After a year of breathtaking changes in the Arab world, what awaits in 2026 is hard to predict

NA

With the speed and breadth of change in the Arab world and surrounding region in the past year, making sense of individual developments can be challenging, let alone predicting how the trajectory of change in the region will unfold in 2026. However, the fundamentals of good governance, job creation and peace-making remain vital for a positive outcome for this year.

On the last day of 2025, while much of the world was on leave, four major developments occurred that will likely shape how 2026 will unfold in the Middle East. Some were expected, others less so. First, the UAE withdrew its remaining troops from Yemen. Second, the pace of protests picked up in a number of Iranian cities. Third, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with US President Donald Trump and informally launched his election campaign. Fourth, the UN ended its mission in Iraq after two decades in the country. The significance of each event stands on its own merit and also contributes to a trend of new positioning for a number of countries of the region.

Yemen was perhaps the least expected area of dramatic change in the region as 2025 was ending, yet it is where key issues converge: the threat of armed groups and the short-sightedness of ignoring them, the failure of political processes to end wars and regional dynamics affecting domestic rivalries. A fragmentation among the anti-Houthi alliance means that, once again, militants benefit from the failure of political forces to agree on how best to rule Yemen. The Houthis remain largely intact, despite continued attacks on international shipping and a lack of seriousness in the political process to end the bitter war since 2014. As the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other southern groups made advances to hold more ground in Yemen over the past few weeks, Saudi Arabia’s surprise strikes on vehicles intended to be delivered to Emirati forces in the country raised questions about the ability of the anti-Houthi coalition to meet its objectives. While the ramifications of those actions will unfold, one thing is certain: the UAE is pulling out its forces from Yemen.

Ten years after it joined the coalition to help restore Yemen’s internationally recognised government, at the request of Saudi Arabia, the UAE is ending its mission. And as the Emirati role there has been focused on counterterrorism in the past 7 years, the withdrawal will undoubtedly affect these efforts. Like its decision to join the coalition in 2015 at the request of Riyadh and the Yemeni government, the UAE’s decision to conclude its mission reflects its agility in decision-making and ability move quickly. In a fast-changing region, fixed principles of peace making and a commitment to fight extremism are incredibly needed. How others will respond will be important to watch this year.

Yemen was perhaps the least expected area of dramatic change in the region as 2025 was ending, yet it is where key issues converge

Across the Gulf and into Iraq, the UN ended its two-decade presence in Iraq on December 31, 2025. The Iraqi government had made it a priority to return to “full sovereignty”, and declared it will no longer need the UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (Unami). This comes at a time Iraqi political forces are wrangling over the birth of a new government and have yet to deal with major challenges including tackling corruption, militant armed groups and 20 years of calls for a revision of the country’s constitution. Meanwhile, Mr Trump’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, issued a new year’s note saying Iraqi militias, largely trained and controlled by Iran, will be confronted this year. With no more UN presence and a clear interest from Iran to maintain its influence in Baghdad, having lost its footing in Damascus and Beirut, how developments unfold in Iraq will have regional consequences.

Perhaps the most under-reported and least understood in the region are the developments in Iran. Will these protests, the first major wave of protests since Israel and Iran’s 12-day war and America’s targeting of Iran’s nuclear programme, undercut an already weakened regime? Quite possibly, at a time when the economic pain of Iranians was often explained away by the government as being necessary to fund and train its proxies around the region. With the “defence strategy” of arming Hezbollah and Hamas in tatters, and the Iranian economy not much better off, the regional and internal dynamics of Tehran are coming to a head – including its support for the Houthis in Yemen.

On January 1, there were reports that two protesters were killed in the central Iranian city of Lordegan, and the following day Mr Trump weighed in on the protests, saying if peaceful protestors are killed, the US “will come to their rescue” and “we are locked and loaded and ready to go”. The threat from Mr Trump came only a few days after he threatened Iran from the podium of a joint press conference with the Israeli Prime Minister. Mr Netanyahu’s visit to the US, including publicly spending New Year’s Eve there, brought to light a bridging of differences between the two. Although not all is resolved, Mr Netanyahu benefited from largely positive comments and press in his sixth meeting with Mr Trump in 2025. Whether he will be able to impose his will on rejecting lasting peace in Palestine and win the upcoming Israeli elections will affect the Levant and beyond.

And yet, the Middle East is not one “Middle East” - and the Arab world extends beyond its regional borders or even Asia, deep into Africa. From the aspirations of the Gulf, to colliding interests in the Sahel, vested interests play a huge role in determining the course of internal strife. And we will see more of that this year.

Defending each nation’s sovereignty and maintaining the fight against extremists will continue to be a theme for 2026. Yemen, Sudan, Syria and places beyond all have their own specific internal dynamics, but the challenge of extremism is a real one to each of them and the wider region. Extremism not only in militant attacks, but also in the ethos and politics that can fill any vacuum of genuine political activity and domestic advancement. This year, like those that have preceded it for the first quarter of a century, leaders in conflict and post-conflict countries face the challenge of healing the social fabrics of countries that have endured war and creating jobs for the largest concentration of unemployed young people in the world. Syria, perhaps, stands out most of all as a country that is choosing to turn the corner on war and destruction. But for it to succeed, it will need the twin tracks of security and prosperity to move positively. How the Syrian administration's second year will unfold will be impacted not only by its internal progress, but by unpredictable regional dynamics that appear here to stay.