Real reform is vital for China's appeal to world publics

The Chinese and US presidents, Xi Jinping and Barack Obama, concluded their first summit on Sunday in California. The meeting appears to have been successful; accords were reached on cyber security and military-to-military ties.

The most interesting joint pledge, however, is to build, in the words of Mr Xi, a "new model of cooperation" between the two nations.

As the Chinese president elaborated, "China and the US must find a new path ... one that is different from the inevitable confrontation and conflict between the major countries of the past".

Mr Xi's emphasis on this subject reflects the critical mission he has inherited: to enhance China's image in the world. The central challenge he faces is that China's soft power - its ability to win the hearts and minds of other nations and influence their governments through attraction rather than by blunt coercion or costly payment - has lagged far behind the hard power built on China's growing economic and military might.

This soft-power deficit could prove to be a real headache for the new Chinese president, for there is increasing international concern, suspicion and even outright hostility as China's international role expands. In the US, for example, public favourability towards China fell by over one-fifth in one year recently - to 40 per cent in 2012 from 51 per cent in 2011, according to Pew Global Research Projects.

At a time of continued economic uncertainty in the US, issues such as China's alleged currency manipulation, the large size of the US trade deficit with China, the large US financial debt held by China and alleged Chinese cyber attacks on US interests, have taken their toll on American public opinion.

In Japan, meanwhile, public favourability towards China fell from 34 per cent to 15 per cent between 2011 and 2012, according to Pew. With Japanese distrust of China growing, Tokyo is actively strengthening its diplomatic alliances, particularly with Washington, as it seeks to balance Beijing's growing economic and military strength.

In this context, Mr Xi rightly recognises the need for better diplomacy and communication to enable stronger international understanding and appreciation of his country. His summit with Mr Obama was thus an unprecedented opportunity to begin to repair China's global reputation.

What must China do if it is to succeed in this journey during Mr Xi's presidency?

In the short term, Mr Xi needs to enhance his country's relationship with the US and restart a broader process of addressing growing foreign concerns about China's intentions as a nascent super power. The president will need to live up to long-standing Chinese pledges of securing a harmonious, peaceful transition as China rises, and become a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

China's agenda will require commitment to meaningful reform. If this happens, China will be able to secure significantly more dividends from the sizeable sums it already spends on foreign charm offensives.

Perhaps the most difficult issue to be addressed is the sometimes- yawning gap between China's attractive culture and traditions and modern achievements such as its scientific progress (admired by many foreigners and a significant source of soft power), and the communist regime's domestic actions.

One case in point was the stunning staging of the Olympics in 2008. The elaborate opening ceremonies celebrated both traditional and modern Chinese culture and society, while underlining Beijing's efficiency in staging major events.

But Beijing squandered much of the soft power thus generated when it clamped down on the uprising and protests that same year in Tibet and Xianjiang. This counterproductive pattern of behaviour is by no means isolated. Beijing needs to avoid what looks like a tendency to shoot itself in the foot going forward.

This requires commitment to political change, transparency and democratisation. Much of the international community is unlikely to welcome China as a peaceful, responsible world power if it regularly clamps down on citizens seeking domestic reform, including political dissidents, lawyers, human rights activists and journalists.

A second issue to address is that, traditionally, there has been too little emphasis on public diplomacy efforts to reach out directly to foreign publics. Instead, Beijing has often placed emphasis, especially in Africa and the Middle East, on improving working relationships with strategically important governments through assistance programmes that may not always serve the interest of local peoples.

Although China has rapidly developed public diplomacy skills and policies, more change is urgently needed if hearts and minds are to be won abroad. Reform must include reducing the role of the state, which still initiates most of China's public diplomacy.

The communications of Chinese state-driven public diplomacy often lack legitimacy and credibility. One solution is expanding the numbers of individuals and non-state groups - including from civil society networks, Chinese diaspora communities, student and academic groups and business networks - involved in public diplomacy.

The challenges ahead are wide-ranging and deep-seated, and will require far more than one summit to overcome. Indeed, enhancing China's reputation is a generational task that will require not only sustained investment but also significant reform - during Mr Xi's presidency.

Andrew Hammond is an associate partner at ReputationInc. He was formerly a UK government special adviser and senior consultant at Oxford Analytica