Last week, Lebanese and Israeli representatives met in Rome to discuss implementation of an important dimension of their recent agreement signed in Washington. The sides examined so-called pilot zones – areas in which the Lebanese army would be posted after an Israeli withdrawal. For now, they remain apart, but Lebanese President Joseph Aoun is scheduled to meet US President Donald Trump at the White House later today, and the Lebanese hope US pressure can increase Israeli flexibility.
The Lebanese want Israel to pull out of significant areas they occupy as soon as possible, to show that their controversial decision to engage with Israel can lead to the liberation of territory and the return of villagers. Israeli officials, in turn, have stressed they are keen to maintain “security zones” in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, showing their commitment to a full withdrawal is not guaranteed.
This Israeli position was reaffirmed after Mr Trump told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israeli forces must leave Syria and Lebanon: “They don’t want you there. You should redeploy,” the US President allegedly said, according to an Axios report.
The Lebanese authorities have come under legitimate criticism for agreeing to a framework agreement last month that placed the onus on Lebanon to meet Israeli conditions, with no guarantees Israel would withdraw its forces. The most Lebanon got out of the agreement was a vague statement “that [Israel] has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon”.
The text was so one-sided that the head of the Lebanese delegation, Simon Karam, reportedly left a negotiating session before being persuaded to return. That said, now that Lebanon has signed the framework agreement, it has two options. It can move forward with the agreement, as bad as it is, and try to take advantage of US backing to obtain Israeli concessions. Or, it can renounce the agreement and declare its support for armed resistance against Israel.
However, the latter choice would lose Lebanon all US support, open the country up to a devastating Israeli response and provoke more destruction of the south, with little likelihood Lebanon would liberate occupied land. Moreover, such a step would concede a major role to Iran in Lebanon, which is precisely what Lebanese officials want to avoid.
It is clear Beirut prefers to go with the first option, hoping to use all peaceful instruments available to push the Israelis out. They would be right in doing so, but a key prerequisite for this would be to reach a consensual decision on what Lebanon seeks to achieve. While the Israelis and their supporters in the US are focusing on concluding a peace agreement, it is becoming evident Lebanon could not sustain such an option domestically or regionally.
A consensus can be built around making Israeli withdrawals a priority and trying to obtain more affirmative statements from Israel on such withdrawals, possibly with timelines. This is where the pilot zones come in. The Lebanese army must post its best units in these zones to ensure they are solidly under state control and that Hezbollah cannot fire at Israel from these zones. This will lead to accusations that Lebanon is defending an enemy and its occupying forces, but there are ways to push back against this.
First, the Lebanese must insist that without an immediate return of the inhabitants, the pilot zones are meaningless. Here, US intervention with Israel would be essential, since the purpose of the pilot zone scheme is to lend credibility to the state and show that negotiations with Israel can produce actual results, which include bringing the displaced home.
Second, the army would be responsible only for neutralising their zones of control, which effectively means that outside these zones, Hezbollah could pursue its actions against Israeli forces in Lebanon. This could serve as leverage to compel the Israelis to widen the areas of Lebanese control, since it is unlikely Hezbollah would seek a confrontation with the Lebanese army in areas evacuated by Israel into which Shiite villagers are returning.
In parallel, if the Lebanese cannot secure a timetable for a full Israeli departure from Lebanon, they should insist that talks at least begin on border demarcation and security guarantees. This would compel the Israelis to officially recognise Lebanon’s borders, but also show a Lebanese willingness to neutralise all cross-border military activities targeting Israel. At the same time, discussions should begin on liberating Lebanese detainees in Israel.
On peace, Lebanon should remain non-committal, certainly until a full withdrawal of Israeli forces. Beirut’s position is to support the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, and therefore it should offer something short of peace until the initiative’s conditions are met, namely an armistice agreement. This is a widely acceptable position inside Lebanon and regionally.
Such an approach would not please Israel, but it could fulfil the demands Israel has publicly stated as its reasons for occupying Lebanon. It would also compel the Americans and Israelis to choose whether they want to make the perfect the enemy of the good by trying to impose a peace agreement that might otherwise undermine Lebanese security guarantees to Israel.
More importantly, this strategy could generate Shiite support in Lebanon among the displaced who can go home, even if Hezbollah opposes it. But the point is not to appeal to Hezbollah; it’s to limit the group’s margin of manoeuvre, allow the state to regain control of the south and bring villagers back, while avoiding a military confrontation with Hezbollah.
Lebanon signed on to a bad deal last month. However, there are ways to rectify this, or at least place the burden on Israel to justify its maximalist policies if it refuses all concessions.
