The next US president is not going to change the Middle East for the 'better'

Then US president Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announce a Middle East peace plan in Washington in 2020. AFP

Until recently, there were still people willing to engage in the somewhat futile discussion of who, Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, would be “better” for the Middle East. Even assuming a consensus can be reached over what the term “better” means, now that the election has been held, we should understand that when it comes to the region, the only choice was always between the same alternative.

The reason for this is that Washington’s foreign policy in the region has been anchored for decades in an approach that seeks to maintain US hegemony, bolstered primarily by American military predominance and technology. US officials like to say that their country promotes regional stability, but all the evidence indicates that its behaviour and objectives are often as destabilising as those of its regional adversaries, above all Iran.

Moreover, in recent years, the relative US disengagement from the Middle East has been accompanied by a parallel development, namely increasing US reliance on Israel to impose a regional military and political status quo. The Israelis have exploited this to sustain a revisionist domestic and foreign policy of their own. Internally, they have sought to bury the Palestinian problem for good by undermining a two-state solution, and externally they have sought to reshape the region by neutralising all potential adversaries.

A protest calling for a ceasefire in Gaza in August outside the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, where Kamala Harris was nominated to become her party's presidential candidate. EPA

The relative US disengagement from the Middle East has been accompanied by increasing US reliance on Israel to impose a regional military and political status quo

Both Ms Harris and Mr Trump were fully in line with this approach during their campaigns. Further, as president, Mr Trump had positioned himself as an enemy of what he called the “deep state”, by which he meant the national intelligence and security establishment seeking to defend Washington’s global hegemony, at the expense of spending at home. But he never once challenged the deep state’s approach to Israel.

At the time, Mr Trump opposed foreign policy certitudes in such places as Europe, but he only reinforced them in the Middle East. He went with the consensus in bolstering US ties with Israel and isolating the Palestinians, and recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, while also legitimising Israel’s illegal annexation of the Golan Heights.

Ms Harris, in turn, was never very experienced, or seemingly concerned, with foreign policy. That’s why it was clear during the campaign that she was always likely to rely on the foreign policy establishment in Washington – one deeply committed to US regional supremacy and to supporting Israel as a prime contributor to this supremacy.

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In light of this, it is almost a certainty that in the coming years, very little will change in a region that continues to be chronically unstable, regardless of the bromides from either candidate. In order to strengthen its regional power, the US has created a vast network of military bases, or sent military assets, throughout the Middle East.

While the US has affirmed that this presence is aimed at maintaining regional peace, in the end this is a by-word for protecting an existing state of affairs that serves US interests. The implicit tension in this situation is that any threat to the equilibrium in place, any move by regional actors to challenge the US-dominated order, inherently invites violence. This is not stability so much as a form of enforced compliance.

Moreover, this situation will feed into the US rivalry with China, with the outcomes not necessarily to Washington’s advantage. For instance, the administration of President Joe Biden has been pushing for a regional economic project called the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (Imec), to create a trade network connecting India with Europe through the Middle East and Israel. For the Americans, the project is a potential substitute to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.

The only problem, however, is that Imec cannot make much progress in an unstable environment. As the Indian policy analyst Abhinav Pandya explained recently, India welcomed Imec, but was “sceptical about [its] future … because of the escalating conflict in the Middle East, but also because most of the infrastructural needs have yet to be built”.

In other words, a region shaped by a US trying to preserve its paramountcy, often through military force, is not one particularly reassuring to investors, because such a situation is bound to invite challengers. A more multipolar region, on the other hand, where interests are shared and some balance is achieved, is more favourable for long-term projects.

As Ms Harris or Mr Trump prepares to take office, neither is likely to break away from the prevailing pattern. If Ms Harris was supported by the likes of Dick Cheney, it’s because they knew it was much less probable that she would question the principles of American global power than Mr Trump. But that’s not understanding that Mr Trump, at least in the Middle East, is equally unlikely to abandon the US-Israeli headlock on the region.

Israel’s great success over the years has been its ability to insert itself as the prime interpreter of the Middle East in Washington. The flip side of US regional hegemony has become Israeli regional hegemony. Like communicating vessels, as the US reduces its forces in the region, it will rely more on Israel to preserve its status. This simple law is one that Ms Harris or Mr Trump will surely follow once in office.

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