The Afghan government of national unity, set up under an agreement brokered by the US secretary of state John Kerry, only announced its first cabinet nominations on Monday after 107 days of hard bargaining between the two rival camps. The agreement appointed Ashraf Ghani as president and Abdullah Abdullah as chief executive officer, a post akin to prime minister.
In Kabul in December, in a ceremony held in private, the US General John Campbell formally closed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Mission “Resolute Support” comprising of 12,500 troops drawn from Nato countries replaces the ISAF. These troops will train and support the Afghan forces.
The 2014 presidential election, which Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, predicted “could well turn into an all-out battle for the country’s future” has proven far more divisive than the US had hoped.
Disclosure of a recent EU report pointing to electoral fraud will put pressure on the nominal power sharing arrangement, which has held for now. Suffice to say, the two sides do not trust each other.
In brokering this power sharing agreement, the US has not learnt from history.
Afghanistan does not have a culture of power sharing. Following the ousting of Soviet-supported Najibullah in 1992, the Peshawar Accord power-sharing deal led to civil war and the rise of the Taliban.
Much of the worry regarding the stability in Afghanistan relates to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which the US equipped hoping that it will shore up the regime left behind.
The ANSF, short on professionalism and deficient on equipment, will remain dependent upon the US for logistics, intelligence, air support and much more.
High turnover, due to an enduring fear of the Taliban and general lack of care for the ordinary soldier, means 60,000 new recruits will need to be found every year. In a society with strong tribal loyalties, young men find it difficult to resist peer pressure. So they desert. With the cover of foreign forces gone, the morale of those who join the ANSF will be tested.
Funding the ANSF remains a headache. The 2012 Nato Chicago Summit decided that the Afghan government would contribute $500 million annually towards security starting in 2015 taking on full costs by 2024.
The remaining $3.6 billion will be borne by the international community. Even if the Afghan contribution reaches $4.1 billion in 2024, inflation and additional needs mean that another $2.8 billion are required to keep the force at the current levels.
Afghanistan faces severe and continuing budgetary constraints leaving the country at the mercy of international donors. But donor fatigue will have adverse implications for the future of the country.
Afghanistan, a majority Pashtun country with deeply rooted tribal traditions and customs, has always had a nominal central figure to unify around. The western-style system where power is divided does not blend with the culture and psyche of Afghan society.
Afghanistan cannot be stabilised without more active international cooperation and yet the interests of many regional players intersect here. The collision of India-Pakistan interests in Afghanistan does not bode well for stability in the country.
Sajjad Ashraf is an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He was a member of the Pakistan foreign service from 1973-2008
