It is not the end of Hezbollah. But it is the end of Hezbollah as we have known it for the past three decades, and as it has known itself.
Israel’s killing of Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah stunned Lebanon and the Middle East, marking the development of a new political and security status quo in Lebanon, with serious implications for Iran’s role in the country. It is not only that Hezbollah cannot survive this new era without a major transformation in its identity, it is also that the group itself has already changed as a result of Israel’s ongoing campaign against it.
Hezbollah built its claimed credibility on the basis of being a “necessary” force for the liberation, and later defence, of Lebanon. But it was Hezbollah itself that helped create this necessity: the group benefitted from the Lebanese armed forces being too weak to stand up to external threats on their own, but it also contributed to maintaining the army’s weakness.
In 2014, when ISIS extremists were planning an incursion from Syria into Lebanon, Hezbollah did not share its intelligence on this plan with the army until after ISIS fighters crossed into the country and began attacking soldiers. Hezbollah then presented itself as spurring into action in aid of the army to show that is needed to defend Lebanon. It has used the same excuse of defence to justify its ignoring of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which stipulates that only the Lebanese army should be present in the area south of the Litani River.
Hezbollah needed this military prowess, including its successes against Israel (namely the latter’s withdrawal in 2000 and after the 2006 war), to bolster its political standing in Lebanon so that it could impose its agenda as well as that of Iran. It also periodically used its weapons inside Lebanon to intimidate its political opponents.
In a country where the political system is based on consensus among Lebanon’s governing elite, Hezbollah needed to maintain its military supremacy so that it could continue to dominate national politics by forcing its opponents to acquiesce. If it did not manage to compel the other parties to toe the line, it was still able to block policy decisions not going in its favour.
Using its veto power in the cabinet and instructing its members of Parliament not to show up for presidential elections, Hezbollah was the main actor driving Lebanon towards a political vacuum. It also captured the state by exercising informal control over its institutions.
Lebanon’s border with Syria became porous, allowing the group to smuggle weapons and drugs in both directions with no state oversight, while the Port of Beirut had warehouses in which its goods were stored without inspection by authorities. In 2008, Hezbollah’s fighters took over areas of Beirut to pressure the group’s opponents to give up asking for its telecommunications network to be brought under government oversight, and used the need to preserve security as the reason why its telecommunications network should be separate from the national grid.
Hezbollah’s humiliation at the hands of Israel significantly shifts this situation. Having incurred such huge military losses due to Israeli air strikes, Hezbollah can no longer present itself as a defender of Lebanon with any degree of credibility. Its infiltration by Israel, which is not only due to cyber operations but also to human intelligence, has revealed its security infrastructure not to be as impenetrable as the group had claimed. Military and security loss paves the way for reduced political status.
Hezbollah is continuing its fight with Israel to still try to save face. But Israel’s relentless campaign no longer aims to push Hezbollah to agree to a deal. It has been upgraded to seek to neutralise the group permanently. It will be some time before Hezbollah sees that it is not what it thought it was, and that it has overestimated its own strengths while vastly underestimating Israel. But that revelation will eventually come.
What the organisation chooses to do about it matters greatly.
Although weakened in the face of Israel, it remains the strongest political actor domestically because it is Lebanon’s only political party in possession of arms. It will probably fiercely try to retain this privilege even if it is defeated by Israel. But its weakening also presents the country with an opportunity to restore state authority.
If the international community backs Lebanon in taking this necessary step, Hezbollah will be presented with two choices: be a spoiler and create chaos in the country, which could lead to civil strife, or shift its modus operandi and agree to become like the rest of the political parties, handing its weapons to the army or at least playing the role of an auxiliary force under state oversight.
While either destiny will take a while to materialise, Iran will be the main decision-maker for Hezbollah in this regard. If Tehran wants to retain a degree of influence in Lebanon, it needs to recognise that Israel will no longer put up with the group being present at its border posing a potential threat.
This means rolling back the extent of Iran’s involvement in Lebanon to accepting a diminished role for Hezbollah. The other path – that of being a spoiler – will eventually attract another wave of aggression not only from Israel but potentially also from international actors in a scenario akin to the global coalition against ISIS.
This is a time of reckoning for Hezbollah and for Iran’s role in Lebanon, a scenario that neither of them ever anticipated facing and which they are not prepared for. The group’s story underlines what happens when an actor’s ego becomes so big that it blinds it. The moment will come when it realises that the bubble has burst.
Lebanon’s stability is hinged upon pragmatism eventually prevailing in the Iran and Hezbollah camp.
