Hizbollah’s plans in Lebanon rely on Syrian war

The presidential vacuum in Lebanon bears heavily on the conflict in Syria, writes Michael Young

A Lebanese man covers his nose from the smell as he passes by a pile of garbage on a street in Beirut, Lebanon. Bilal Hussein / AP Photo

Asked last week about what lies ahead for Lebanon, a Lebanese politician explained in private this way: “Everything depends on the battle for Aleppo. It appears to be lost. The Persian empire is winning.”

However, within a matter of days the situation in the city had changed, as forces loyal to president Bashar Al Assad, along with their pro-Iranian and Russian allies, failed to maintain a blockade on rebels in the eastern half of Aleppo. For many Lebanese this fight had profound implications for their own country, which has remained a hostage of the Syrian war.

The politician provided a hint of how the dynamics are perceived in Lebanon. Iran and Hizbollah have perpetuated a presidential void in the country since the end of the term of president Michel Suleiman in 2014. To many observers, Hizbollah seeks to win the military campaign in Syria and then use that momentum to alter the Lebanese political system to its advantage and that of the Shia community.

The rationale appears to be that the presidential vacuum in the country will give Hizbollah more leverage to impose changes it desires, in exchange for finally allowing the election of a president. But beyond the presidency, the fate of Aleppo will have wider implications for events in Lebanon, because the outcome there may very well determine the course of the Syrian conflict.

Until last weekend, the siege of Aleppo appeared to be the final stage in a regime strategy to reconquer western Syria. Had the Assad regime triumphed in Syria’s largest city, it would have been in a position to eliminate the last major rebel bastion in Idlib province, completing regime control over all of Syria’s major population centres between Damascus and Aleppo.

While this might not have signalled total victory, it would have altered the dynamics in Syria significantly by consolidating Mr Al Assad’s rule and undermining all talk of a transition away from the president. It might also have allowed Hizbollah to begin thinking of how to profit from this in Lebanon.

Instead, the reversal of fortunes, which may be momentary, means that Hizbollah will continue to lose men in Aleppo – which carries implications for the party on the domestic Lebanese scene. What this portends for Lebanon is more deadlock as the party continues to freeze the domestic political scene until there is a breakthrough in Syria.

Such dynamics have led some Lebanese adversaries of presidential hopeful Michel Aoun to make a counter-intuitive proposal: elect him as president now, in such a way as to fill the political vacuum and deny Hizbollah the latitude to do so later on its own terms.

Two of Mr Aoun’s old adversaries have adopted such reasoning: the Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, who this year endorsed him for the presidency, and Walid Jumblatt, who, far less enthusiastically, has said he would vote for Mr Aoun if it filled the country’s debilitating political void. Yet for Mr Aoun to gain a majority he would also need support from the Future bloc, led by former prime minister Saad Hariri.

Within Future there is disagreement over whether to vote for Mr Aoun. Mr Hariri has taken no decision, but one source in the bloc says he is keeping an open mind. While he doesn’t want to divide his bloc, he may believe that a new president brought in by his bloc’s votes could alter his own political fortunes, at a time when Mr Hariri is facing a major blow with the reportedly imminent sale of his bankrupt Saudi Oger company.

Electing a new president would probably damage, or at least hinder, Hizbollah’s strategy of using the deadlock in Lebanon to force constitutional changes on the party’s terms. The hurdles in this were well illustrated in a series of national dialogue sessions hosted last week by Nabih Berri, the speaker of parliament.

Mr Berri had initially portrayed the sessions as a potential forum for agreement over a package deal to resolve the presidential impasse and address other national issues. Some viewed this as a context in which Hizbollah could begin making its broader political ambitions clearer. However, nothing came out of it other than a fruitless, yet also highly symbolic, session on constitutional steps to fully implement the Taif agreement.

The symbolism lay in the fact that constitutional matters were addressed at all in sessions focused on more immediate issues, such as ending the presidential vacuum. That is precisely what Hizbollah’s adversaries in Lebanon do not want. They refuse to accept constitutional amendments brought about by the party’s political obstructionism. They want this done on the basis of a national consensus.

Which brings us back to Aleppo. Hizbollah’s ability to coerce its adversaries will depend on how its campaign in Syria goes. A struggling Hizbollah will only encourage more defiance in Lebanon, while a party flush with victory will be in a better position to get what it wants. That’s why, for now, the battle over Aleppo will feed the political battle in Beirut.

Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut

On Twitter: @BeirutCalling