Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s successful visit to Washington is a good example of the Biden administration’s readiness to nudge partners, rather than coerce them, to take positions desired by Washington.
It is noteworthy that the US has accepted India’s strategic neutrality on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in the hope that this might evolve in the future. It has also refrained from criticising New Delhi over some of the country’s domestic challenges.
The Biden administration appeared satisfied with India’s stance towards China, without seeking to further inflame it. India boasts vast economic and technological capabilities that position it as a formidable competitor to its neighbour. India’s flexible policies have the potential to establish it as a global economic powerhouse, possibly surpassing even China in the future.
Mr Modi’s visit marks a pivotal moment in US-India relations, expanding them beyond simply countering the challenge posed by the rise of China.
It was evident that the common priority for US President Joe Biden and Mr Modi was strengthening their countries’ economic, security and military relations to support their overall strategic relationship – without any pressure to change positions on which the two sides diverge.
Their joint statement on Ukraine, for instance, underscored respect for the country’s territorial integrity, which is noteworthy given that New Delhi had previously sought to avoid taking a stance on the conflict.
Washington abstained from criticising India’s extensive economic, energy and trade relations with Russia, with exports from Russia to India reportedly topping $40 billion in the last fiscal year. The Biden administration’s primary objective is for the US to eventually surpass Russia in securing military contracts that hold significant financial and security importance within the strategic relationship.
The former Trump administration had adopted a more rigid approach by trying to pressurise India to distance itself from Russia. But the Biden administration has chosen a step-by-step approach coupled with a larger American engagement with India, while maintaining a strong commitment to pursuing arms deals.
The Modi government is comfortable with this approach. It sees benefits in India’s continued participation in groupings supposedly aimed at countering China – especially the Quad, which also includes Australia, Japan and the US. Yet this is as far as New Delhi is willing to go, given that it seeks to avoid getting entangled in an outright conflict with China.
This is noteworthy in the context of the current trajectory of US-China relations.
Mr Biden recently described Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “dictator”, which appeared to be a gaffe he made at an election campaign rally. But during the joint press conference with Mr Modi, the US president refused to back down, perhaps out of concern that this might reaffirm the widespread impression that he is prone to gaffes.
Mr Biden attempted to downplay the episode by expressing his expectation of a future meeting with the Chinese president. He added that such opinions would have few implications on the US-China relationship.
Beijing thinks otherwise. It officially protested in a letter submitted by Xie Feng, China’s ambassador to the US, demanding a retraction of those statements, or else face consequences.
China, however, does not seek to escalate matters with the US. It is highly probable that diplomats from both countries will find a way out of this awkward situation, especially as it follows US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to Beijing. Mr Blinken’s trip was marked by a conciliatory tone and a concerted effort to strengthen channels of communication.
Mr Biden’s time in office has been marked by a series of slip-ups and gaffes, causing ripples of controversy.
Last year, he called Russian President Vladimir Putin a “butcher” and asserted that he “cannot remain in power”, prompting swift qualification from White House aides that his remarks did not indicate a policy of regime change. However, even as Mr Biden candidly voices his opinions that often diverge from diplomatic norms, they could sometimes be viewed as authentically reflecting the true sentiments held by the US administration.
The predicament lies in the fact that, it is the US that is seeking to demystify the US-China relationship. China, on the other hand, shows no urgency in doing so. And even if it did, it would not openly express it, as ambiguity appears ingrained in its mindset and policy. Consequently, while the relationship may tolerate occasional missteps, it will undoubtedly be affected in a manner contrary to the Biden administration’s goals. Both the US and China are averse to confrontation, and American diplomats are effectively conveying to their Chinese counterparts that verbal missteps do not define their policy. Instead, they say, the true essence of the policy is found only in precise official statements, which shape the contours and finer nuances of US foreign policy.
The message conveyed by the US to India holds significant weight, not only on content but also delivery. Mr Biden characterised the relationship with India as vibrant and thriving. The reception accorded to Mr Modi in Washington was exceptional. It included an elaborate state banquet at the White House and the opportunity for the Indian prime minister to address the US Congress.
In addition to bolstering and broadening trade, security, military, energy, technology and space relations, Mr Biden’s unwavering belief in the US and India as “two great nations, two great friends, two great powers that can define the course of the 21st century” and their potential to serve as role models in tackling the challenges of this era is not mere rhetoric or a mere verbal misstep on his part. Rather, it is a language reflecting utmost respect for a nation that has emerged in the recent past and has now matured, as it asserts itself in the scales and manifestations of great power status.
The significance of the US-India strategic partnership couldn’t be more evident.
