The Camp David summit with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders has the Obama administration casting about for ways to enhance security assurances. Fearful that a probable nuclear accord with Iran would mark a strategic shift towards Tehran as regional guarantor, the GCC is speculating on a worst-case scenario.
America abandoning its security ties to the GCC, however, is highly unlikely. Even if negotiators reach agreement with Iran, there is no linkage to any wider US-Middle East policy. In fact, the divorce of the Iran deal from any larger US strategy was one of the criticisms that former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz made of the administration in The Wall Street Journal.
Nonetheless, such fears cannot be wished away. Occasional White House hints suggest it hopes that a nuclear accord would lead to a thaw in US-Iranian relations. Such a fading enmity makes the Gulf’s fears almost inevitable.
It is worth noting that it has not been a case of either/or. Until the 1979 Iran revolution, US security policy in the Gulf was based on supporting the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia. The strategic importance of the Gulf states would not disappear with an Iran deal. But any renewed version of America’s “twin pillar” diplomacy would require a detente if not reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
A formal alliance, as the United States has with Nato or Japan, would require Congressional ratification and is off the table. But instability in the region and the Gulf’s importance argues for an enhanced security relationship.
There may be some possibilities to be gleaned from the long-standing US security relationship to Taiwan. While short of an alliance, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) is instructive. It requires the US to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future “a threat” of “grave concern”. It stipulates that in such circumstances, the US would “provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature” and “to maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” that jeopardise Taiwan’s security.
In addition to the TRA, when the US normalised relations with China, it gave an informal pledge, known as the “six assurances” to Taiwan. These included a commitment to keep arms sales open-ended, to not alter its position on sovereignty over Taiwan, and to not pressure Taipei to enter into negotiations with the People’s Republic of China.
Unlike the Nato Article 5 commitment – that an attack on one member is an attack on all – or the firm commitment to defend Japan if attacked, the TRA did not commit the US to defend Taiwan if attacked. But it did lock the US into efforts to help Taipei defend itself, and the “grave concern” language implied the US might take military action.
Most Asia analysts assume that if China took unprovoked military action, the US would intervene. Though Beijing-Taipei relations are relatively smooth, forthcoming elections in Taiwan could well see tensions rise. However, if Taiwan provoked Beijing by formally declaring independence, there is a good chance that the US would not respond. Since the TRA was passed, the ambiguity in the security relationship has been a factor reinforcing stability.
Even Saudi’s hints that it may go nuclear if Iran does has a Taiwan precedent. On two previous occasions in the 1970s and 1980s, the US detected secret Taiwanese efforts to build nuclear capabilities. The US in effect, forced a choice: security ties or strategic independence. Any enhanced US-GCC relationship should have understandings about the effect of nuclear proliferation on US security obligations
Of course, the situation concerning the GCC is very different. But the Taiwan example may be helpful in crafting stronger assurances to the GCC than are currently the case. Perhaps some Congressional mandate to help the GCC defend itself and a US commitment to view with “grave concern” any outside aggression could help better reassure America’s strategic partners.
After Mr Obama’s “red line” fiasco over Syria and Gulf concern about the US-Iran reconciliation, the administration desperately needs a creative approach to enhance its security relationship with GCC nations. Drawing lessons from the Taiwan experience is not a bad place to start.
Robert A Manning is a senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council and its Strategic Foresight Initiative
On Twitter: @RManning4
