Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, centre, with US secretary of state John Kerry and the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura. Brendan Smialowski / Reuters
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, centre, with US secretary of state John Kerry and the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura. Brendan Smialowski / Reuters
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, centre, with US secretary of state John Kerry and the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura. Brendan Smialowski / Reuters
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, centre, with US secretary of state John Kerry and the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura. Brendan Smialowski / Reuters

Russia’s ability to resolve the Syrian crisis is overstated


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Talks in Vienna last Friday on a political solution for the Syrian conflict ended with no clear solution apart from a mutual commitment to continue the process. With 17 countries involved, along with the UN and the EU, the main point of difference remained the eventual fate of Bashar Al Assad.

That neither Mr Al Assad’s representatives nor Syrian opposition groups participated suggests that much work needs to be done. Having intervened to protect the regime, Russia is insistent that only the Syrian people should decide on the complexion of a new government. Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, commented it was not for others to decide if “Assad has to go or to stay”.

While the meeting did mark a new impetus in the diplomatic process, the cautious tone adopted by Mr Lavrov in Vienna is at some variance with recent rhetoric from the Kremlin.

In a recent speech in Sochi, Vladimir Putin denounced the US in fiery terms. He criticised Washington for playing a “double game” with regional terrorists. Justifying his tough stance towards extremist groups, Mr Putin told his audience that the “streets of Leningrad taught me that if a fight is inevitable, you have to hit first.”

However, recent Russian strikes in Syria have been predominantly directed at anti-Assad factions rather than at ISIL. As well as providing such overt support to the regime, rumours of an agreement between Baghdad and Moscow over targeting ISIL in Iraq suggest that Russia is seeking to expand its Middle East intervention to boost its influence with Haider Al Abadi’s government in Iraq. This would constitute a direct challenge to the US. Some senior Iraqi politicians and Shia militia leaders, frustrated by the US-led coalition’s slow progress against ISIL, have urged Mr Al Abadi to seek more help from Moscow. Russian participation in a new intelligence-sharing centre in Baghdad, along with Iraq, Iran and Syria, suggests that the Kremlin is increasingly emboldened in its quest to undermine the position of the US and its allies.

In response, the US is seeking to deploy special forces and attack helicopters to revitalise their operations against ISIL. Washington warned that any agreement between Russia and Iraq on air strikes would prompt a basic re-evaluation of US policy towards the Abadi government along with current commitments to aid the Iraqi armed forces. Gen Joseph Dunford, the new chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, recently won assurances that Iraq would not seek Russian help.

However, in view of Washington’s subsequent decision to drop its opposition to Iran’s participation in the Vienna talks, the Kremlin could be forgiven for drawing the conclusion that its assertive regional policy is paying dividends. Iran’s inclusion in the talks will boost Russia’s diplomatic hand given that Tehran is the only other staunch backer of Mr Al Assad that is also in a position to offer material aid. Threatening to take the fight over the border into Iraq also gave the Russian president an easy win in that it allowed him to project his willingness to seize the initiative on combating ISIL in contrast to Barack Obama’s perceived dithering in the face of the extremist threat.

Moscow is evidently aware that symbolism is of as much value as actual action in the current situation. The truth is that Russia’s influence on the situation and its ability to resolve the current crisis can be easily overstated. While he relishes an opportunity to score propaganda points against the US, Mr Putin is well aware that Russia’s military intervention can achieve little apart from propping up Mr Al Assad in his coastal enclave. What was less noticed in his Sochi speech was Mr Putin’s comment that “we need to unite all forces – the regular armies of Iraq and Syria, the Kurdish militia groups and various opposition groups ready to make an actual contribution to the defeat of terrorists”.

While the Russians have enough power to protect Mr Al Assad’s regime, their ability to make a significant difference elsewhere is questionable.

The Russian strike force in Syria, estimated to be between 30 and 35 aircraft, is currently carrying out more than 60 sorties a day and will almost certainly intensify operations over the next few weeks. However, while the tempo of Russian operations is comparable with the US-led coalition’s strike rate since August last year, it is difficult to see how Russian action can be more effective given ISIL’s resilience until now. In addition, the Russians lack the precision-guided weapons of the quality and quantity available to the US and its allies.

Mr Putin’s call for a local coalition of forces to defeat ISIL was a realistic assessment that Russian strikes can only have a limited impact. When international talks in Vienna resume at the end of next week, the Russian delegation will play a full part in what will probably be tortuous efforts to reach a political solution. While the Kremlin is committed to supporting the regime for the time being, Moscow accepts that the Syrian president cannot be held in place indefinitely against the wishes of his people. Russia’s rumoured military intervention in Iraq looks like a feint within the wider geopolitical game in the region. Mr Putin’s policy remains to reap credit for pursuing extremists while also forcing the major international and regional powers to acknowledge Russia as indispensable to a settlement.

Stephen Blackwell is an international politics and security analyst