Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine shattered Europe’s sleepy assumption that war in Europe was a relic of history while also showing that the breakneck speed of technical advances is becoming a barrier to scaling up defences.
Ambitious promises have been made with a major increase in spending that has become more pressing with the threatened US drawdown of troops.
But Ukraine’s evolution of drones, AI and autonomous systems has dramatically changed the face of warfare. Two years ago, the Western tank was touted as the answer to reverse Russia’s invasion. Now the behemoths are locked up in garages, too vulnerable to be risked against drones that cost a fraction of the tanks' price and possibly possess more intelligence.
The military assessment is that, when the Ukraine war ends, Russia could be ready to mount an assault on Nato within three years, but despite the threat, the upscaling of Europe’s defences remains sluggish.
“Nobody is rearming quickly enough in Europe,” said Dr Lynette Nusbacher, a former military intelligence officer. “The Germans and border states are making a good effort at it because they are staring down the barrel of a gun and taking this seriously, pulling Nato into focusing on what we need to do to prepare.”
The manner in which Europe addresses its defences will be examined by Nato leaders, particularly US President Donald Trump, when they meet in Ankara next week.
Capability quickness
European members of Nato spent $560 billion on defence last year and 23 of its 32 members now exceed 2 per cent of GDP, compared with just three countries in 2014. A Nato summit in 2014 agreed a 2 per cent target before that was updated last year.
But an underlying issue is that the developments on the battlefield in Ukraine are so rapid that militaries fear an order placed today will be out of date tomorrow.
“The Ukrainians are making technical advances within 48 hours of a problem being identified,” said a defence industry source. “The capability problem is that if we start a manufacturing line and then the requirement changes or a key advance is made, then we might have to undo the entire production.”
He added that many companies were waiting for the Ukraine war to culminate before seriously committing to manufacturing.
Cash for arms
When the Cold War officially ended in 1991, Western governments took the “peace dividend” that assumed the threat of state-on-state war had disappeared. Defence budgets shrank dramatically, with the UK halving from 4 per cent to just over 2 per cent in a decade. That meant arms factories and production lines closed and arsenals depleted.
But there is a question over several European countries' willingness to actually spend. Britain’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) promised the most significant overhaul in a generation, with high-end kit making Britain ready for high-intensity conflict.
The Defence Investment Plan (DIP), published on Tuesday, promised £15 billion in extra funding – although it contains a questionable £5 billion black hole – the reality is that £28 billion was needed.
The ambition to reach 3 per cent of GDP “when fiscal and economic conditions allow” has led to criticism that the SDR’s much-welcomed aspirations remain unfunded.
“The problem for Britain is that Europe does not regard it as taking defence seriously enough, especially given the delays and controversy over the DIP,” said military expert Francis Tusa.
“The view from Europe was, ‘please, could someone tell the Defence Secretary and Keir Starmer not to turn up to next week’s Nato conference in Ankara with the DIP, because we know it has been fudged’.”
State of Europe
In Europe, France starts from the strongest industrial position. Companies including Dassault Aviation, Naval Group, Thales and MBDA give Paris sovereign capabilities across combat aircraft, missiles, naval construction and nuclear deterrence.
That has been helped by President Emmanuel Macron, who once lamented that Nato was “brain dead” but had the prescience to argue that Europe must become autonomous rather than permanently dependent upon Washington.
But even France faces difficult choices. Defence spending is scheduled to rise sharply under the 2024–30 Military Programming Law, yet there is mounting pressure on its public finances with demands for welfare, health care and debt reduction.
While Germany’s €100 billion outlay on defence in 2022 was significant, “most of that is actually financed by debt”, said Dr Linus Terhorst, of the Royal United Services Institute think tank. “So defence companies have to think about how long Germany is actually capable of maintaining that.”
Germany, like much of Europe, has its own economic problems, he added, with a declining automotive industry, over-commitment to pensions and an ageing population. “So people that think about this long term can see that there's a crunch coming. The orders are coming in but the question is, are they going to be sustainable so that industry feels confident to invest in its capacity?”
However, Germany is at least committing, with its biggest company, Rheinmetall, building seven munitions plants across the continent. Mr Tusa lamented that Britain was not so quick with six new munitions plants meant to be operational by 2030, “but for goodness’ sake, the war’s meant to start in 2029!”
Poland has emerged as Europe's standout spender. Defence expenditure is expected to exceed 4 per cent of GDP this year, the highest proportion in Nato. Warsaw has placed orders worth tens of billions of dollars for Abrams tanks, Himars rocket systems, F-35 fighters, South Korean K2 tanks and K9 self-propelled artillery, while also expanding its armed forces towards 300,000 personnel.
Yet Poland emphasises the reality that Europe must confront: its industrial limitations in producing new equipment, which must be imported because manufacturers cannot deliver quickly enough.
Weapons fragmentation
Ukraine has exposed not only Europe’s difficulty in replacing the shells, missiles and tanks consumed on the battlefield but also the immense variety of kits its armies possess.
The EU still has dozens of separate procurement systems, multiple tank designs, several fighter aircraft programmes and competing defence manufacturers.
This is “low-hanging fruit” that Europe could rapidly address, said Dr Terhorst.
“We need to co-ordinate these systems more closely, agreeing on a joint platform that we all want to use.” The idea, he contended, should be to “pool industrial capability” but also to look at joint orders. “Defence ministries often don't manage to call one another and say ‘actually we all need new Patriot missiles, should we just all order them together so we might be able to get a better deal?’”
Geography also plays a significant role in how seriously countries are tooling up their military power. Those on the borders with Russia – the Baltic states, Poland and Scandinavia – feel the threat the most and have built up their resources accordingly.
“The further east or north you go, you see the industrial base and fundamental change in production capacity in order to deter a war,” said Dr Terhorst.
The greater the distance from Russia, the less the spend, with Spain and Italy both investment laggards, a category Britain could soon find itself in.
If Britain and others were going to take “a serious approach to defence acquisition”, it had to be done on the understanding of future capabilities, requirements and capacity, “and we are so not there”, said Dr Nusbacher. “The further away from Ukraine, the less well we understand the realities.”
