The only strategy for Syria is that neither side wins

The best we can hope for, four years into this conflict, is that efforts be made to tamp down the killing on all sides, writes James Zogby

Bashar Al Assad’s regime operated for decades as a key partner in Iran’s regional axis. AP Photo

It should be clear after four bloody years in Syria that we can only move forward by shedding the illusions that have shaped the discussion.

It was inevitable that the conflict would morph into a proxy war between Iran and those who were deeply concerned by Iran’s hegemonic ambitions.

Despite the pretence that it is the “beating heart of Arabism”, Bashar Al Assad’s regime operated for decades as a key partner in Iran’s regional axis. Not only did it alienate the Gulf Arab countries, it stoked sectarian flames at home and in neighbouring Lebanon. Therefore, the argument that “all would have been different if only the US had supported the opposition earlier” rings hollow.

Calls for early US engagement ignored the reality. Those who assumed that the US merely had to supply more weapons to the opposition and that this would have tipped the scales, are mistaken. The Russians, who had been burnt by the US-led effort in Libya, were unwilling to lose another strategic asset to the West. Any increase in the opposition’s capacity to wage war against the regime, would only have accelerated Iranian and Russian support for their ally in Damascus.

Nor would more support for the Free Syrian Army have dissuaded others from taking the fight into an increasingly sectarian direction – the brutality of the Assad regime took care of that. Once this conflict began, it was preordained to become a sectarian, regional proxy war with a US-Russian overlay.

Those who have called for the US to become an active combatant, by establishing no-fly zones or humanitarian corridors, also ignored political realities. After an eight-year failed war in Iraq, the American public and military is weary and wary of any new engagements in the Middle East. In that setting, the US president and Congress (barring a few hawks) were loathe to commit to a new open-ended conflict. Those who advocated US military action could propose tactics, but they could not demonstrate how these added up to a winning strategy.

They also ignored the negative perceptions of the US in the Arab world. Zogby Analytics polling has consistently shown that the US rates extremely low in every country in the region (in many instances, lower than Iran). Some of America’s closest Arab allies have expressed opposition to any US-led military intervention in Syria.

From the outset, it should have been clear that once this conflict began, it would not easily end. Despite that, there were fantastical suggestions that one side could or should vanquish the other. The Assad regime demonised the opposition as “terrorists” who must, at all costs, be defeated. Meanwhile, opposition groups insisted that there could be no negotiations with the regime. This set up the conflict as a zero sum game. It’s true though that the US helped to create this mindset by declaring early on that “Assad must go”.

Mr Al Assad has undoubtedly lost legitimacy with many Syrians (although, it could be argued that he was probably never seen by them as legitimate) and that his brutal behaviour has further damaged his reputation. But a substantial body of Syrians, including urban elites, Christians, Alawites and other minority communities, continue to see Mr Al Assad as essential to their security because they fear the opposition more than they fear the Ba’ath regime.

Mr Al Assad’s Ba’ath party is an ossified and corrupt clique and his regime operates more like a military junta than a government. For its part, the opposition is dispersed and dysfunctional and includes too many armed, dangerously sectarian elements – not just the groups listed as terrorists.

It is important to recognise that Syrians are so deeply divided that there never could be unity as the result of a military solution. As the Lebanese learnt after 15 years of bloody civil war, the only solution was one that had “no victor and no vanquished”. In the end, hard compromises had to be made as sworn enemies agreed to accept a new formula for governance.

The best we can hope for, four years into this conflict, is that efforts be made to tamp down the killing on all sides. The Syrian Observatory records that both the regime and the opposition can take near even credit for the deaths of their countrymen. Those who defend the regime and point the finger of blame at the “terrorists” are wrong. They are ignoring the regime’s use of chemical weapons, barrel bombs and mass starvation. Those who defend the opposition groups ignore the horrors inflicted by ISIL, Al Qaeda and countless other out-of-control armed gangs.

This conflict includes elements of a civil war, a struggle to end a dictator’s rule, a regional proxy war and now a campaign against terrorist groups who have seized control of parts of the country. The way forward lies in addressing all of these while recognising that in the end the solution must be political.

Dr James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute

On Twitter: @aaiusa