Trump-Xi summit is a meeting of opposites

Alan Philps previews the first official meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping

China's president Xi Jinping attends the official welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Helsinki. Martti Kainulainen / Lehtikuva via AP
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The American and Chinese leaders are often put in the same bracket – that of nationalist leaders with a “strongman” style, such as India’s Narendra Modi, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin, who has perfected this approach to governing Russia over the past 17 years.

But the differences between the two men are more startling than their similarities. Xi Jinping is the ultimate insider, with a deep understanding of the workings of the Communist Party from his father, one of the first generation of leaders under Mao Zedong.

Donald Trump, by contrast, has switched political allegiance five times and delights in playing the role of the lone gunslinger in western movies who rides into town to drive out the bad guys. With his White House split between a “Leninist” faction under chief strategist Stephen Bannon, who wants to destroy the federal government and rebuild it, and more moderate voices, it is not surprising that he has failed so far to notch up any great achievements.

As is normal for the Chinese leadership, Mr Xi articulates policy in terms of frameworks, often combining a number of abstract ideas. Mr Trump is a man who trusts his instincts and his ability to communicate by Twittter. The words “policy framework” do not come readily to his tongue.

All these differences have combined to set a dramatic backdrop to this week’s meeting between the two men, at Mr Trump’s opulent Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida. If the relationship between Washington and Beijing is the key to world stability, then rarely has a summit been convened with so many explosive issues to discuss.

During his election campaign Mr Trump accused China of “raping our country” with its export-orientated industries, and threatened a 45 per cent tax on imports. He is promising a huge boost to defence spending, to challenge China’s attempts to extend its control over the East and South China Seas. On the issue of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, where China and the United States have co-operated in the past, Mr Trump said recently: “If China is not going to solve North Korea, we will.” That suggests a military option.

Perhaps most seriously from Mr Xi’s point of view, Mr Trump came to power with an instinct to abandon the long-standing “One China” policy under which Washington recognises only the government in Beijing and has no formal relations with Taiwan.

It is here that the different styles of the two leaders come into sharp focus: the Chinese diplomatic machine got to work fast on the Trump White House, which is still not fully staffed. It has focused its efforts on the president’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, whose global and domestic remit as senior adviser seems to know no bounds.

The Chinese ambassador Cui Tiankai was able to persuade the White House that there would be no contact between the presidents until the One China policy was recognised. Mr Trump duly did that in February, and the White House announced it as a concession to Mr Xi, a rare step backwards for a president who claims to be always winning.

Against this background Mr Trump looks like a “paper tiger” – Mao’s favourite description of the US government. But the more likely explanation is that Mr Trump’s concession could be the platform for China and the US do work together on the topics which are closest to the president’s heart – jobs for American workers.

It is well within Mr Xi’s power to reduce the dumping of cheap steel on the American market, to restrain the global ambitions of state-backed Chinese firms in buying up assets in the US and to open up China to some more US imports.

Mr Xi’s interest for the next few months is for a quiet life – he hopes to cement his hold on power at the Communist Party Congress in November. A smiling face and good relations with Washington will show him to be the man to lead the country at a difficult time.

The last thing that Mr Xi wants at this stage is rising tensions with the US, which a small incident – say a collision involving US and Chinese aircraft or ships – could whip up into an outpouring of nationalist fervour leading to anti-American rioting in Shanghai and the smashing of Starbucks stores. So the Chinese interest is in a smooth, scripted summit, though that is not quite the Trump style.

The issue that may ruin the script is North Korea, which US experts believe will be able within the next four years to send a nuclear missile to California. Mr Trump does not want this threat hanging over him when – as he hopes – he runs for re-election and his opponents blame him for doing nothing about it.

The Chinese claim that North Korea is not their ally any more, and that they have no ability and no desire to strong-arm Kim Jong-un. They point out that members of the Kim dynasty believe they would all be hanging from a noose if they followed the example of Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qaddafi in abandoning a nuclear arms programme. So long as US policy of “de-nuclearisation” is a code for Iraq-style regime change – which it is in the minds of many in Washington – then there is no solution.

For the past 20 years the US has tried various types of sanctions but none has worked. Washington is now suggesting that Chinese banks and firms could be sanctioned for working with North Korea.

The prospect of the US destroying North Korean nuclear and missile assets on the ground is now very real – even though a war would almost certainly devastate South Korea, with hundreds of thousands dead in the two Koreas and catastrophic consequences for the global economy. But with an unpredictable president in the White House, the Chinese have to be ready for anything. This is where the Washington-Beijing relationship is at its most fragile.

Alan Philps is a commetator on global affairs

On Twitter: @aphilps