It was a taste of what could become one of the decisive threats next year, when the flight path between Dublin and Britain’s Sellafield nuclear reactor was disrupted by unidentified drones.
On the incoming jet was Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his wife, minutes away from landing at Dublin Airport, slightly ahead of schedule.
After an Irish naval vessel reported that a number of drones were manoeuvring 36km north-east of the city – Sellafield is just 200km from the capital – Ireland’s Justice Minister Jim O’Callaghan said it was a “co-ordinated threat” to “put pressure” on Europe and Ukraine.
Just days later, the menace shifted. The French Navy opened fire on drones detected over a highly sensitive site housing the country’s fleet of nuclear submarines.
The drones at Ile Longue naval base were ultimately intercepted with jamming systems, but their presence over one of the continent’s most heavily protected sites sent a clear message: Europe is waking up to significant vulnerabilities to its military and civilian nuclear sites, and Russia is widely suspected to be behind the activity.
Nuclear threat
France has 19 nuclear power stations, Britain has five − including Sellafield, in Cumbria, north-west England − and many more are spread across the continent. Defence analysts have warned that a hostile state could target a vulnerable power station rather than resorting to the outright belligerence of launching a nuclear weapon.
Causing a nuclear incident with several drone strikes would be difficult, but even a limited attack could cause symbolic and economic damage. Fallout could include enforced shutdowns, mass evacuations and financial market panic, all without a state crossing the nuclear threshold.
“What if Russia just blows up one of the nuclear power plants in the UK using drones that are flown from within the UK?” said Ed Arnold, a senior military analyst at the Royal United Services Institute think tank. “That’s a different vector of threat, but it would achieve the same result from a Russian perspective.”
He added that the sites’ “vulnerabilities are really quite critical, because this is hard to defend against,” and that even just flying drones over sensitive sites “is cheap, deniable and has a high economic impact”.
Ukraine, on one level, is responsible for tactics that were previously the stuff of imagination. Its remarkably successful Operation Spider-Web in June demonstrated the changed boundaries of warfare.
The operation used more than 100 short-range kamikaze drones launched from lorries parked within 10km of several Russian airbases, destroying 11 Russian long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
“Although it was a costly lesson, it likely opened Moscow’s eyes to the opportunities afforded by these capabilities,” wrote Dr Daniel Salisbury in an International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank paper on the growing threat. “Even minimal capability can use emerging technologies to hold nuclear assets at risk,” he added.
A year ago, the idea of a head of state being targeted for assassination by drones seemed like a plot from a Tom Clancy novel. Not any more. Presidential security details now carry drone jammers that resemble oversized guns.
But it is not just the French and Irish incidents that are setting off a wave of concern over Europe. Last month, drones were spotted over Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium on three consecutive nights.
New modes
In the Netherlands, guards fired at drones over Volkel Air Base, which hosts US nuclear weapons under Nato’s nuclear-sharing arrangements. Earlier this month, Dutch F-35 fighter jets were scrambled to intercept a drone.
Similar incidents have been reported around RAF Lakenheath in eastern England, which is likely to soon host US nuclear weapons after a two decade absence.
What is troubling the authorities is that the flights are clustered around high-value nuclear and military sites, with drones larger and more capable than those usually used by hobbyists.
“These are not people flying toys,” said Belgium’s Defence Minister, Theo Francken, after the Kleine-Brogel incursion. “They came to spy, to see where the F-16s are, where the ammunition is and other highly strategic information.” Furthermore, some of the UAVs flew higher and proved resistant to jamming.
This adds to a series of incidents since September in which drones flew over civilian airports across Eastern Europe, as well as Germany and Scandinavia.
The flights, likely conducted by criminal gangs and paid for in cryptocurrency by Moscow, could well be construed as “hostile reconnaissance” to look into sites or indeed test their anti-drone technology for a future conflict.
Drones can also gather real-time imagery that satellites cannot and if one could capture either a French nuclear-armed submarines leaving Ile Longue or a Royal Navy one departing Faslane in Scotland it would give enemies a significant tracking advantage.
Drones everywhere
Hostile states can also use the rapidly expanding civilian drone market to blend into the noise to hide their true intentions. In Britain it is estimated that by 2030 there could be 76,000 commercial drones operating in its airspace, according to The Economist. And across Europe, more than 3,800 close encounters between drones and aircraft were recorded last year − more than double the previous year.
Drones, Mr Arnold argued, are perfectly suited to “grey zone” operations, those activities that fall short of open warfare but inflict disruption and apprehension.
Annabelle Walker, an analyst at the intelligence company Sibylline, also suggested that Russia has a strong interest in probing Nato’s readiness.
“The use of drones has exposed a particular gap in European countries,” she said. “Testing response times, decision-making and co-ordination tells you a lot and it can all be done below the threshold of war.”
Shoot 'em down?
Shooting down drones risks collateral damage. Main defences include jamming or “spoofing”, in which drones are tricked into misidentifying their location. Jamming is less effective against autonomous drones programmed to strike or that are using fibre-optic control − as seen widely in the Ukraine-Russia war.
Defenders can use physical countermeasures such as guns that shoot nets, and shotguns, which are broadly carried in Ukraine. The National understands that Kyiv is set to unveil next year a state-of-the art interceptor drone. The counter-drone industry is now becoming a major market for defence companies.
To defend against a serious attack on a nuclear site, governments must identify vulnerable locations then use a layered defence of radar, electronic warfare and trained personnel dedicated to counter-drone operations, said Douglas Barrie of the IISS.
But air defence was an area where European states had underinvested for decades since the Cold War ended. “Western Europe and the UK really need to pay more attention as this is back on the agenda in a big way,” Mr Barrie told The National.
“Moscow is clearly in the frame, and they’re testing the boundaries of what they can get away with before the other side pushes back,” he added.
Mr Zelenskyy’s near-miss over Dublin was not necessarily an act of war but it was a warning − as were the other incidents − and Moscow may well consider further disruptive operations that avoid open conflict.
It is now a question of whether Europe can strengthen its defences against a threat that will only intensify.
