At the beginning of this year, many observers believed that this region had finally settled on a new path. The tumult of the Arab Spring had given way to a sense of destiny for some of those countries swept up by the uprisings. And yet, with only a few hours left in 2013, most of the predictions have since been proven wrong.
To be fair, who would have predicted a year ago that Iran would make overtures towards the United States and sign an interim agreement limiting the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions? Or that Syrian president Bashar Al Assad would not only still be in power allegedly after using chemical weapons on his own civilians but that his position would be strengthened? Or that in Tunisia, the spiritual birthplace of the Arab Spring, the Islamist party would voluntarily relinquish power to a caretaker government?
In Egypt, the army sided with the people to remove Mohammed Morsi. The military, and indeed millions of Egyptians, believed that the Muslim Brotherhood was taking their country into the unknown – as polarisation and tolerance of Islamic extremists reached worrying levels.
For Syria, a year ago, the talk was mostly about when, not if, the Assad regime would fall, even if it did not cross Barack Obama’s explicit “red line” of using its chemical weapons during the bitter and bloody civil war. That red line was reportedly crossed five times before August, when government forces used a cocktail of chemical weapons, including sarin gas, on a rebel-held section of Damascus.
But the end result of that period was to show that the Western public had little appetite for involvement in more conflicts in this region. Instead, Russia brokered a deal for Syria to relinquish its chemical arsenal, the deadline for which will expire today without achieving its stated goal. Meanwhile, with the tide of the war shifting towards both hardline jihadist groups and the regime’s forces, Mr Al Assad began – remarkably and questionably – to emerge as the least-worst option in the eyes of the West.
In Libya, the question was always whether the nation’s educated populace and oil resources would outweigh the effect of private militias and the lack of civil institutions. The increasing uncertainty there shows they have not, at least yet. To the surprise of few, the sectarian violence in Iraq continues to escalate and the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks still resemble a mere sideshow to the construction of more settlements.
That’s the bad news. But in the Middle East, there is often bad news. There is also much to be optimistic about. The unexpected rapprochement between Iran and the West, even if motivated by sanctions rather than genuine bonhomie, could pay dividends for a range of conflicts, from Lebanon to Syria, and from Iraq to the Gulf. Yes, the motivations of Iran are still to be properly established. And, yes, there is scepticism in this region about whether a genuine agreement is possible. But it is a start.
So, too, is the agreement last week in Yemen to move towards a federal system, an agreement that could contain the separatist movement in the south and avert further political (and real) conflict. And other countries that sometimes seem fragile have proved remarkably resilient: Lebanon is holding firm against the spillover from Syria, as is Jordan.
That, in the end, is the great power of the Middle East. Often divided by politics, it is united by people.
Despite the enormous challenges the region faces, the vibrant communities, the deep ties of family and culture, and the strength and resilience of individuals shine through.
Difficulties or not, there is no other place in the world we’d rather call home.
