US Democrats will regard an Israeli invasion of Lebanon as election interference

A Lebanese flag flutters in the Lebanese city of Tyre on Thursday amid ongoing cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces. Reuters

Just six weeks before a highly consequential election, Washington is scrambling to avoid a full-scale war in the Middle East that could be triggered by an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. US President Joe Biden’s domestic policy and legislative achievements have been remarkable, but his handling of the Gaza war has been woeful. Now US policy faces a meltdown, not at the hands of adversaries like Hezbollah and Iran, but Israel.

The Biden administration adopted a focused policy of conflict containment of the war to Gaza, hoping to manage the strategic fallout from anything deemed plausible inside Gaza. This reflected deep anxiety about the war spreading, particularly into Lebanon, which might spiral into a regional conflict potentially drawing in the US and Iran, and even setting them directly against each other.

Some in the Biden administration have long harboured suspicions that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might hope to manoeuvre tensions over Lebanon to eventually, and at long last, secure the direct US strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities that he has been demanding, without success, for almost two decades.

The Biden administration’s de facto carte blanche for Israel, particularly in the first few months of that savage war of vengeance against the entire Palestinian society in Gaza, was developed for numerous reasons. But an important factor was the belief that by supporting Israel strongly in Gaza, the Biden administration effectively positioned itself to block any Israeli impulse to unnecessarily spread the war into Lebanon.

That calculation appeared to play out precisely on several key occasions.

As early as October 12, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and other hawks began pressing for an immediate and massive strike against Hezbollah. One of the key factors thwarting this effort was a forceful intervention by Mr Biden telling Mr Netanyahu and others that such an attack was unnecessary, unwise and would not be supported by Washington. Similar scenarios played out on at least two other occasions in the subsequent months in which Mr Biden was able to restrain Israel.

US President Joe Biden addresses world leaders at the UN General Assembly on Tuesday. AFP

Israel has been able to establish escalation dominance, because even cautious Israeli leaders can see potential benefits from taking on Hezbollah under current circumstances

However, if things pan out over the subsequent days and weeks, an invasion of Lebanon could expand the Gaza war not just to Israel’s north but also potentially into an uncontrolled regional conflagration. Yet, at the time of writing, neither Israel nor Hezbollah had indicated any interest – at least in public – in a three-week pause in cross-border attacks that was being proposed by Washington and other regional and international governments.

The current standoff goes back to the immediate aftermath of the October 7 attacks, when Hamas demanded that Hezbollah and other militias in the Iranian-managed “axis of resistance” intervene with full force against Israel. Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, disappeared into virtual hiding, and when he emerged after two weeks, he clarified that while the organisation would be intensifying its military activities, they would be directed at the Lebanon-Israel border area and, supposedly, in the interests of liberating two Lebanese towns still occupied by Israel.

The answer to Hamas was no, but Hezbollah did feel the need to ramp up cross-border attacks so as not to appear completely docile. But since that opening salvo, Israel has been able to establish escalation dominance, because even cautious Israeli leaders can see potential benefits from taking on Hezbollah under current circumstances.

In particular, they hope to inflict significant costs to Iran and its Arab regional militia network, which they believe have benefited virtually cost-free from the aftermath of the October 7 attacks. They would also be hoping to restore the domestic credibility and legitimacy of Israel’s national security institutions that were badly tarnished by the military meltdown on October 7.

Neither Iran nor Hezbollah see any point in a major war with Israel under current circumstances. Hezbollah’s main regional role has been to protect Iran from Israeli or American attacks on its homeland, and particularly its nuclear facilities. Tehran and Hezbollah have had no interest in a war over a place, Gaza, which has little strategic, historical or religious significance to them, or to rescue an organisation, Hamas, which has proven to be an unreliable ally of the “axis of resistance” in the past (Hamas broke it over the Syrian war between 2012-2019).

Key takeaways from Nasrallah’s speech after pager attacks in Lebanon

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The main American point to Israel all along has been that this war is unnecessary and avoidable because the other side does not want to fight one.

Israeli ambivalence appeared to decisively dissipate after the pager and walkie-talkie sabotage detonations last week. Reports suggest that Israel wanted to use those explosions in the earliest stages of a potential ground attack on Lebanon, but growing suspicions about the malfunctioning or badly performing devices prompted a “use it or lose it” analysis in Israel. Therefore, if these reports are true, the explosives were detonated independent of a specific policy goal or broader strategy.

Yet predictably enough, a cycle of escalation immediately followed.

What Israel seeks from a ground invasion is not clear, but it potentially ranges from the establishment of a new occupied “security barrier” in southern Lebanon to an all-out effort to smash the infrastructure of Hezbollah similar to that conducted in Gaza against Hamas. Either way, Lebanon has once again been dragged into a conflict that has absolutely no connection to any Lebanese national interest. Yet Israel’s escalations may help obscure that, instead restoring Hezbollah’s popularity and the perceived legitimacy of its resistance.

For the Biden administration, an Israeli ground operation in Lebanon constitutes the ultimate failure of its Gaza war policy. The conflict will have spread despite Washington’s best efforts and because of Israel’s bellicosity rather than that of Hezbollah or Iran.

Mere weeks before a US election is hardly the time any administration is going to get tough on Israel. The Israelis know this, and they are taking full and cynical advantage of the Biden administration’s priority of securing the victory of Vice President Kamala Harris over former president Donald Trump.

Indeed, a ground offensive, if it were to happen, with no urgent need and just six weeks before the US presidential election, will be regarded by many Democrats as shocking and intolerable election interference on behalf of Mr Trump. Relations between Mr Netanyahu and Democrats may never recover.

It could also accelerate the advent of a deeper schism between the US, or at least Democrats, and Israel in general. That’s been a long time in the making, and Mr Netanyahu appears determined to make such a bitter reckoning inevitable, and perhaps imminent.

Meanwhile, his policies could leave Israel fighting ongoing insurgencies against renewed or intensified occupations to the south in Gaza, to the north in Lebanon, and quite possibly to the east in the West Bank. Israel’s only calm border would be the Mediterranean Sea. If that’s a formula for security, it’s hard to imagine what dangerous insecurity might look like.