Global Talk: Have Iran nuclear talks progressed? - Ep 5

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at a press meeting after a round of talks with the European Union in Vienna, on July 18, 2014. Samuel Kubani/AFP Photo

As world powers extend the deadline for Iran to reach a nuclear deal until November 24, Dina Esfandiary, from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, outlines the progress and implications of those talks.

* the below transcript has been lightly edited.

The National: A few days ago the P5+1 and Iran agreed to extend their talks over Iran’s nuclear programme until November 24. What are the main issues still preventing them from reaching an agreement?

I think it’s quite important firstly to highlight some of the progress that’s been made during these talks. There are three main areas. Firstly, it seems that negotiators have pretty much agreed on a path for downgrading the Arak heavy water reactor, which was a proliferation concern. They’ve spoken about different ways to convert the Fordow enrichment plant into, for example, a possible research facility. And they seem to have agreed more or less on intrusive transparency and verification measures, which are intended to prove the peacefulness of Iran’s programme.

All of this is really good, but, as you know, serious gaps remain. They are clearly significant enough that they weren’t able to bridge them before the 20th of July deadline.

The main gaps are on the duration of the agreement. Iran for example, is talking about an agreement that will last between five and eight years. While the P5+1 is talking more in line of 20 plus years. Another problematic area is on sanctions relief. Mainly on the order, the timeline, and the scale of the sanctions relief. But the most important gap that remains is on the size and efficiency of Iran’s enrichment programme. The main issue here this is idea of Iran’s practical needs. The P5+1 says Iran does not need a significant enrichment programme, that it has agreements with countries like Russia to fuel its power plants, while Iran says it can’t rely on external providers and should be able to fuel its own plants.

So, the P5+1 is calling for a sharp reduction in Iran’s enrichment capacity, while Iran is perhaps open to reducing it for the moment, it wants to maintain its current capability and have a plan for future expansion.

The National: It was just announced that Iran has diluted all its 20 per cent enriched uranium or converted it to oxide fuel. Will this be welcomed by the West as a positive step after the extension of talks?

Absolutely. So it’s important to highlight that the 20 per cent enriched uranium is the most sensitive stockpile of enriched uranium that Iran has because it provides for a faster path to the bomb. Under the November 13th agreement, which is the interim agreement signed last year, Iran agreed to dilute or turn most of it into oxide fuel. The IAEA just said most of this had been done. It clearly shows that Iran has been implementing the interim agreement and that its been doing it in good faith. And in return the P5+1 have been implementing their end of the bargain, by giving Iran slow but steady agreed sanctions relief.

The National: If a deal is reached and sanctions lifted, what will be the impact of Iran re-entering the regional and international markets? In terms of oil prices and production and then also do you think there will be a rush by international businesses to position themselves in Iran?

I think it’s quite important to highlight that in any deal, sanctions relief will be very, very slow. It will take many years for it to be implemented. So, while even with the interim agreement there’s been an increase in interest in Iran and the Iranian market, there’s not really a risk that anybody is going to be rushing back into Iran until the terms of the agreement and the timeline of sanctions relief is very clear.

A lot of companies have invested quite a lot in complying with sanctions. Then a lot of these countries are very risk averse. So they don’t want to rush back into Iran and risk being caught out. But there is one thing that is absolutely true: Iran is a major untapped market. So once we do have a nuclear agreement and the terms of it are quite clear, I think think there will be a slow but steady increase in interest in Iran.

The National: Along with its professed aim to foster greater cooperation with the West and its Arab neighbours, Iran also wants to be acknowledged as a regional power and promote Islamic democracy. We see a clear example of Tehran proving its regional power in Iraq and Syria but where else do you see it exerting influence and where is it trying to promote Islamic democracy?

Iran is defintley a force to be reckoned with in the region. And I think that’s undeniable at this stage. But from an international perspective, the goal is to integrate it into regional relations and thereby have more leverage over it, rather than treating it at a pariah and making it want to exert its influence in the region.

But up until now all engagement with Iran has really been dependent on a nuclear deal. If there is a deal than this would make it easier to talk to Iran, to engage it on a whole range of issues and hopefully reign it in a little bit. Including on things like Iraq and negotiations on Syria, where there will be no solution without the involvement of Iran.

In terms of exerting its influence throughout the region, it certainly does, but it doesn’t do it in a very coordinated matter. Or, for example, as it’s often pinpointed, in a way that’s just with the Shias. Iran is not a sectarian state. If it were it would have massive problems within its own borders, given the diversity of sects that are within Iran.

The National: Do you see Iran pursuing a more sectarian policy outside its borders?

Not necessarily. Though, Iran is a reactionary state. If it finds itself in a situation, for example in Iraq or even in Bahrain, where other countries are supporting opposing sects, then it will see that as an opportunity to support some of its own minorities in the region. Then it will say, the Shias are an oppressed minority, and therefore we have to help them. But it has never been the first country to promote the defence of Shias in the region.

Iran wants to spread Islamic democracy throughout the region. It would rather have influence over all Muslims rather than just Shias.

The National: Has Iran and Hamas, the Palestinian group in the Gaza Strip that is currently battling Israel, been able to rebuild ties after a split over the Syrian war?

There was definitely a split after that. But Iran is quite a pragmatic actor. It is going to want to safeguard its interests in the region. Just because they disagreed it certainly hasn’t stopped dealing with Hamas over disagreements in Syria. It’s going to insure that channels of communication are kept open and it’s going to continue to try and influence Hamas and what it does.

And on the other side Hamas can’t act on its own. It also needs Iran, especially given the latest rounds of the conflict with Israel. It cannot sustain war efforts against Israel on its own.