The challenge in the ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran is not confined to the substance of the issues under discussion. It extends more fundamentally to the question of representation.
The absence of Gulf nations – among the actors most directly affected by the outcome – does not merely constitute a procedural gap. It raises deeper questions about whether any resulting arrangement can adequately reflect the complexity of regional security dynamics.
At present, the US is operating within a strategic framework focused on containing escalation and avoiding a broader regional conflict. Washington’s priority is risk management rather than structural transformation. For its part, Iran is seeking to preserve a degree of strategic flexibility that allows it to maintain and expand its regional influence without triggering direct confrontation. Between these two approaches, a negotiating logic emerges that prioritises what is most urgent to the primary actors – most notably the nuclear file.
Yet this prioritisation carries significant implications for the Gulf region. Issues that lie at the core of Gulf security concerns – such as missile capabilities, proxy networks and maritime security – risk being treated as secondary or deferred altogether. The problem is not simply that these issues may be excluded from formal agreements, but that such exclusion can effectively expand the space in which they operate.
In this sense, any potential agreement is unlikely to eliminate tensions as much as reorganise them within manageable parameters. What is likely to emerge is a form of managed de-escalation: a reduction in the risk of large-scale conflict, accompanied by the persistence of lower-intensity, longer-term pressures. This form of stability may reduce immediate risks, but it introduces a different kind of strategic environment – one that requires continuous management rather than definitive resolution.
Within such a framework, the question of security guarantees becomes particularly complex. Guarantees that are not shaped through the direct participation of those they are intended to protect are inevitably conditioned by broader strategic calculations. For the US, this may involve limiting military exposure. For regional actors, it may reflect deterrence considerations. The result is a potential mismatch between the scale of the challenges on the ground and the robustness of the guarantees provided.
The implications extend beyond the immediate outcomes of any agreement to the rules such agreements establish. Major diplomatic understandings do not simply address crises; they define what is considered acceptable behaviour and what can be managed within certain thresholds. Without meaningful Gulf participation in shaping these norms, there is a risk that emerging arrangements may not fully align with the region’s specific security requirements.
In this context, any understanding that does not sufficiently reflect Gulf concerns or interests may result in a shift in which part of the burden of managing regional balances falls upon the Gulf itself – even in the absence of direct involvement in the negotiation process. This reflects not only a redistribution of responsibilities, but also a reconfiguration of how risk is allocated within the regional system.
At the same time, these challenges do not preclude opportunities. The negotiating process, despite its limitations, may open space for more inclusive approaches to regional security.
Expanding dialogue, strengthening co-ordination mechanisms and building broader frameworks that incorporate the perspectives of all affected actors could help mitigate some of these structural imbalances. Gulf nations, in this regard, retain significant agency through the continued development of their national and collective strategies, as well as through diversified partnerships.
Ultimately, the future of regional stability will not be shaped outside the Gulf, but through it and in connection with it. The central challenge is to ensure that Gulf nations are active participants in shaping that future, rather than actors primarily tasked with adapting to its outcomes.
The issue, therefore, is not only the absence of Gulf nations from the negotiating table, but the possibility that the results themselves may take shape in the absence of their perspective.
