Venezuela and Ukraine are currently the top foreign-policy priorities for US President Donald Trump, but that hasn’t stopped his administration from pursuing other issues, old and new, as dictated by his instincts and temperament.
Indeed, Mr Trump is resolved to encircle Iran and Hezbollah everywhere from Caracas to Tehran, through Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon with direct measures and sharp warnings, including the introduction of advanced US drones into the equation. Yet his team is working to avoid war with Iran and its armed proxies, while continuing to deter Israel because for the US President, persuasion by pressure is still preferable over military force.
But in which direction is the needle of coercion and persuasion pointing right now?
In Venezuela, the US is trying to avoid military action while coaxing President Nicolas Maduro to step down using a mix of incentives and threats. The US President sees enormous strategic gain in expelling Russian influence from Latin America and blocking China’s backdoor access to sanctioned Iranian oil, facilitated by the Venezuela-Iran partnership.
That partnership extends to Hezbollah in Lebanon and includes drug trafficking, drone manufacturing, intelligence collaboration and money laundering to circumvent sanctions.
Mr Trump sees Venezuela as yet another means to choke the so-called “Axis of Resistance”, plus an opportunity to dominate global oil markets if and when Venezuela comes under US influence. Severing the arteries connecting Venezuela to this axis would require surgical, damaging military operations but these plans are ready if diplomatic persuasion fails.
The fallout for Iran and Hezbollah would be severe. Both are in fragile positions and fully aware that the Trump administration is cornering them with escalating intensity. A recent uproar in Iraq, following the publication of a government gazette listing Hezbollah among “terrorist organisations” whose assets are to be frozen, hasn’t subsided even after Baghdad insisted it was a mistake and promised an investigation. But whether this episode was accidental or a calculated test balloon, the message was clear, and the tools of containment are creative and diverse.
In Lebanon, the encirclement came through the gateway of negotiations with Israel. Iran and Hezbollah tried to prevent the Lebanese state from engaging in talks and were even prepared to provoke an Israeli war that would lead to a full occupation of southern Lebanon to thwart talks. The Iranian assault on Lebanese sovereignty was multi-pronged, accompanied by Hezbollah’s incitement against the state and attempts to undermine the Lebanese army’s credibility.
But the Trump administration responded with firm and unequivocal warnings demanding that Beirut swiftly enforce its decision to place all weapons under the exclusive authority of the state or Israel will do so by force, and Washington will not stand in the way.
Washington made it clear that negotiations with Israel cannot be ducked if Lebanon hoped to reclaim its rights. The US pledged to pressure Israel if Lebanon committed to talks and expanded the negotiation mechanism to include a civilian representative alongside the military figure in the ceasefire monitoring mechanism. It clarified that the goal is to demarcate the border and eventually normalise Lebanese-Israeli relations following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from positions it still holds, after Hezbollah’s disarmament.
The US message to Beirut was clear: either get serious about both state sovereignty and dismantling Hezbollah’s infrastructure or face imminent Israeli escalation. Lebanon’s leadership heard the message loud and clear. President Joseph Aoun responded decisively, appointing ambassador Simon Karam to head the Lebanese delegation in the “mechanism” meetings after Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri agreed to the move.
All three leaders understood the stakes: either the state regains its sovereignty or Lebanon invites destruction on itself. They acted before it was too late. This came as a shock to Hezbollah and Iran, especially after Tehran was informed that military action was no bluff – not just in Lebanon, but also directly against Iran if it escalated. The US made it clear that its superior drones are ready to strike if Tehran makes the wrong choice.
Thus, Iran has found itself hemmed in by US drones and encircled in regions extending from Venezuela to Lebanon and Iraq through warnings and action. Tehran, meanwhile, has also lost its base in Syria, collapsing its grand “Persian crescent” project.
The US vision for the proposed buffer zone in southern Lebanon rejects Iran and Hezbollah’s strategy of turning the area into a launchpad for provocation and destruction under the banner of “resistance”. The vision excludes Iran entirely, unless it boards the Middle East’s transformation train.
That buffer zone rests on two pillars: security and economy. The American vision prioritises stability, investment, reconstruction and prosperity through Arab, American and European partnership. This also serves to contain both the Iranian and Israeli visions for Lebanon’s future. These negotiations pushed forward by Washington and embraced by Beirut are therefore a step in the right direction.
At the very least, one can now answer the question every Lebanese person I meet asks: war or no war? The answer remains uncertain in such conditions, but what came before the negotiations is no longer what follows them. For now, war is postponed.
