The Lebanese government’s decision last Thursday to endorse the objectives of a US-drafted plan provoked a negative response from Hezbollah and, to an extent, its ally within the Shiite community, the Amal Movement. However, the two parties, realising the risk of isolating themselves further, did not withdraw their ministers from the government of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam.
The document presented to the Lebanese cabinet by the interim US envoy to Lebanon, Tom Barrack, outlined, among other things, a process for Hezbollah’s disarmament. Prior to its Thursday session, the Salam government had ordered the Lebanese army to prepare a plan by the end of August. This plan would implement the decision taken by the state to secure a monopoly over weapons by the end of this year.
The legal basis for this process is UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for the disbanding of all militias in Lebanon, Lebanese and non-Lebanese; as well as Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 Lebanon war. Resolution 1701 had imposed a Hezbollah pullback to behind the Litani River, but also reaffirmed the provisions of Resolution 1559.
It still remains unclear how the Lebanese government and army will be able to implement such decisions if Hezbollah continues to refuse to surrender its weapons. Both Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Mr Salam want to avoid violence at all cost, and seek to avert a rupture with the Shiite community, a majority of which supports Hezbollah and Amal.
One aspect that has been left largely unmentioned in this context is what Israel might do if Hezbollah and Amal manage to derail the government’s plan to disarm the party. Both parties, in their recklessness, have to grasp the real dangers if the Israelis resume their military campaign in Lebanon, especially given that they enjoy unconditional US support.
Hezbollah finds itself very lonely in Lebanon today. Many people blame it for having carried the country into a war over Gaza that was unnecessary, highly destructive, and allowed Israel to reoccupy parts of Lebanon, after it had pulled its forces out of the country in 2000.
Since last November, when the ceasefire was reached, Israel has continued to hit Hezbollah sites and target party officials, or alleged officials, almost on a daily basis. The Israelis also violated the ceasefire agreement by refusing to withdraw completely from Lebanon in January, as the agreement stipulated, a position supported by the Trump administration.
A proposal by Mr Barrack subsequently tied an Israeli pull-out from the Lebanese areas that it still occupies to the demilitarisation of Hezbollah. By drawing this link, the US envoy effectively placed the burden of the continued Israeli presence on the party.
The Israelis will certainly take this into consideration as they plan their strategy in Lebanon. If the Trump administration is willing to blame Hezbollah for the Israeli occupation, then this provides Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government several options for what to do next if the party continues to refuse to disarm.
Israeli forces can occupy more Lebanese territory up to the Litani River, and proceed to destroy all Hezbollah infrastructure south of that – though this process has already begun under the Lebanese army. Israel's leaders can then make a condition for withdrawal that the Lebanese government disarm Hezbollah, or even sign a peace treaty with Israel. Barring Lebanese acceptance, an expansionist Israel could even permanently annex Lebanese land.
A more ambitious plan would be for Israeli forces to occupy territory up to the Awwali River, at the level of the southern Lebanese city of Sidon, and make similar demands, or even contemplate annexation. This would empty the south of its Shiite population, while the ensuing humanitarian crisis would increase pressure on Hezbollah and the Lebanese state to comply with the Israeli government's demands.
If the Lebanese fail to do so, Israel could use its new installations in southern Lebanon to mount a long campaign to destroy Hezbollah positions and arms depots around Lebanon, using aircraft, drones, or commandos flown in by helicopter, as they did against a Hezbollah missile factory in Masyaf, Syria, last September.
Some observers feel that if the Israeli forces redeployed to southern Lebanon, this would provide a lifeline for Hezbollah, which could revive its resistance dimension by fighting the occupation. Perhaps, but the challenges are many. First, the party would be on its own in doing so, with many Lebanese wanting an end to the conflict with Israel. Second, without a regular arms supply line through Syria, the party’s capacities to sustain such a military effort would suffer.
And third, if Hezbollah tries to form a front against the Israeli presence, particularly along the Awwali, this would mean anchoring itself in non-Shiite areas, where local communities are deeply hostile to the group. Under such circumstances, Hezbollah would probably find it exceptionally difficult to mount an effective resistance struggle.
The Shiite parties, above all Hezbollah, are certainly conscious of their vulnerabilities. Moreover, Hezbollah does not appear to have a credible plan B. It is now under direct Iranian control, since its leadership cadre was decimated last year, and has been reduced to trying to defend an untenable status quo. The possibilities open to Israel make such a strategy even less likely to succeed, while the potential outcomes are deeply alarming.
