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When the US and Israel launched air raids against Iran at the end of last month, Gulf states hoped the conflict would remain distant.
Instead, the six members of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) have borne the brunt of Iran’s retaliation, with cascading effects prompting a reassessment of security strategy across the region, analysts have said.
Current and former Gulf officials are increasingly discussing, publicly and behind closed doors, the importance of establishing a joint security framework and deepening defence ties with Washington, The National understands. Similar messages have emerged from Emirati and Qatari officials.
The idea of a joint defence system is not new. Gulf states activated collective defence measures at a meeting in Doha in September. And in December, leaders at the 46th GCC summit in Bahrain focused on finalising a joint air and missile defence shield, following attacks on Qatar last year by both Iran and Israel.
However, questions remain over how effectively these measures translate in times of crisis.
“Operationally, the deterrence framework has not proven sufficiently effective in preventing escalation or shielding regional partners from direct threats,” Abdulaziz Sager, chairman of the Gulf Research Centre, told The National.
“Politically, there is a growing perception that US decision-making has not adequately taken into account the security, safety and strategic interests of Gulf states. Major decisions appear to be taken without meaningful consultation with regional partners.”
Officials in the region now say Iran has crossed red lines, and that any future deal must address that threat. While Gulf allies of the US want the war to end, they are equally focused on what a ceasefire would look like in practice.
Continued restraint
Since the eruption of hostilities on February 28, Gulf countries, including long-standing mediator between Tehran and Washington, Oman – have witnessed an unprecedented barrage of Iranian missiles and drones attacking not only US military bases but also critical national infrastructure. At least 27 people have been killed across the region, according to Gulf defence and interior ministries.
Iranian officials have repeatedly maintained that their campaign is aimed at US interests. But the scale and pattern of strikes, hitting energy sites, airports and economic infrastructure across Gulf states, belie that assertion.
Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas hub – one of the world’s largest liquefied natural gas export terminals – sustained significant damage, disrupting energy flows and rattling markets. A desalination plant in Bahrain, the UAE's key oil trading hub of Fujairah and Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery and Samref refinery in the Red Sea port of Yanbu were also attacked.
The kingdom’s heavily fortified energy infrastructure has been under assault in the past. In September 2019, an unprecedented barrage of drones and missiles on the Abqaiq and Khurais plants temporarily knocked out more than half of Saudi crude production and shook global markets. Ras Tanura was also attacked in 2021 by Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis, in what Riyadh described as a failed assault on global energy security.
So far, Gulf states have remained in a defensive posture, with observers noting that they are unlikely to engage offensively, as the war is not considered their own.
“We have nothing to do with it. There is no reason to join this war. It's very much a US-Israel war,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, an Emirati non-resident fellow at Harvard University.
“There isn't much that, if we shift to a more offensive mode, we could do beyond what the Americans are already doing. Our joint efforts would not add significantly to targets that have already been eliminated.”
Mr Abdulla noted that any move towards an offensive posture would probably be collective, rather than undertaken by a single country.
Security rethink
In 2023, Saudi Arabia pursued a deliberate strategy aimed at de-escalating tension with Iran without fundamentally resolving underlying rivalries. This approach reflected a broader Gulf consensus on the need for regional stability as a prerequisite for economic diversification.
It allowed Saudi Arabia to shift focus towards domestic modernisation and large-scale economic initiatives, including giga-projects along the Red Sea.
That progress is now under strain. While the US and Israel launched this war from the air, its immediate impact has extended to maritime routes. Iran’s unofficial closure of the Strait of Hormuz – a chokepoint through which about one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas flows – has almost halted tanker traffic and driven up oil prices.
For Gulf countries, the crisis threatens the stability they have painstakingly cultivated: security, prosperity and a perception of insulation from regional volatility.
Experts say the region may require deeper collective defence mechanisms, including joint command structures, shared early-warning systems and integrated missile defence measures that could provide more coherent response options than ad hoc arrangements. Some have framed this as a potential “Gulf Nato”.
Mr Abdulla, however, said such a framework would face political challenges.
“There are a few countries among us that are hesitant to declare Iran an enemy. So it is technically difficult, and politically, not everybody is on board,” he explained.
Oman was the only Gulf state that did not attend a meeting of regional foreign ministers last week in Riyadh to discuss Iran's attacks on the region. It has also adopted a clearly anti‑war stance.
Mr Sager noted that strengthening national defence capabilities and advancing collective security at the GCC level are both important.
“The current context underscores that the threat environment is no longer confined to individual states but is shared across the region. The traditional model, characterised by limited co-ordination and largely national approaches to defence, is becoming less viable,” he clarified.
“This moment may serve as a catalyst to revisit and strengthen the GCC’s collective defence framework, deepen military integration and enhance co-ordination mechanisms as a means of reinforcing regional deterrence.”
Stronger ties with Washington
Alongside discussions about a joint regional security system, Gulf countries are also emphasising the need to deepen ties with Washington. For decades, these states have relied on the US as the primary guarantor of regional security, and there is growing conviction that those ties would be strengthened further.
“I think the UAE and the other Arab Gulf states have already learnt the lesson from this aggression. It is time to expand relations with the US. The relationship is strong enough – and it is going to become even stronger,” said Mr Abdulla.
Mr Sager agreed that the US is expected to continue as a key security partner, particularly in terms of deterrence and advanced capabilities.
“At the same time, Gulf states may further diversify their external engagements, especially in arms procurement, by expanding ties with other global actors such as China and, selectively, Russia,” he added.
