Pakistan’s ‘cutting strike’ operation is really a blunt instrument

Manzar Zaidi looks at the battle to neutralise extremist groups in North Waziristan.

Pakistani troops in South Waziristan in 2009; North Waziristan is now their battlefield. Anjum Naveed / AP

The North Waziristan operation in Pakistan, named “Zarb e Azab” (literally, “sharp and cutting strike”), is underway, and is being celebrated by some in Pakistan as the mother of all battles against terrorists. This has all been heard before.

Pakistan has a chequered history with countering terrorism, whereby militancy would incrementally escalate in a village or a small region, and little or nothing would be done to resist it by the local administration.

When things seemed to be getting worse, either a hastily conducted military operation would cause a blowback or negotiations would ensue, just like before this latest operation. This approach provided time and opportunities for terrorists in the short-term: they could reradicalise their community, relocate and retrench.

Then there is the problem of the diversity of groups in North Waziristan. It is said to be home to the so called “pro-state” factions like the Gul Bahadur and (late) Mullah Nazir groups, which vacillate between hostility and an uneasy truce with the Pakistani state, and the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) militants.

The area has long been said to host the Haqqani network, which has ostensibly played an intermediary role between the pro- and anti-state groups. Roving bands of Uzbeks, Chechens, Uighirs and even a few Europeans crop up as allies of one group or the other, usually against the Pakistani state. Their most recent appearance is in the form of the Khorasan group, which appears to be an Al Qaeda affiliate.

Pakistan has long denied claims by Americans that the Haqqanis are in the area. Gul Bahadur’s group started preparing for terrorist operations against the state if it ever invaded North Waziristan, which obviously Pakistan has done now.

When Mullah Nazir was killed by a drone strike in 2013 there were angry rumblings from the group, but it seems that an uneasy truce has somehow prevailed. Just recently, TTP declared that Mullah Nazir allied militants helped Pakistanis recapture Adnan Rashid, the Taliban leader who had been freed by a terrorist assault on Bannu Jail in 2012.

It is unlikely that the “pro-state” groups will be engaged within the ambit of the operation, as this would potentially open up more fronts than the army can engage with.

“Pakistan has to engage the groups that commit terrorism out rightly against the state,” says Khawaja Khalid Farooq, ex-head of Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority.

“Unfortunately, North Waziristan has historically become a nucleus of many other militant entities, and it’s not wise to engage all these disparate groups all at once, especially if they are not attacking the country. Separate solutions have to be found for displacement of these groups,” he adds.

It may not be that easy. There have been many media reports in Pakistan about mass relocations of militant groups outside the area, since the operation has been in the offing now for some time.

The deadly TTP has decentralised into a cell-based network that is much harder to detect and engage with. Apparently, much of the command and control structure of TTP has also relocated to urban centres in Karachi and South Punjab. Just recently, there were police-led operations in the Malir area of Karachi against terrorists, which is one indicator that these groups are entrenched in Karachi.

The military operation is likely to neutralise some cadres and commanders, while clearly many other heads of the terrorist hydra continue to thrive elsewhere

Zarb e Azab is not an easy operation to conduct. The Pakistani Taliban use a combination of territorial control and flexible guerrilla tactics while holding a swathe of territory, sending roving groups to secure areas further afield and terrorise local populations.

On the other hand, the garrisoned Pakistani security forces have to fight for every inch of ground gained, and obviously cannot emulate Taliban’s terror tactics.

That is probably one of the reasons why the state resorts to displacement of local populations, which has the unfortunate consequence of exacerbating the already problematic refugee issue.

One man who travelled from Hassokhel near Mir Ali in North Waziristan to Bannu with his five children, described his woes: “There is no proper arrangement for food and water, and my youngest daughter nearly died of fatigue and sickness on the way,” he says.

The long queues for rations at hastily set up and under resourced camps will not help either, and subsequent relocation would be a huge issue. It may be too soon to start celebrating the success of the latest military operation in ­Pakistan.

Manzar Zaidi is a security analyst and academic