The West is placing its hopes in Syrian tribes to stop ISIL. In an attempt to replicate the success of the so-called tribal “awakening councils” that routed Al Qaeda in Anbar, Iraq, the US unveiled in March a grand strategy to train as many as 5,400 Syrian tribesmen per year in Jordan. The Pentagon revealed last week that the $500 million training programme has so far attracted only 60 tribesmen.
Admitting that the number was “smaller than we hoped for,” US defence secretary Ashton Carter has expressed optimism over the 7,000 Syrian tribesmen currently being vetted for training. Washington and its Arab allies should not hold their collective breath.
For behind the failure of the training lies an important lesson: Syria is not Iraq and Syrian tribes are far from the sons of Anbar.
The biggest difference between Syrian and Iraqi tribes has its roots in the nature of the Saddam Hussein and Hafez Al Assad regimes. While Saddam actively recruited tribal support, Assad worked fiercely to undermine them.
A second difference lies in the conflict itself. Unlike Iraq, Syrian tribes were bitterly divided by their country’s conflict, each clan and family branch joining one of the dozens of groups.
Activists were quick to court Syrian tribes, with local coordination committees urging sheikhs in June 2011 to join their movement.
Likewise, Damascus was quick to pressure tribal leaders to publicly denounce the protesters as “criminals”.
The duelling pressures resulted in a split – with several tribes forming the opposition Syrian Tribal Council and the pro-Assad clans gathering under the Syrian homeland banner.
The divisions could be seen in the response of tribes to Jordan’s offer of assistance in arms. Within days of pledges by King Abdullah in June to arm and support Syrian tribes, a coalition of tribes in Damascus refused the help, accusing Jordan of sponsoring “terrorism”. A day later, tribes under the umbrella of the opposition welcomed the help.
Syria’s tribal divisions even run along jihadist lines. While Iraq’s Sunni tribes have had a confrontational relationship with jihadist groups, many Syrian tribes have actively joined them to settle old tribal feuds.
After the Abu Jamel tribe of Deir Al Zour joined the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Al Nusra in mid-2013, its rival Al Bikr tribe pledged its allegiance to ISIL. Clashes have continued to erupt between the rivals since.
Perhaps the biggest factor separating Iraqi and Syrian tribes is their response to violence.
While ISIL’s slaughter of more than 400 members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Mosul in November 2014 only galvanised tribal opposition, a massacre of 700 members of the Sheitat tribe in Deir Al Zour in August 2014 silenced tribes in the region. No Syrian tribe in that area has moved or spoken out against ISIL since.
Iraq’s Sunni tribes have been reaching out to their Syrian neighbours, in an attempt to build a coalition against ISIL to seal off the porous borders between their two countries – cutting off the extremist group’s vital supply lines.
The coalition has a historic – and familial – precedence. The Tay tribe in Hassakeh, Syria, stretches all the way to Mosul, while several Anbar tribes, including the Dulaim clan can be found in south-east Syria. The Jubour tribe lies on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border.
Yet after hours upon hours of deliberations in five-star hotel lobbies in Amman and in Bedouin tents along the Iraqi-Syrian frontier, Iraqi tribes have walked away with a lesson the West has yet to learn.
Syrian tribes cannot be counted on. They remain fractured, slow moving and unable to organise their followers.
As one frustrated Iraqi tribal said after the collapse of talks: “Syrian tribes cannot get their followers to walk in a straight line.”
One day, Washington and its allies may come to the same conclusion. Until then, tribes will remain the fool’s gold of Syria.
Taylor Luck is a political analyst and journalist in Amman
