Political scientists and wider civil society from Armenia and Azerbaijan don’t often see eye to eye. After decades of war between the two countries their grievances run deep, with each side blaming the other for continued rounds of conflict.
But experts in Yerevan and Baku can now agree on one thing: the meeting held in Abu Dhabi on July 10 between their heads of government was a moment of respite for the South Caucasus. After months without a major meeting between the two sides (the leaders met briefly at the margins of the European Political Community summit in Tirana in May), Abu Dhabi was able to host their most comprehensive gathering in known history, attended by representatives who cover all key aspects of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.
Still, expectations should be managed. The two sides may yet be very far from signing a peace agreement, though a draft was announced earlier this year. There are thorny issues, like border demarcation, that remain unresolved. And there are competing visions for how the future of transport links should evolve. Nonetheless, the Abu Dhabi meeting has revived the diplomatic track, giving new hope for peace and stability, while calming fears of an imminent outbreak of war.
The risk of military escalation has come down considerably; as recently as December, foreign diplomats in Yerevan predicted that a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would likely take place by summer. But Abu Dhabi changed the atmospherics and the overall direction of talks.
At a joint dialogue last weekend, Azerbaijani, Armenian and Turkish think-tank experts discussed the impact of the Abu Dhabi dialogue. “There is comfort with the UAE as a benign, trusted facilitator,” reflected one attendee, Ahmad Alili of the Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre in Baku. “It was quite a good start and creates a new precedent for bilateral talks.”
One notable shift was the idea that the road to peace now could run through the global south, rather than the traditional interlocutors in Russisa and the West. Starting in the 1990s, the peace process had been jointly managed by Washington, Moscow and Paris as co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group. The arrangement reflected an idealistic notion that gained popularity after the collapse of the USSR that Russia and the West could collaborate to solve problems in the former Soviet republics.
But a new era of intense competition between the US and Russia derailed such thinking. The animosity accompanying the war in Ukraine, in particular, has cast a shadow over the South Caucasus, too. Washington has worked to expand its influence in Armenia and push out Russian influence wherever it could. The US and Russia are hardly able to talk to each other; co-hosting diplomatic initiatives between Armenia and Azerbaijan appears to be out of the question.
Instead, the two superpowers have launched parallel and often contradictory negotiation tracks, jostling for the opportunity to broker a landmark deal that would invariably be shaped to their liking. For Russia, it would be a deal that gave Moscow privileged influence over new transit routes and border crossings between Armenia and Azerbaijan – if their currently sealed border were to re-open.
The US, in contrast, would want to shape a deal that minimises Russia’s role in the region across multiple spheres. That would include much less reliance in Armenia on the Russian troops patrolling its borders with Iran and Turkey, as well as the Russian military base that has been in the country since the 1940s to maintain peace and stability. Were it to oversee a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which would also likely unfreeze relations between Armenia and Turkey, Washington would likely shape a new regional order in Russia’s backyard. That setup would seamlessly connect Europe and Turkey, a Nato ally, to Central Asia.
These are the stakes in an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal, and they illustrate the extent to which the South Caucasus could see a step change in any deal – even one brokered without superpower involvement. Stability begets development, and with a much-needed calm in the South Caucasus the peace dividend would be significant. Over time, trade routes that run from East-to-West and North-to-South could shorten transit times across key geographies. After the recent turbulence and conflict dynamics in Iran, this would provide the region with an undergirding of stability.
The talks in Abu Dhabi were also a remarkable first for direct diplomacy. It was the first major public meeting in which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan engaged in extended one-on-one talks, without Russians, Americans or any other third-country nationals in the room. This was a key demand for Azerbaijan, which has long wanted to deal with its neighbour on a bilateral basis. This may favour Baku given the imbalance of power between the two states – Baku has far greater military and energy resources to hand – but Armenia still benefits from the process. Yerevan is much better off with direct talks than with a complete break in the peace process, as it staves off the steep cost of armed conflict.
Short-term success in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process may be elusive. One of Azerbaijan’s preconditions for signing a deal has been a change in the text of Armenia’s constitution, eliminating references to the Armenian declaration of independence adopted in 1990. That would require a public referendum that could take place in June 2026, at the earliest, when a government panel is expected to submit a draft for a new constitution.
But there could be flexibility around even this sticking point. Having a revived process is already a major step forward, enabling parties to craft new solutions to their old concerns. During a press conference in Yerevan on Wednesday, Mr Pashinyan mentioned that the preliminary signing of a peace agreement was discussed in Abu Dhabi. This reinforces that the meeting has put the peace process on stronger footing.
Holding talks in the light of Abu Dhabi makes it more likely that Armenia and Azerbaijan will find their way forward, as it highlights the opportunity that lies ahead if they can prioritise the future over the past. Global powers interested in the development of the South Caucasus should continue to deliver a clear message: stability will bring prosperity to Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the time for military escalation is over. Armenia has shown its willingness to make steep concessions for the sake of peace. Azerbaijan should be satisfied by its victories in 2020 and 2023, pivot toward an orientation toward peace and use this unique opportunity to turn the page on the animosity in the South Caucasus.
Lara Setrakian is an award-winning journalist, social entrepreneur and co-founder of the Applied Policy Research Institute (Apri) of Armenia
Benyamin Poghosyan is a senior research fellow at Apri and former director of Armenia’s Ministry of Defence think tank
