Violence in Kashmir has flared up again. This time the trigger was the killing of 21-year-old rebel commander Burhan Wani. The tech-savvy poster boy of the Hizbul Mujahideen – an indigenous militant outfit – Wani represented new-age militancy in Kashmir.
His brush with militancy came about not because of any ideological drift but as the result of the killing of his brother by security forces and the sense of indignation it provoked. It was not an individual phenomenon created by a personal ideology, but the product of the alienation and injustice of prevailing political dynamics. The lack of agency, ownership and engagement exacerbated by the excesses of unreceptive governments not only spawned growing radicalism, especially among the youth, but also rekindled the appetite for a shift back to violent methods of protest.
For Kashmiris, Wani was the emblem of resistance and symbolised the defiance of India and the combating of its “constant violations” in Kashmir. His killing became the release valve for a more deep-seated and grave resentment.
After a decade of relative calm, how did Kashmir get here again? More than a decade of armed insurgency has generated conflict fatigue in Kashmir.
The peace overtures that began in 2003 between India and Pakistan were widely welcomed in Kashmir. The confidence-building measures from peace talks generated much hope.
The engagement of the moderate faction of the separatist leadership by the government of India, the introduction of a bus service and trade mechanism between the divided parts of Kashmir and relative peace along the line of control created a feel-good factor providing much needed relief.
The Mumbai attacks of 2008 proved the decisive bolt, dismantling the peace edifice. External reversals coincided with internal strife as controversy over the transfer of forest land rocked Kashmir the same year.
The resulting unrest and communal friction including an economic blockade jolted Kashmir. Within the milieu of unreasonably raised expectations and a desperate hope, the ensuing upheavals of 2009 and 2010 left more than 200 people dead and thousands injured, rupturing the cautious trust and optimism the people of Kashmir were so painstakingly nurturing with India.
While New Delhi was able to contain the unrest it was unable to contain the anger or the sense of betrayal. Having invested tremendous political and emotional capital in the peace process, Kashmiris felt let down and a siege mentality set in.
Rather than reaching out to Kashmir especially at a time when Pakistan was consumed by its own domestic challenges, New Delhi added to the despondency, by stoking controversies.
Within any conflict resolution, mechanisms such as optics, gestures and political timing play an important role – a reality New Delhi seems completely oblivious to.
In the context of rising militant attacks in Kashmir, the killing of Wani was probably meant to signal the vulnerability and susceptibility of militant activity within Kashmir.
It was meant to be a show of power and ability while also function as deterrence. The timing however is precarious coming at the height of summer when a drawn out bloody unrest is inevitable.
The killing could further encourage the militants to carry out reprisals, while luring their already galvanised Pakistani cohorts to cross over and undertake deadlier attacks, kept somewhat in check earlier by Nato’s presence. Pakistan has been handed diplomatic leverage and the ability to undermine India’s image abroad by showing its human rights violations.
The resulting and increased violence could further destabilise the region.
Tragically the faceless dead will soon dwindle into a mere statistic while providing separatists a new lease of life – yet it’s anyone’s guess whether they have the autonomy or the will to deliver.
The disconnect between New Delhi and Srinagar could be sealed. Revelling in a misplaced triumphalism, it wasn’t just New Delhi’s ability to break the back of militancy but also the Kashmiris’ pursuit of peace that enabled the intervening negative peace.
As New Delhi refrained from political engagement, Kashmir forced its own engagement – regrettably through the barrel of the gun.
While this summer of unrest too will pass, subdued back to a manageable calm, it will not be the last of the cycle of conflict blighting Kashmir, but also India.
As New Delhi grapples with the present cycle it will do well to revisit its aims and the means towards those aims within the valley.
Asma-Khan Lone is an assistant professor at Jindal School of International Affairs in India
