have their full rights protected, have some limited economic independence and also have local security forces protecting their local communities and towns,” said Myles Caggins, former spokesman of the US-led coalition against ISIS.
He added that the SDF had done a “favour to the world” for fighting ISIS and expressed concern about a possible resurgence, given the chaotic handover of detainment camps to the Syrian government and the transfer of militants to Iraq.
What happens in Syria will resonate far beyond its borders. There are an estimated 30 million to 35 million Kurds across the Middle East, from Turkey and Iran to Iraq and Syria, all watching. Whether Syria becomes another warning or a rare exception will shape not only the future of its own Kurds, but the broader Kurdish outcome across the region for years to come.
For some, the collapse of the SDF’s experiment in self-rule marks yet another chapter in a long history of aborted autonomy and broken guarantees. For others, it could offer a narrow chance to renegotiate Kurdish rights within a unified Syrian state, anchored in constitutional protection rather than wartime arrangements.
“It’s really a matter of to be or not to be,” the Qamishli resident said.
