With the right tools, a peace in Syria is possible

Statements from John Kerry and Syria's foreign minister have taken the diplomacy two small steps forward

Small steps forward are now the way of diplomacy on Syria, ahead of this week’s Geneva II talks. There were two over the weekend. In the first, US secretary of state John Kerry suggested, almost as an aside, that Bashar Al Assad would have no place in Syria’s future. That, a key demand of the opposition, might be intended to sugar-coat the pill for the opposition of attending the conference.

One of the key objections of the opposition for attending the conference is that it would legitimise the Assad regime: no longer something to be struggled against, but one party to be negotiated with for Syria’s future. The Assad regime feels the same way about talking to the opposition. But, surprisingly, they both have given that card away. The meeting in Moscow on Friday ended with the Assad regime offering a truce in Syria’s largest city Aleppo, as well as a prisoner swap. Perhaps unintentionally, the regime has, at a stroke, given de facto recognition to the rebels, and undercut its own narrative of the civil war.

Since the beginning of the uprising, Syria’s government claimed the rebels were terrorists, a ragtag group of foreign fighters. Repeatedly, the government claimed there was nothing to talk about and no one to negotiate with. Geneva talks, to the regime, are no more than a way to fight “terrorism” with the help of the international community. Yet now, by suggesting a truce in Aleppo, the regime has essentially accepted that the opposition comprises a coherent group that can be negotiated with, and, especially, that the opposition has some influence with the fighters on the ground. That is a big change, because it means the opposition is now a part of the negotiations over Syria’s future.

The opposition is understandably sceptical about the offer. There have been similar small-scale ceasefires in the beleaguered suburbs surrounding the capital, and none went very well. The regime has rarely kept its part of the bargain, in some cases attacking or arresting those offered safe passage out. In other areas, the ceasefires have been more of a surrender that came after months of starvation. The offer could also be a ploy to show that the opposition cannot force extremist elements to accept ceasefires.

So there is plenty of reason for caution. But a ceasefire in the country’s largest city, if enforced internationally, could strengthen the opposition, by allowing them to demonstrate some progress from talking with the regime. If the ceasefire works – and that is a big if – it could provide a model for other areas of the country. That would be a small step in a big war, but a welcome one.