US isn’t as smart or powerful as the Arab world thinks it is

Two big myths are distorting Arab perceptions of what the US does in the Middle East, and why.

People in the West are still mystified by the Arab world, as I attempted to demonstrate in my 2012 book Arab Voices: What They Are Saying and Why It Matters.

And without real understanding, public discourse and policy debates in the West are too often informed by crude myths and negative stereotypes about the culture, people, and politics of the Middle East and North Africa.

Much the same is true in reverse. Having just returned from the Middle East, I continue to be struck by how much of the Arab world’s political discussion about US policy is myth-based.

Two persistent myths influence Arab perceptions about why and how America does what it does in the world. The first is that Arab Americans think America is smart – that we know what we are doing and intend the consequences that our actions create.

The other myth is that America is all-powerful and can do almost anything – so when the US takes an action and makes a mess, or does not act, there must be a reason.

Both of these myths are ill-founded and dangerous. Ill-founded because, to be honest, we aren’t that smart and, therefore, sometimes blunder. And dangerous because they have all too often given birth to fantastic conspiracy theories as a way of making sense of the disastrous consequences of US policy.

Both myths are on full display in many current analyses of US policies towards Egypt and Syria.

In the case of Egypt, one line of thought begins with “America supported the Muslim Brotherhood” and goes on to argue that the US saw (or hoped for) the creation of a “Sunni crescent” in the Middle East as a check against Iran and its allies.

As evidence, some point to the fact that President Barack Obama recognised the elected Muslim Brotherhood president, Mohamed Morsi, and continued US aid to Egypt after Mr Morsi took power.

Adherents of this view also note that in the lead-up to the Tamarrod protests, the US ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson, addressing a public gathering, discouraged demonstrations. She suggested that activists should instead strengthen opposition political parties for the next election. And a few days later, Ms Patterson visited Muslim Brotherhood headquarters.

Then, after the military deposed Mr Morsi, the US did not immediately embrace the transition. Instead Washington sent a high-ranking official to urge reconciliation and compromise. Case closed.

The reality, however, was far more complex. One the one hand, it was entirely reasonable for the US to try to work with the elected government of the largest and most strategically significant Arab country.

America has important interests to protect in the region and sees peace, stability, and progress in Egypt as vital to those interests. It might also be seen as reasonable that a US official would caution against potentially destabilising demonstrations and, after the military action of July 3, to urge the parties to seek accommodation and restore civil order.

Fault can reasonably be found, however, with the US intelligence services, for failing to understand the depth of Egyptians’ frustration with and alienation from the Morsi government.

As difficult as all this is to accept for those who would rather comfort themselves with conspiracy theories, America did not have a clue what was going on in Egypt.

Myths have also become widespread about the plan to bomb Syria. In that case we saw not the “America is smart” myth but rather the “America is all-powerful” myth.

I have heard too many members and supporters of the Syrian opposition express the conviction that America could, if it wanted to, “take out” Bashar Al Assad in a final way. These people were disappointed that the US intended only to teach the Assad regime a lesson.

But it was never on the cards that America would play the determining role. That expectation was simply not reality-based.

This president was hesitant to act without support from UN, or at the very least Nato. Even the US military was not supportive. And in the dysfunctional, hyper-partisan world of US politics, the Congress would have eaten Mr Obama alive had he bucked their will and gone to war without their agreement. The war-weariness of the American people is another important restraint.

The premise that the US should “just help the Syrian opposition win” ignores the question “then what?” It is clear that the deeply fractured opposition cannot govern, at least not now. So who would stabilise the country after the fall of the regime? The US public will not tolerate a new occupation, and I don’t see any other country stepping in.

When the “all powerful” myth didn’t play out, conspiracy theories ran wild: “America merely wants the war to continue, to bleed Iran” or “America wants the regime to stay, because they fear Al Qaeda more than they dislike Al Assad”, or “because that’s what Israel wants”.

The US is powerful, but reality imposes limits on that power. And American policymakers are smart, but they do make mistakes.

In this context, I shudder when I hear some Arabs and Americans say “I wish we had Bush back, he never hesitated to act on his beliefs” – forgetting the absolute ruin George W Bush left after he thoughtlessly used power in a way that ignored reality.

Both Egypt and Syria are unique and unprecedented challenges to the US and the region. Each poses real problems for policymakers. And it is better to see those problems in the clear light of day than to view them through a lens distorted by myths.

James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute

On Twitter: @aaiusa