Why did Israel assassinate a Fatah official in Lebanon?

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Israel’s assassination of Khalil Al Maqdah in the southern Lebanese city of Saida on Wednesday marked the first time a member of the Palestinian group Fatah has been targeted in Lebanon since the Gaza war began.

Fatah has favoured diplomacy with Israel and peaceful resistance over armed resistance since the 2000s, and has played no role in the war in Gaza, raising questions about why Mr Al Maqdah was killed, in an air strike near Saida's Ain Al Hilweh refugee camp.

Israel claims that Mr Al Maqdah was acting “on behalf of the Hezbollah terrorist organisation and the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps”.

Hezbollah, backed by Iran, has engaged in cross-border fire with Israel since October in support of its ally Hamas in Gaza. Several groups, including Hamas, the Lebanese Fajr Forces, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other armed factions have taken part in this conflict.

Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades

Mr Al Maqdah is the brother of Mounir Al Maqdah, the leader of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in Lebanon.

The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades is an informal coalition of Fatah-associated groups, consisting of various armed cells spread across the Palestinian territories and refugee camps in neighbouring countries. The group’s arm in Gaza publicly aligned with Hamas in its October 7 attack on Israel and has since confronted Israel's subsequent invasion of the Gaza Strip, taking part in several operations.

“The primary role of Mounir and Khalil [in Lebanon] was that they created the ‘Popular Army’ which is a group of Palestinian youth – around 500 people in Ain Al Hilweh camp alone, which is no small amount,” said Zaher Abou Hamdeh, an expert on Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps.

According to Mr Abou Hamdeh, the Popular Army operated as a cell within the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades that has been armed and trained for confrontations against Israel “in case of a war or invasion”.

“And at the same time, Khalil and Mounir were smuggling weapons into the West Bank and supporting other cells within the Brigades,” he said.

A Fatah representative acknowledged that Mr Al Maqdah was a member of the movement but denied his involvement with the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.

“Khalil Al Maqdah was a retired officer in the Palestinian National Security Forces in Fatah,” said Serhan Serhan, deputy secretary of Fatah in Lebanon. He said Mr Al Maqdah received a pension and other benefits from the movement.

“With all respect to these groups, we in Fatah have nothing called the Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade,” he told The National.

However, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades issued a statement claiming Mr Al Maqdah as a member and praising his role in “supporting the Palestinian people and their resistance during the Battle of the Flood of Al Aqsa” – a reference to the name given by Hamas to its October 7 attack on Israel.

Divisions within Fatah

The differing accounts about the existence of the brigades is a testament to the many fractures and splinters within Fatah’s membership – with some favouring diplomacy while others hold on to armed resistance against Israel’s occupation.

It also reflects Fatah’s attempt to maintain international legitimacy, Mr Abou Hamdeh said.

“Fatah, as a structural leadership, does not adopt the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades due to American and European pressure, and accusations of terrorism. Most importantly, this gives the Brigades flexibility and freedom to operate without political pressure.

“They receive no support whatsoever from Fatah,” he said. “There is no official decision from Fatah to support and adopt the Brigades.”

But, he said, some Fatah officials may funnel portions of their salaries into the armed group.

The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades did originate as the armed wing of Fatah but the movement distanced itself from its militant counterpart when it committed to diplomacy and peaceful struggle under its current leader, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.

“After that the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were no longer part of Fatah or the Palestinian Authority,” Mr Abou Hamdeh said.

This separation created a void that was filled by Fatah’s rival, Hamas, as well as Hezbollah and Iran, illustrating the willingness of Palestinian groups to put aside political rivalries in favour of strategic alliances against Israeli occupation.

“The alliances of each cell are dictated by the place they’re in. In Gaza, for example, they’re allied with Hamas,” Mr Abou Hamdeh said.

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Contributed by Thomas Vanhee and Hend Rashwan, Aurifer

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