Yemen’s status as a unitary state has never been a simple affair, and that was the case long before the Houthi rebels’ ultimatum this week to Yemen’s president to appoint a new government. After the Iran-backed Shia rebels took over Sanaa and large tracts of the country,they felt empowered to warn that if the government did not meet their approval, they would appoint a “national salvation council” instead.
Given that the Houthis are a minority Shia group within the mostly Sunni state, this might seem like a classic case of disproportional influence. But such is the murky network of allegiances of convenience as the country navigates the aftermath of the Arab Spring that the Houthis have support from those still loyal to ousted president Ali Abdullah Saleh and other allied tribes.
Yemen’s most recent manifestation as a single state has only been since 1990, when the collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated the Russian-supported People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, known as South Yemen, negotiating a peaceful unification with the Yemen Arab Republic, then ruled by Mr Saleh and known as North Yemen.
Even that unity was shaky, with a civil war breaking out in 1994 when secessionists from the south declared the creation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen. The secession fizzled out within months when troops from the north seized Aden.
The central premise behind Yemen’s Conference of National Dialogue, a GCC-brokered deal designed to find a peaceful way forward for the country after the end of Mr Saleh’s rule, was that the country would remain a single entity. Models based on varying degrees of federalism were designed to diminish the power of the secessionist calls being made out of the southern governates.
With the Houthis’ control of the capital and the important Red Sea port city of Hodeida, the southern provinces’ secessionist argument gains new vigour and appeal, making the prospect of Yemen breaking into two or more countries increasingly probable.
This would be bad on several levels, not least that Iran would do in Yemen, formerly within Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence, what it did with Hizbollah in Lebanon. A divided Yemen would have less influence in the region and be poorly placed to provide the stability and prosperity its people desperately seek. If Al Qaeda and its affiliates thrive in the south, it could threaten regional security. It is not in the interests of most Yemenis and ought not be allowed to happen.
