Call it the Wagnerisation of US diplomacy – like the Russian mercenary group, trading military for metals. The White House’s sudden, bizarre fixation on minerals from Ukraine to Greenland to Congo makes little economic, political or security sense. But for one key person, it might be explicable.
This approach to foreign policy is not new. China has for a couple of decades sought to integrate crucial minerals overseas into its supply chains through political deals, direct ownership, supply contracts and infrastructure funding. US President Donald Trump, during his first presidential campaign, advocated seizing Iraq’s oil, saying “You win the war, and you take it”.
But for Beijing, this was just one element of engaging with other countries. Mr Trump has made this new doctrine into a core principle.
First threats to annex Greenland for its rare earths. Then, starting last month, talks to support the Democratic Republic of Congo’s president in a war against Rwanda-backed rebels in return for copper, cobalt and uranium. Finally, the hostile White House meeting where Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was expected to sign over his country’s mineral wealth in return for … what exactly was not clear.
It is obligatory when discussing these minerals to note that “rare earths” are not actually that rare. What is rare are economically viable concentrations. They are hard to separate from one another, the process is polluting, and they are often mixed with thorium and uranium which would leave radioactive residues.
Only four or five of the 17 elements in the group are really industrially important. Neodymium and dysprosium, used in powerful magnets for motors in electric cars and wind turbines, are particularly critical. Attempts to develop sources outside China have mostly focused on the light rare earths, which other than neodymium are not particularly vital nor in short supply.
The term “rare earth”, though, is often carelessly used to mean “critical mineral”, a much wider group. What constitutes a critical mineral is in the eye of the beholder, with the US, EU, Japan and others issuing lengthy lists featuring more than half of the periodic table.
But materials critical for the new energy economy include lithium, cobalt, nickel, copper, silver and graphite. They are used in wiring for an increasingly electrified world, making solar panels, and the batteries that power consumer electronics, electric cars, and storage for renewable energy. Other important minerals are used in defence or industry, such as uranium, titanium and tungsten, or as fertilisers, namely potash and phosphates.
There is no firm evidence that Ukraine has any commercial rare earths. Its geological institute says it has such deposits, including neodymium, but details are classified. It does hold resources of titanium, graphite, uranium and other minerals, though, and potentially potash and phosphates. But most importantly, and what might have attracted the eye of electric car tycoon and Trump acolyte Elon Musk, is lithium.
The country holds an estimated 500,000 tonnes of lithium resources, the biggest in Europe. That is a bit less than a tenth of the reserves of Australia, the world’s largest producer, or a sixth of China’s. But one of the deposits is in a Russian-occupied area, and another was recently overrun by the Russians. The best-known site holds lithium in the mineral petalite, which requires an additional processing step to convert it into spodumene, the most commonly-used lithium ore.
Mr Musk is constructing a lithium refinery in Texas at a cost of $1 billion, to supply material for Tesla’s batteries. This centre will process spodumene. The US mines hardly any lithium itself, although new mines are under way and oil companies are looking at separating it from underground waters. In September 2020, Tesla announced a process to extract lithium from clay minerals in Nevada, but industry experts are sceptical it is economically viable.
And it is not just electric cars. SpaceX, Mr Musk’s explosive rocket venture, uses an aluminium-lithium alloy for its light weight.
There is no direct evidence that he is involved in the Ukrainian minerals negotiations. But Reuters reported that, following the rejection of the US’s demands, negotiators threatened to turn off Ukraine’s access to his Starlink system, crucial for frontline soldiers. Mr Musk vehemently denied this.
World lithium demand could triple by 2030. A new source of lithium, even if none of it comes directly to the US, would help keep prices down, and offer some diversification from Chinese sources.
But now for the flaws in this plan. For now, lithium supplies are ample, and prices for battery-grade lithium carbonate have slumped below $10,000 per tonne, from more than $78,000 in 2022. Rather than being worth the touted $500 billion, Ukraine’s lithium and other minerals may be at best modestly profitable.
Mere deposits in the ground are not of much use. Even for those that are not in an active war-zone or under hostile occupation, developing a new mine can take a decade or more. If Russia were to conquer the mineral deposits after a failed peace deal, the US would presumably be equally willing to buy from Mr Putin.
Anyway, the real bottleneck in lithium, rare earths, graphite and several other critical metals is not getting them out of the ground, but processing them into usable form.
China dominates here much more than in mining, its proprietary technologies giving it a competitive edge. Most countries do not want the polluting process on their soil. It would not help the US much to have an alternative supply of raw materials if it still needs Beijing to refine them.
In December, China banned the export of gallium and germanium, used in semiconductors, and antimony, which has military applications, to the US. In February it limited in general the export of tungsten, used to make armour-piercing munitions, and four other elements.
Attempts to extract lithium in Europe, such as in Portugal and Serbia, have faced – ironically – environmentalist opposition. So Ukraine’s resources would be more useful to Europe, which would gain a domestic source, than to the US which has its own minerals as well as easy access to mining powerhouses such as Canada and Brazil. At least, it had easy access to Canada until choosing to stir up a trade war.
Mr Zelenskyy’s original offer of mineral rights was probably a smart attempt to harness Mr Trump’s transactionalism and give him a reason to care about Ukraine’s continued security. But mercenaries are famous for seeking higher pay. Whether the business model is the Trump Organisation, Tesla or the Wagner Group, lithium is not going to propel Ukraine to peace.
