For some observers, there will be a sense of deja vu about the talks taking place between the US and Iran over Tehran’s nuclear programme. Weeks of painstaking negotiations, disagreements over uranium enrichment and Iranian efforts to dislodge long-running US sanctions are compounded by will-they, won’t-they speculation regarding a potential deal.
It is reminiscent of 2015, the year in which the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – a multinational agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear activities to peaceful and civilian endeavours in return for sanctions relief – was finalised in Vienna. However, the Middle East has changed much over the past decade. Some of these changes, if coupled with sensible and strategic compromises, could lead to a new deal that may benefit the entire region.
Crucially, Iran’s network of armed proxies that once stretched from Lebanon to Yemen has lost much of its reach. Iran used much of the sanctions relief after 2015 to prop up some of these armed groups, adding to its internal economic crises. Tehran’s reduced ability to impose its agenda on regional neighbours has alleviated, to some degree, a sticking point that dogged earlier negotiations.
Diplomatically, too, much is different. In early 2023, Chinese mediation led Saudi Arabia and Iran to normalise relations, and in April of that year Tehran appointed an ambassador to the UAE for the first time since 2016. These improved relationships are even more important following the return to the Oval Office of US President Donald Trump, who, in 2018, pulled America out of the JCPOA. Mr Trump’s recent visit to the Gulf has signalled greater involvement by Washington in the Middle East, not less – a change with which Iran will have to reckon.
Few would benefit more from a new nuclear deal and sanctions relief than the Iranian people. Years of internal mismanagement and US restrictions, particularly on oil exports, have led to reduced state revenue, currency devaluation and high inflation, fuelling economic woes. Iran’s infrastructure is similarly ailing; last month, Danial Rahmat, a Tehran-based energy and geopolitics analyst, told The National that the country’s rail infrastructure “is next to collapse while its civil air fleet, shipping vessels, sea ports and highways network are kept operational with a low performance”.
On top of this, Iran needs electricity more than ever before. Rapid urbanisation and industrial development have put large demands on energy supplies, as have black-market activities such as unregulated crypto mining. A decade of underinvestment in electricity generation has not helped. A civilian-focused nuclear programme would benefit ordinary Iranians more than military spending.
Given these circumstances, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is some guarded optimism about the chances of an agreement being struck. In a recent interview with The National, former US national security adviser Jake Sullivan – a key figure in the 2015 deal – said “Iran is signalling in every way they possibly can that they want to do a deal”.
With stringent monitoring and a parallel process of incremental sanctions relief, a new deal is possible, and it could remove another lingering crisis from the world’s geopolitical risks. It would also continue a trend of new beginnings in the Middle East, seen most recently in countries such as Lebanon and Syria.
If Mr Trump is willing to face down the hawks in his Republican party, and Iran’s leadership is willing to sideline its own hardliners – as well as end its support for armed groups including Yemen’s Houthi militia – then it might be possible to at least re-establish a pragmatic understanding.
