Amid rising turmoil, Turkey’s voters put stability first

President Erdogan's party tapped into right-wing, conservative bloc that forms critical mass in Turkish electoral politcis.

Supporters of the Justice and Development Party celebrate in Istanbul following the result of the Turkish general election on November 1, 2015. Kerem Uzel / Bloomberg

ISTANBUL // “Give your vote to stability,” was the slogan coined by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) ahead of Turkey’s November 1 election. On Sunday, voters responded emphatically.

Faced with the rising violence of a reignited Kurdish insurgency, ISIL suicide bombings and a summer of failed coalition talks, Turks delivered an unexpected landslide victory to the only party that could credibly promise to deliver a stable government.

That the result confounded pollsters and pundits alike is a reflection of the failure of many domestic and foreign observers to read the mood within the conservative, right-wing section of the public that has always formed the critical mass in Turkish politics.

The AKP and its founder, president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, consolidated this bloc, stealing ground from its main right-wing rival, the National Action Party (MHP), a clutch of smaller religiously conservative and nationalist parties, and by winning back conservative Kurds who had abandoned it for the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party (HDP).

In a sense, the result was the least bad of the several unpalatable paths presented to Turkey. Given the country’s deeply polarised political scene, it was doubtful that another hung parliament would have led to a stable coalition. The best prospective partner for the AKP was the MHP, whose far right leanings and hard line on the Kurdish issue may only have deepened tensions in the country.

Turkey’s newest party, the HDP, kept its support above the 10 per cent threshold below which parties are disqualified from parliament, ensuring the continued representation of Turkey’s Kurdish movement.

Its success denied the AKP a 330-seat supermajority that could have allowed it to ride roughshod over all opposition parties to put to referendum the controversial new executive presidency favoured by Mr Erdogan.

Though Mr Erdogan’s supporters may claim otherwise, Sunday’s vote was not a mandate for that plan, which he unsuccessfully put to the nation at the last election, and he will still be unable to carry out any constitutional redrafting without opposition inclusion.

Whether the result will deliver Turkey the stability it craves, however, remains far from certain, particularly if the government continues its confrontation with the Kurdish separatist movement.

Stalled peace talks between Ankara and the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) broke down in June amid mutual mistrust, with each side accusing the other of acting in bad faith. The AKP’s nationalist constituency had always been uneasy about the talks; the party’s new uncompromising line was resoundingly vindicated at the polls.

Amid its newfound confidence, the AKP may be less inclined to return to the peace process on terms acceptable to the militants. Much will depend on the PKK, which was one of the clear losers in the election, after the conflict cost its political counterpart significant support.

However, attempting to force a military solution on the Kurdish rebels will only deepen unrest and violence in the south-east, and further alienate and radicalise a great mass of the country’s population.

While Ankara claims it can both fight terror and expand Kurdish rights, in practice it is only likely to create a deeper atmosphere of oppression as long as draconian anti-terror laws draw no distinction between armed militants and their civilian counterparts.

It is also doubtful that the win will heal the rifts in a society that is more polarised than ever after a summer of traumatic violence. In his victory speech, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu struck a conciliatory note, but for the 50 per cent of the electorate that did not back him – including many Kurds, leftists, Alevis and the urban, secularised middle class – this will seem like platitudes often heard before.

One of the stories of the AKP’s 13 years in office has been its steady domination of the organs of Turkish state – the education system, judiciary, police and media – first in conjunction with its erstwhile ally the Fethullah Gulen Movement, and now alone.

The party’s supporters see this process as the long overdue empowerment of the country’s previously marginalised conservative masses. To its critics, however, it represents the slow merger of party and state into a regime that may spell the death of the country’s imperfect democracy.

Turkey’s opposition parties share some blame – with the exception of the emergence of the HDP, they have continually failed to present any credible democratic challenge to the AKP.

In the current environment, their scope to do so may be narrowing. In an ominous sign of the times, a clutch of Gulen-affilated newspapers and television stations were raided by police, taken over, and transformed overnight into pro-government outlets after a judge appointed an AKP-linked trustee to oversee their parent company.

In the absence of any meaningful domestic political challenge other than that presented by the Kurdish movement, the drama in Turkish politics in the four years before the country heads to presidential elections in 2019 will likely come from within the party.

A key question will be whether the market-friendly economic team headed by economy czar Ali Babacan that oversaw Turkey’s success in the early part of the AKP’s rule will remain in place, or lose out in its struggle against a coterie of more unorthodox advisers close to Mr Erdogan.

Tensions may also flare between Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu, who in the past has chafed against the president’s continuing dominance of the party and may now feel emboldened by his resounding election win.