After incorporating Crimea, Russia faces universal condemnation. Variously described as a gangster state and a neo-imperial bully, the country’s regime seems to be going rogue and pursuing Russian revanchism. Eastern Ukraine, the disputed Moldovan territory of Transnistria and the Russian-dominated areas of the Baltic States appear to be next on the Kremlin’s hit list.
But vilifying Moscow escalates rather than eases the simmering tensions. To halt the descent into war, the West needs to offer a grand bargain to Russia, Ukraine and all the countries in the contested borderland. Such a bargain must focus on mutual security guarantees and a road map for a common security architecture.
Annexing Crimea was wrong. Unlike Kosovo where Serb forces butchered Kosovars in their thousands, Russians on the Crimean peninsula faced no such threat. In a climate of fear, the rushed referendum to join Russia lacked legitimacy. Moscow rightly argues for wholesale constitutional reform in Ukraine that grants more regional autonomy and protects minorities, but concerning Crimea the Russian leadership never gave diplomacy a proper chance.
Crucially, Russia’s neighbours are understandably worried about the military build-up and veiled threats coming from the former Soviet foe. In recent years, cyber attacks on the Baltic States have been traced to Russian hackers who enjoyed state support or acted in a climate of impunity. Either way, Moscow seems to mimic Machiavelli’s mantra that “it is far safer to be feared than loved”.
The trouble with this narrative is that it lays the blame solely at Russia’s door and absolves the West. Amid loose talk of a new Cold War, Vladimir Putin is being likened to both Stalin and Hitler – apparently imposing totalitarian rule at home while invading neighbouring countries under the false pretence of protecting fellow citizens.
With no limits on hyperbole and hysteria, politicians and pundits are engaged in mindless Moscow-mauling. With Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi gone, Mr Putin has apparently joined the “axis of evil” – only marginally less mad and dangerous than North Korea’s Kim Jong-un.
For western hawks, the erstwhile enemy is a pariah state that must be punished and banished.
But ostracising Russia will make a bad situation far worse. As the history of unilateral sanctions shows, an isolated regime will be more aggressive, more paranoid and more prone to lashing out.
Just as violence begets violence, so too distrust breeds distrust. There’s something of a self-fulfilling prophecy about denouncing Russia as the “evil empire”.
East and West have got to break this vicious circle and avoid a slide into military confrontation.
In the current climate, any provocation from Ukrainian or Russian extremists on the ground in eastern Ukraine could trigger war.
From the 2008 conflict with neighbouring Georgia, Moscow knows that it cannot win against Nato troops. Even when the Georgian army was in meltdown, Russia still managed to lose aircraft and the intelligence battle because of dysfunctional radar systems and faulty communications equipment.
Little wonder that the Kremlin has since raised defence spending by 31 per cent to about US$70 billion a year, third only behind the US and China. But as Moscow continues to rely on foreign technology, France looks set to cancel a major arms deal in protest over Crimea.
The West is adamant that it does not want to fight Russia. Certainly the EU doesn’t have the stomach, and Barack Obama is merely committed to “leading from behind”. If there’s one positive legacy from the Cold War, it is that both sides continue to rule out a nuclear first strike against the other.
But otherwise the enduring Cold War mentality has poisoned relations. Since the Soviet Union’s demise, the West has either ignored Moscow or reduced it to the status of junior partner. Either way, Western powers have not acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security interests or its deep social-cultural ties with neighbouring countries. Nato’s eastern expansion without offering Russia equal status is resented as a humiliating encirclement.
For its part, Moscow needs to drop the narrative of victimhood at the hands of America and the rest of the West. It also must abandon the logic of the zero-sum game whereby Russia’s win is the West’s loss and vice versa. A bankrupt or partitioned Ukraine would hurt all sides.
Crucially, the Kremlin would do well to remember that glory and greatness are rewards, not privileges. If Russia wants respect from its neighbours, then it must earn it. Abstaining from any destabilising action and reaffirming their sovereign independence would be a good start. Solving the “frozen conflicts” over disputed areas like Transnistria would also help.
Without Russia, the resolution of existing conflicts will be unnecessarily harder. That’s true for ridding Syria of chemical weapons, agreeing a deal with Iran, fighting terrorism and stabilising Afghanistan – including withdrawing western troops using Russian railways.
Moreover, enhanced trade with Russia is key to securing the global economic recovery. The mutual benefits of concrete cooperation are clear. New institutions and rules of behaviour must be agreed.
Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, Russia and the West can either create a permanent divide or strike a grand bargain. All it takes is imagination, courage and leadership.
Adrian Pabst is senior lecturer in politics at the University of Kent in the UK and visiting professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lille (Sciences Po), France
