What is the best way forward for Afghanistan?

Is the United States planning a military surge in Afghanistan? Shaukat Qadir has heard rumblings

A US marine patrols in a farmland area in southern Afghanistan. The US is seeking ways to clear the Taliban out of their strongholds in the region. AFP PHOTO/PATRICK BAZ

Judging by recent statements I have heard from the United States, an American military surge in Afghanistan seems like a real possibility.

First, a few words on the nature of conflict. It is a war between Afghanis who style themselves as freedom fighters against what they view as foreign invaders assisting a government they have installed.

This will not be a war of pitched battles, but of skirmishes, raids and ambushes. But wars are fought to be won, so what would constitute victory for the US?

In modern military campaigns, commanders define their maximum and minimum aims to achieve victory. In my opinion, the maximum aim would be to return Afghanistan to the state of a stable, secure country; and the minimum aim would be to return it to a state sufficiently secure and stable that the government can govern and its own agencies can maintain law and order.

If that is so, how does the US get there? Since America’s military experience is on foreign soil, they are indifferent to the concept of “winning hearts and minds”. Thus the use of the obscene term “collateral damage” for the innocent people they kill or maim.

If they have to achieve just the minimum aim, this time they have to win the hearts and minds of most Afghans.

Since they have spent the past decade and a half alienating the locals, this is a daunting task. The upside is that it’s still not impossible. The downside is that to try to succeed in this daunting task will result in increasing American casualties.

Foremost here is the requirement of good governance. Since Kabul’s writ is confined to its immediate surroundings, this will require the use of force. But it will have to be temperate and selective.

The use of intelligence will need to be intensified. But the vastly superior electronic intelligence capabilities of the US are of limited value in identifying targets. To American eyes, all assemblies where Afghans are armed seem threatening and therefore suspicious. Sensible safety measures require offensive pre-emption of all such assemblies. If hearts and minds are to be won, this will have to change. If it is changed, there will be more US casualties.

Therefore there is a need for old-fashioned human intelligence which, over the years, the CIA has become less proficient at and has resorted to outsourcing. But this is also likely to fail. The few Afghans who will take the risk of becoming domestic pariahs are those already at the fringes of society. Others may be double agents.

In support of governance, it is essential to have an efficient system of justice. No central or even provincial justice system in Afghanistan has ever had an outreach beyond towns and cities. Over time, it has disappeared from these, too.

Consequently, the only thing that will work will be the restoration of the age-old tribal/village jirgas (assemblies), with some kind of semi-official recognition.

The catch here is to find a leader and members for jirgas that are acceptable to locals. This has been tried, at least in some areas of southern Afghanistan; but with disastrous results.

The reason is that Americans tend to pick the first volunteer. The only ones who will volunteer are those who are apprehensive of tribal reprisal and/or aware that they will never make it to this position by their own right.

The risk here is that, if you pick the wrong guy, you will either alienate the rest of the tribe or be arming potential enemies.

The sole way forward will be to bring the enemy into mainstream politics like the United Kingdom finally did with the IRA. To do this, there will need to be a loya jirga (grand assembly). But it has to be a real one.

The art of negotiation, even coercive negotiation, is to use the strengths of the opposition against it. The Pashtun are egalitarian.

Not only the member of each tribe is equal, but each tribe, irrespective of numbers or strength, is equal. Therefore, a loya jirga is functional only if it invites all stakeholders. It can be done, but will it?

Brig Shaukat Qadir is a retired Pakistani infantry officer