Media reports this month suggested that India’s prime minister Narendra Modi had told the Chinese during a recent visit to Beijing that the China-Pakistan economic corridor was “unacceptable” to Delhi.
On the face of it, the statement seems quite ridiculous. By what right could India object to an agreement between two sovereign countries to utilise their territories for commerce?
But, there was more to the statement than meets the eye.
When the British finally decided to leave India, two countries, India and Pakistan, came into being. There were more than 500 semi-autonomous princely states in British India and they were allowed to decide which country they wished to join. Mostly, the rulers of these states made the ultimate choice but not all of those decisions were according to their people’s wishes.
Jammu and Kashmir was one such princely state. Its ruler was Prince Hari Singh, a Hindu. The territories of Gilgit-Baltistan were part of Hari Singh’s state. It is through Gilgit-Baltistan that the planned China Pakistan economic corridor will run.
The tangled history of the Kashmir dispute and the fact that it remains disputed territory 68 years after independence, is what makes Delhi’s objection to the new economic corridor understandable. But is it valid? Why are Gilgit-Baltistan being linked to the Kashmir dispute?
It is important to understand the relevant history of the Kashmir dispute in order to understand the Indian position with respect to Gilgit-Baltistan.
Until the late 19th century, when the British annexed it, Gilgit-Baltistan had its own rulers. After annexing it, the British decided to hand it over to Jammu and Kashmir. In 1935, fearing Russian expansionism, the British government acquired Gilgit-Baltistan under a 60-year lease. However, barely 12 years later, the territory was returned to Jammu and Kashmir. It was August 1, 1947 and independence and partition were just a fortnight away.
The Pakistani view of Gilgit-Baltistan is that its people wanted to join Pakistan and, more importantly, that it had never really accepted being part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. There was a revolt soon after independence from Britain. On November 1, 1947, the state formed its own government, which promptly announced accession to Pakistan.
Interestingly, several Indian commentators also agree that Gilgit-Baltistan, the northernmost territory administered by Islamabad, should not be linked to the Kashmir issue. Pakistan treats it very differently from the part of Kashmir that it administers, they say. They point out that while Pakistan-administered Kashmir has its own constitution, for example, Gilgit-Baltistan has been ruled mostly by executive fiat and until 2009, the region was simply called the Northern Areas.
All of this is true but back to history. The Gilgit-Baltistan revolt of November 1947 was led by a serving British officer, Major William Brown. Then commander of the Gilgit Scouts, he was left in post by the British even after they handed the territory back to to the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Maj Brown is still hailed as a liberator by the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
The view from Islamabad would have it that Gilgit-Baltistan’s revolt and accession to Pakistan was entirely indigenous, unlike in Kashmir and the two issues should not be linked.
It also seems clear that the revolt, after the British returned Gilgit-Baltistan was not merely a desire to accede to Pakistan. Perhaps the people found it unacceptable to be part of a princely state once again.
That the revolt was led by a serving British officer who had spent some years in this region, might even imply a semi-official acceptance by the British government of Gilgit-Baltistan’s decision to go with Pakistan.
But even if it doesn’t, the revolt certainly implies Maj Brown’s personal support for an uprising that he felt had popular support.
Going by this argument, India’s pique over the new China-Pakistan economic corridor is called into question.
Brig Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer
